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Portrait of José María Leyva (Cajeme), taken while he was  under arrest. National 
Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution NAA: 81-7675.
Introduction
While traveling through Sonora in April 1887, a reporter from the Tucson 
Daily Citizen witnessed the public execution of Cajeme, one of Mexican his-
tory’s  great enigmas.1 José María Leyva, as he was less commonly known, 
had been born to Yaqui Indian parents and raised in the Yaqui village of 
Ráum in southern Sonora, but lived much of his life in another world en-
tirely. Shortly  after the young Leyva and his  father returned from Gold 
Rush– era California having failed to strike it rich, his parents made the no 
doubt difficult decision to entrust their son to Prefect Cayetano Navarro of 
nearby Guaymas. It was at this moment that Leyva left his Yaqui home for 
what appears to have been the last time. In Guaymas he began his educa-
tion, supplementing the smattering of En glish he had learned in California 
by learning to read, write, and speak Spanish. He completed his studies at 
the age of eigh teen and left Guaymas literate, trilingual, and well traveled—
in other words, a very aty pi cal Yaqui. At some point during his residence in 
Guaymas, however, he had evidently ceased to identify himself as such.
Rather than return to his village, Leyva entered into a period of aimless-
ness, joining, then abandoning, the military repeatedly, briefly apprentic-
ing with a blacksmith, and working in a mine for a short period of time  until 
drifting back to Sonora around 1861. Upon his return, he learned that the 
Mexican government was in the pro cess of putting down the latest in a string 
of Yaqui uprisings. He immediately, and inexplicably, enlisted in the expe-
ditionary force sent to quell the rebellion. They succeeded and then dis-
banded. From  there, Leyva drifted around Sonora with no stable occupation 
 until 1867, when he again enlisted in the military following reports of yet 
another Yaqui uprising. This latest campaign was especially violent, culmi-
nating in the so- called Bácum Massacre, in which 120 Yaquis lost their 
lives when a church Mexican soldiers  were using as a makeshift prison for 
some 450 captives mysteriously went up in flames. It is remembered, to this 
day, as one of the darkest chapters in Yaqui history.2
Why Leyva took up arms against his own  people during this period is 
an intriguing unknown, though it has been the subject of speculation. It has 
been argued, for example, that since he had had virtually no contact with 
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the Yaquis since departing for Guaymas he prob ably no longer felt rooted 
in his Yaqui heritage, if he ever had in the first place.3 Opportunism also 
cannot be discounted as a possibility. His acquaintance with the Yaqui 
language placed Leyva on the fast track within the Sonoran military estab-
lishment, providing opportunities available to few enlistees, opportunities 
that must have seemed attractive given his perpetual lack of occupational 
stability. What ever his motivations may have been, Leyva quickly distin-
guished himself as a respected Indian fighter and a dependable member of 
the local militia. In 1874, Sonoran governor Ignacio Pesqueira handpicked 
Leyva for the post of alcalde mayor of the Yaqui River valley, charging him 
with the governorship of the lands encompassing the Yaquis’ eight pueblos 
with the expectation that Leyva would help pacify his  people.4 Leyva ap-
parently made quite a bit of pro gress in his new post, with the creation of a 
regional tax system, a commercial market that connected the Yaquis with 
outsiders, and a more refined system of local government on his list of ac-
complishments. But for reasons that are not entirely clear, Leyva ultimately 
vacated his government post and traded his Spanish name for Cajeme, which 
in the Yaqui language translates as “he who does not drink,” a name attrib-
utable to his habit of drinking  water only once a day, at four in the after-
noon, as a form of self- discipline. He then seized control, through infamously 
violent means, of the eight Yaqui pueblos, and, from  there, directed one of 
the largest indigenous uprisings in North American history. Cajeme’s objec-
tive, put simply, was to win Yaqui in de pen dence from Mexico, and he had 
what the Mexican military estimated to be between 4,000 and 5,000 Yaqui 
soldiers— organized into cavalry, artillery, and infantry units and possess-
ing some 12,000 firearms— backing him up as he attempted to establish 
control of the Yaqui River valley.5
Mexican soldiers sent to quell the rebellion found Cajeme to be surpris-
ingly elusive. In fact, some Mexican authorities began to question  whether 
he existed at all. As one Mexican soldier put it, “He seemed to be an imagi-
nary being, invisible, a myth created by the fantasy of his  people.” 6 More 
pragmatic military officials, meanwhile,  were predicting that the cunning 
and crafty Yaqui leader would most likely try to disguise himself and head 
for the U.S.- Mexico border.7 Cajeme managed to remain at large  until 1887, 
when an Indian spotted him just outside of Guaymas and notified the mili-
tary. When fi nally ferreted out of hiding, he reportedly put up no strug gle 
and, at least according to one account, appeared relieved. The Mexican mil-
itary transported Cajeme by ship to the Yaqui River valley and paraded 
him through the streets of the tribe’s vari ous pueblos to erase any doubt that 
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he had been apprehended and would be executed. His “tour” ended in 
Cócorit. Sonora’s governor at the time, Ramón Corral, allowed Cajeme to 
visit with friends,  family, and even the general public while awaiting exe-
cution. Corral was apparently so taken with Cajeme that he went on to 
become the Yaqui leader’s first biographer. He would characterize him as 
not the stuff of myth, but “a man of medium height, slim but not skinny, 
with an astute smile on his wide mouth, friendly and good- natured and com-
municative as few Indians are.” 8
 After Cajeme’s execution, the aforementioned reporter from the Tucson 
Daily Citizen watched as a grieving Yaqui approached the tree against which 
Cajeme was felled and affixed to it a small cross containing the inscription 
“INR, aque [sic] fallecio General Cajeme, Abril 23, 1887, a los 11 y 5 la ma-
ñana.” The abbreviation INR is Latin for Jesus of Nazareth, King. Among at 
least some of the Yaqui  people, Cajeme was akin to a deity.9 Among his en-
emies, however, he personified a disturbing conviction, one deeply held by 
indigenous  peoples across the Amer i cas: that only Indians should govern 
Indians. It is this conviction that forms the heart of the pres ent study. A re-
lentless insistence on po liti cal and cultural autonomy became a fundamen-
tal component of indigenous identity virtually from the moment of Eu ro pean 
contact, and this impulse remained just as acute even  after geopo liti cal bor-
ders coalesced, gained international recognition, and gave rise to power ful, 
omnipresent nation- states.  These nation- states had as their primary objec-
tive the smothering of any and all competing claims to sovereignty within 
their borders, and indigenous  peoples, it turned out, tended to represent 
the biggest obstacle in  these nationalizing proj ects. Stories of indigenous 
re sis tance in this context are extraordinarily common. Less common, how-
ever, are stories of indigenous re sis tance in a transnational context, or stories 
of Indian  peoples challenging, subverting, capitalizing upon, or just plain 
ignoring any geopo liti cal border that sought to contain, neutralize, and 
ultimately extinguish their own nationalistic aspirations. And stories of 
Indian  peoples winning  these contests, as the Yaquis ultimately would, are 
even fewer and farther between.
 Under Cajeme, or from roughly 1875 through 1887, the Yaquis entered 
into a  bitter and violent bid for in de pen dence that displaced and nearly de-
stroyed the tribe. It was akin to blowing on a dandelion clock: the Yaquis, 
like seed- bearing spores, scattered aimlessly in all directions, entering into 
a period of dormancy while awaiting the opportunity to flower. They be-
came, in the words of the anthropologist Edward Spicer, “the most widely 
scattered  people in North Amer i ca,” thinly and precariously settled from 
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central and southern Arizona and California all the way down to the Yuca-
tán Peninsula.10 In hindsight, however, it appears that Cajeme did the Yaquis 
more of a ser vice than many would have predicted during  those tumultu-
ous years. He helped reawaken and reinvigorate a once- powerful national-
ist impulse that had waned somewhat among the Yaquis in the years leading 
up to the late nineteenth- century cycle of rebellion. And although the re-
bellion  under Cajeme had wide- ranging consequences, when the dust fi nally 
settled the Yaquis  were in a much better position to bargain with Mexican 
authorities in their push for the greatest degree of Yaqui autonomy pos si-
ble, an opportunity they did not hesitate to seize. Once it was safe to come 
out of hiding, a portion of the tribe negotiated its return to the Yaqui River 
valley, and thereafter maintained at least a precarious peace with Mexican 
authorities. Other Yaquis, meanwhile, looked to the United States for ref-
uge during and in the immediate wake of the tumultuous Cajeme years, 
founding what would become a series of vital transborder communities, one 
of which would ultimately gain official sanction as an “American” Indian 
reservation despite the fact that the tribe originated in Mexico. Over the 
course of the twentieth  century, the tribal  whole would work  toward not 
only forging transborder ties in order to link  these far- flung settlements, but 
also reconstituting the Yaqui nation. It was an unusual strategy for over-
coming seemingly insurmountable obstacles in maintaining po liti cal cohe-
sion and cultural continuity. Not surprisingly, other tribes inhabiting the 
border region hit upon a similar strategy, with some even enjoying a simi-
lar degree of success.
While the Mexican government waged war on the Yaquis during the 
latter years of the nineteenth  century, the U.S. government waged a war of 
a dif fer ent sort on Kickapoo Indians living in Oklahoma. They became one 
of many targets of the government’s ill- fated 1887 General Allotment Act, 
designed to hasten the Indians’ assimilation by undercutting their more tra-
ditional land use practices, or by dividing communally held reservation 
lands into private plots. As in the Yaqui case, many Kickapoos responded 
to this assault on their autonomy by simply crossing the border. Kickapoos 
had been migrating to Mexico since at least the 1820s, arriving in a succes-
sion of waves for a variety of reasons. The Mexican government, looking to 
bolster defenses along its northern periphery, typically welcomed  these mi-
grants, gave them land, and even guaranteed their right to speak their own 
language and maintain their distinctive culture. Still, the population of 
Kickapoos in Mexico fluctuated wildly for much of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries as Kickapoo bands traveled back and forth between 
Introduction 5
Mexico and Oklahoma. At one point Mexico boasted a Kickapoo population 
of several thousand, at another point less than twenty. Gradually, however, 
the tribe solidified and legitimized its transnational orientation. As in the 
Yaqui case, what began as a last- gasp effort to maintain tribal cohesion 
and cultural continuity evolved into an utterly new way of life, though not 
one without unique pitfalls.11
The U.S.- Mexico border has also profoundly affected the Tohono O’odham 
tribe of southern Arizona and northern Sonora, though in a dif fer ent way. 
In contrast to the Yaqui and Kickapoo cases, the Tohono O’odham’s division 
by the U.S.- Mexico border was not the result of  either voluntary or forced 
migration, but of  simple geographic orientation. Essentially, the 1853 Gads-
den Purchase, which added the far southern portions of the present- day 
states of New Mexico and Arizona to U.S. territory, cut the Tohono O’odham 
in two, leaving a portion on the U.S. side and a portion on the Mexican side.12 
Like the Yaquis and Kickapoos, the O’odham often jumped at the chance to 
capitalize on borderlands dynamics. At the turn of the  century, the O’odham 
entered the cash economy, laboring on both Mexican and American ranches, 
plantations, and mines. More long- standing subsistence patterns, however, 
gradually fell by the wayside. The O’odham quickly slid into a pattern of 
de pen dency on both sides of the border, with  little holding the two halves 
of the tribal  whole together. Then in 1916, concerned U.S. officials created 
a formal reservation for the tribe. While a protected land base might seem 
like a good  thing, the reservation symbolized a kind of compartmentaliza-
tion of the O’odham, or a tacit recognition that  there  were now two kinds 
of O’odham: “American” and “Mexican.” In short, the reservation ultimately 
fostered a sense of displacement on both sides of the border despite the fact 
that the tribe had not actually moved. However, although the O’odham may 
appear to have come up short as nation builders when examined alongside 
the Yaquis and Kickapoos, the fact is that they emerged with their collec-
tive identity, many of their traditional lifeways, and a respectable (although 
vastly reduced) portion of their ancestral land base intact. Even O’odham 
residing south of the border who  were being forced to endure what the his-
torians Andrae Marak and Laura Tuennerman characterized as a “massive 
assault” on their ancestral lands by non- Indians could not be purged of their 
O’odham identity.13 Regardless, for at least a few de cades  after the border’s 
advent, the O’odham, like the Yaquis and Kickapoos, would successfully use 
it to at least their economic advantage. For a variety of reasons, however, 
the win dow of time in which they  were able to do so would be frustratingly 
narrow. Put simply, it would not take long for the United States and Mexico 
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to step up their bureaucratic presence in the border region and attempt to 
more meaningfully manage transborder traffic. While the Yaquis and Kick-
apoos proved to be remarkably  adept at navigating  these changes, the 
O’odham often seemed to be surviving in spite of, rather than  because of, 
the existence of the international boundary.
Still, for much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, his-
torical parallels between the three groups are easy to locate. Spurred to 
action by unremitting assaults on their sovereignty, each developed a coun-
terstrategy that included, first and foremost, exploiting U.S.- Mexico border-
lands dynamics, a strategy that they carefully expanded and refined over 
time. For  these Indians, border crossings became acts of “creative defiance,” 
as the historian Oscar Martínez phrased it in a more general discussion of 
what he termed “border  people.” Such crossings  were a way to capitalize— 
economically, po liti cally, and culturally—on a po liti cal line of demarcation 
created without their consent (and in some cases without their knowledge), 
but one that nonetheless held a tremendous amount of promise. Like Ca-
jeme,  these Indians gradually grew  adept at moving between an array of 
individual and group identities and ethnic and cultural worlds, all the while 
maintaining a specific indigenous identity and a nationalistic agenda. Border 
crossings, then, enabled  these Indians to strike a balance between asserting 
their sovereignty and maintaining their anonymity.14
Along the U.S.- Mexico border alone  there are a host of indigenous groups 
that have assumed a transnational orientation in response to pressures at 
home, including the Mixtecos, Zapatecos, Triquis, Otomíes, Purépechas, 
 Cocopahs, Kumeyaays, and Nahuas, among  others.15 Furthermore, similar 
pro cesses continue to play themselves out not just along the U.S.- Canada 
border, but essentially anywhere tribal and nonstate  peoples have chal-
lenged the authority of nation- states to restrict their movements and dictate 
their national loyalties. Formal international bound aries have histori-
cally been notorious for inviting the creation of transborder networks that 
enable and even encourage transnational interaction. Such was the case with, 
for example, the Baluchis, divided by the borders of Iran, Af ghan i stan, and 
Pakistan, or the Kurds, divided by the borders of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The 
Yaquis and Tohono O’odham, incidentally, could easily be added to this list 
in that while they technically belong to a nation- state, they nonetheless 
continue to harbor the sense of being a  people apart.16
But the stories contained herein are not merely case studies of individu-
als, families, and/or communities struggling to adapt to the real ity of geo-
po liti cal borders while also attempting to capitalize on  those same borders. 
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Focusing primarily on the three groups of border Indians discussed above— 
the Yaquis of Sonora/Arizona, the Kickapoos of Texas/Coahuila, and the 
Tohono O’odham of Sonora/Arizona— this book highlights moments when 
 these  peoples began, in a sense, nation building in the U.S.- Mexico border-
lands. Although their transnational orientation complicated this pursuit 
considerably, it also, serendipitously enough, made its realization far more 
likely. Near- constant movement on a transnational scale kept  these indig-
enous groups beyond the po liti cal and cultural purview of each of the 
nation- states within which they resided (or to which they migrated), ex-
empted them, in many cases, from detrimental Indian policy currents on 
both sides of the border, and, above all, helped them maintain a mea sure 
of anonymity, which allowed them both the physical and ideological space 
within which to enact their own vision of nationhood. The resultant trans-
border settlements, some of which non- Indians initially viewed as  little 
more than refugee camps or way stations, gradually became officially sanc-
tioned, durable, and dynamic centers of indigenous life.
The use of the U.S.- Mexico border as a strategy for group survival, and 
ultimately group expansion, required the ability to identify and capitalize 
on holes in the immigration system (which  these groups often had a pen-
chant for locating) and the audacity and vigilance to confidently assert their 
 legal privileges as indigenous  peoples, privileges that both the United States 
and Mexico  were morally obligated, if not treaty- bound, to re spect.  Doing 
so helped them carve out a unique (and uniquely  legal) position for them-
selves within the borders of both the United States and Mexico, a position 
from which they negotiated,  little by  little, an almost staggering degree of 
autonomy. This is a remarkable feat even in the arena of transnational his-
tory, where stories of displacement and survival are the norm. One scholar 
defined “transnationalism” as “a pro cess through which mi grants cross in-
ternational bound aries and synthesize two socie ties in a single social field, 
linking their country of origin with their country of immigration.”17 Far 
more improbable, however, is the endeavor of nation building across extant 
international bound aries.
Re orienting one’s perspective within  these indigenous nations, then, al-
lows one to approach  these three groups’ histories as might a historian of 
foreign policy or international diplomacy. Native  peoples  were no strang-
ers to external relations with Eu ro pean powers prior to the advent of the 
United States and Mexico. Add other indigenous groups to the mix, and 
 Indian diplomacy assumes a complexity that would baffle even established 
nation- states as they attempted to navigate the world stage. However, the 
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temptation has long been to regard Indian history as, in the words of the 
historian Donald Fixico, “a special or exotic subfield” or “a minority his-
tory of less importance.” Yet even a cursory look at  these three groups re-
veals that they  were far from “internal subjects.” Instead, they consistently 
displayed a determination to assert some form of control over foreign rela-
tions, often with surprising degrees of success.18 Rather than pres ent  these 
Indians as variables moving within a larger transnational system, then, 
this book inverts this formulation and demonstrates that the Indian  peoples 
examined herein envisioned their own system, a system within which both 
the U.S. and Mexican governments, and neighboring Indian nations for that 
 matter,  were but variables.
Thus, more than simply being a line on a map, the U.S.- Mexico border 
affected and still affects individual and group pro cesses of identity con-
struction and retention in profound ways. Traversing the physical border 
often meant traversing less tangible classification systems. The indigenous 
 peoples discussed in this book experiment with countless combinations of 
identities— tribal versus pan- Indian, Mexican versus American, Mexican 
versus Indian, American versus Indian, along with a host of regional and 
intertribal identities— all the while maintaining an inherent and inalienable 
sense of Indianness fed by a desire for in de pen dent nationhood, one that 
was not often articulated but, as  will be shown, was always deeply felt. 
Although they did not boast borders that marked the landscape in as 
formidable a fashion as that separating the United States and Mexico, the 
conception of themselves as distinct po liti cal and cultural entities was no 
less acute. Writing about the Yaquis in the 1950s, one anthropologist ob-
served, “As pres ent Yaqui leaders conceive it, their government is for 
Yaquis only and is one which exists by virtue of a divine, or super natural, 
mandate.”19 It would prove difficult for both the United States and Mexico 
to argue with this brand of logic.
This book, then, examines in comparative fashion  these Indians’ experi-
ences as they strug gled to reconcile an indigenous vision of nationhood with 
that of two power ful, omnipresent nation- states. But it also highlights  those 
moments when the realities of international coexistence forced  these in-
digenous nations, like other transborder  peoples, to forfeit some of their 
hard- won autonomy, or to learn to share power with surrounding nation- 
states.  After all, maintaining one’s po liti cal isolation and unqualified sov-
ereignty in an increasingly interconnected world is no small task. Still, the 
surprising end to this story is that  these three groups managed to force 
two power ful nation- states to essentially redraw their borders, or to at least 
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rethink the real and  imagined limits of their own nationhood.20 What we 
are left with, then, is a distinctly dif fer ent North American  legal, po liti cal, 
and cultural milieu than  those typically proffered by historians, one in 
which nations and nation- states not only abut one another, but also over-
lap and interact from varying positions of power and with varying degrees 
of consequence. It is one in which “borderlands” appear more multidimen-
sional and less binary than the term “transnational” implies, since formal 
lines of demarcation, when viewed from the ground rather than on a map, 
all too often command  little, if any, re spect.21 Fi nally, it is one in which 
“nationhood” is, more often than not,  really in the eye of the beholder.
The larger U.S.- Mexico border region has long been a contested space and 
meeting place, even prior to the creation of the formal border. At dif fer ent 
moments during the colonial period, Spain, France, and  England all com-
peted for control of the region with both one another and the indigenous 
 peoples who called the region home. First explored by the Spanish during 
the sixteenth  century, the arc that came to be known as the Spanish Border-
lands, which reached from present- day Florida to present- day California, 
changed hands repeatedly as the fortunes of colonial powers and,  later, 
nation- states  rose and fell. Spanish, French, and British colonial powers 
came into increasingly regular contact in the region during the eigh teenth 
 century as the French expanded from the  Great Lakes region into the Mis-
sissippi River valley and as the British began their own exploration of and 
expansion into parts west and south. Thus began the often violent pro cess 
of staking territorial claims. The first to leave the region  were the French, 
who, at the end of the French and Indian War, forfeited their claims to Lou-
isiana, leaving the region temporarily in Spanish hands. The British con-
tinued pressing south and west, putting the Spanish on the defensive.  After 
gaining its in de pen dence from  England, the new United States continued 
the British tradition of contesting Spanish claims. Its efforts produced a slow 
but steady southward recession of the Spanish frontier. In the early nine-
teenth  century, Louisiana changed hands yet again, passing from Spanish 
to French hands, only to be sold to the United States shortly thereafter. The 
fact that France failed to specify the Louisiana Purchase’s exact bound aries, 
however, virtually assured continued conflict between the United States and 
Spain.22
The two nations settled the boundary dispute in 1819 by drawing a line 
of demarcation from the Sabine River in present- day Texas, north to the 
forty- second parallel, then west to the Pacific. Mexico’s in de pen dence from 
Spain in 1821 meant that the task of defending the northern frontier from 
10 Introduction
U.S. expansionist designs now fell to the nascent Mexican government, a 
task it was largely unprepared to undertake. Chaos reigned in the region 
from the early 1830s through the 1840s as the new nation was unable to 
forge a lasting peace with area Indians, and soon the northern third of 
Mexico degenerated into what one historian called a “vast theater of ha-
tred, terror, and staggering loss for in de pen dent Indians and Mexicans 
alike.” Chaos and instability, in turn, left the region vulnerable to the 
United States’ designs. Another blow for Mexico came in 1836, with Texas’s 
in de pen dence, then another in 1845, with Texas’s annexation by the United 
States. It was the U.S.- Mexican War of 1846–48 and the resultant Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo, however, that resulted in the most significant loss 
of land in Mexico’s history (the present- day American Southwest, which 
amounted to about half of its territorial holdings). The United States and 
Mexico took the last step in formalizing their boundary in 1853 with the 
Gadsden Purchase.  Because of worsening financial woes, coupled with a 
 great deal of pressure and intimidation emanating from Washington, the 
Mexican government sold southern sections of present- day New Mexico 
and Arizona to the U.S. government, which was then envisioning a poten-
tial route for a transcontinental railroad.23
It is impor tant to keep in mind that  those Indian groups situated closest 
to the border  were among  those borderlanders (and  there  were many) who 
 were not convinced that the retreat of Mexico’s northern frontier was com-
plete by 1853. Like every one  else in the region, they often contemplated how 
best to protect themselves and both their individual and collective agendas 
in such a volatile and unpredictable atmosphere, and  were sometimes moved 
to action. For example, writing to an American military officer in 1873, Chief 
John Horse from the “Seminole Wildcat Party,” which briefly lived along-
side the Kickapoos in Nacimiento, Coahuila, implored, “The [U.S.] Govern-
ment might take Mexico  every hour or minute and of course  will take all 
the land and General please let us know what we  shall do to keep our own.”24 
In the end, however, Chief John Horse’s fears proved unfounded. Although 
rumors of annexation schemes emanating from north of the border persisted 
 until the end of the nineteenth  century, and although Mexican officials 
would go so far as to query the U.S. State Department about  these rumors, 
the State Department would ultimately deny any hand in their fabrication 
and any knowledge of their origin. And although efforts to  either seize or 
purchase additional Mexican lands by  either filibusters or more formal 
agents of the U.S. government did not cease in 1853, the boundary between 
the two nation- states moved very  little in subsequent years.25
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With the formal border separating the United States and Mexico now 
drawn, the region entered into a new phase in its long history, one in which 
local populations began mounting challenges to the efforts of distant cen-
ters of power to dictate their national loyalties and confine them within 
seemingly arbitrary bound aries.  After all, though the United States and 
Mexico claimed owner ship of their respective sides of the border, much of 
the region was actively controlled by indigenous  peoples. This new trend 
produced what one scholar called a “confusion of identities” in the border-
lands. In other words, the border region had officially become a site where 
once- stable identities  were being “deterritorialized and renegotiated,” a pro-
cess that challenged and even undermined “culture, class, and region, as 
well as gender and nation.”26 But although the “confusion of identities” char-
acterization is apt, borders can and often do have the opposite effect. Some 
of the indigenous  peoples in this study  were drawn to the region only  after 
the United States and Mexico delineated the boundary between their 
national domains. It has not been unusual for indigenous  peoples living on 
the “periphery” of their own “core” to re- create and revitalize social and 
cultural norms in even far- flung and unfamiliar geographic contexts. In 
fact,  those living farthest from the group’s “traditional” core often prove the 
most determined to safeguard their indigenous identity, a trend that  will 
be brought into sharp relief in subsequent chapters.27
Similarly, while the border may often divide  peoples and places, it has 
also historically done the opposite.  After all, national borders do not always 
deliver on the promise of national sovereignty. As the historians Elaine 
Carey and Andrae Marak observed, while borders are indeed “contested 
spaces that divide  people, leading to the construction of seemingly distinct 
races, nationalities, genders, and cultural practices,” they also tend to “act 
as barriers across which social, po liti cal, cultural, and economic networks 
function.” Put simply, they very often create “nebulous spaces” that have 
the tendency to invite all manner of opportunism.28 Indeed, since the U.S.- 
Mexico border’s advent,  peoples, pro cesses, and phenomena have conspired 
to keep transnational channels open. Mines and military posts in Arizona, 
for example, relied on supplies and laborers from Sonora from the second 
half of the nineteenth  century on. In fact, a railroad connecting Sonora to 
Mexico City was not completed  until 1927. By that point a railroad had con-
nected Sonora and Arizona for over four de cades. Religious events, such as 
the annual fiesta of San Francisco in Magdalena, Sonora, drew an inter-
national crowd, including Indians from both sides of the border as well 
as Mexican mi grant workers, for much of the nineteenth and twentieth 
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centuries. Since mines and smelters on both sides of the border would of-
ten suspend operations for  these occasions to allow workers to attend, 
some Anglo- American workers even joined in the festivities. Wayward  cattle 
required transborder roundups, roundups in which local custom tended to 
trump the laws of the state. Law enforcement officials on both sides of the 
border often allowed one another to cross the border in the pursuit of al-
leged lawbreakers. To get around the illegality of such crossings, officials 
simply requested temporary leave prior to the transborder pursuit, thereby 
sidestepping international law. Thus, despite the efforts of distant policy-
makers to impose a national divide, borderlanders themselves gradually 
forged economic networks and local customs that defied all efforts to sever 
hard- won, and often surprisingly active, transnational networks. By the 
twentieth  century, then, many of the indigenous  peoples in this story  were 
moving on well- worn paths, paths between mines and fields, between 
ranches and smelters, even refugee pathways, all of which, sometimes 
coincidentally and sometimes not so coincidentally, traversed the interna-
tional boundary. In the pro cess, as this book  will demonstrate, many also 
managed to locate so- called regions of refuge within which to exercise 
individual and group autonomy in the state’s shadows, acting in defiance 
of not only the geopo liti cal boundary, but also the sovereign authority of two 
looming nation- states.29
But Indians  were not your ordinary border crossers. Scholarship on trans-
national  peoples and phenomena has all too often  either ignored the indig-
enous perspective or done  little to differentiate their experiences from  those 
of other immigrant groups and/or ethnic/cultural enclaves, and the result 
has been a diminution of their significance in  these debates. Certainly his-
torians need to pursue all manner of border crossers so that they might more 
fully appreciate how even ordinary individuals defied the authority of the 
state in shaping and reshaping the border region, but they also need to re-
main mindful that as far as Indian  peoples are concerned, Indians belong 
to nations, not shadowy enclaves. Defining “nation,” however, is no small 
task, as the rich body of lit er a ture devoted to this effort can readily attest. 
Crafting a definition that does not exclude  those po liti cal entities whose 
borders are not as tangibly delineated as  those of, for example, the United 
States and Mexico, has required a bit of scholarly creativity, and even schol-
arly license. Benedict Anderson, for one, famously defined the nation as an 
“ imagined po liti cal community” that is  imagined as both “inherently lim-
ited” and “sovereign.” It is  imagined in the sense that its members, although 
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rarely personally acquainted with one another, still foster a sense of collec-
tive communion with fellow members. It is limited in the sense that it has, 
in Anderson’s words, “finite, if elastic bound aries, beyond which lie other 
nations.” It is sovereign in that the concept came of age in a postdynastic 
era in  human, or at least Western, history. Fi nally, it is a community in the 
sense that its members tend to feel a kind of comradeship or fraternity that 
has made it pos si ble, again in Anderson’s words, “for so many millions of 
 people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.” 
Anderson also acknowledges the increasingly vis i ble phenomenon of what 
he calls “sub- nationalisms” within the borders of “old nations,” po liti cal en-
tities that not only challenge the dominant nationalistic impulse but also 
“dream of shedding [their] sub- ness one day.”30
Historians of Native Amer i ca, however, have tended to question the 
supposed “sub- ness” of competing nationalisms within “old nations.” As the 
historian Jeffrey Shepherd reminds us in his study of the Hualapai, for ex-
ample, “nations” need not “possess large populations, standing militaries, 
or bureaucratic states,” as one might assume, but “they do include literal 
and figurative bound aries and cultural borders, common origin stories, a 
 mother tongue, and the assertion of some superiority over surrounding 
groups.” In fact, employment of the “rhe toric of the nation” alone goes a 
long way in “gaining control over the cultural,  human, and natu ral resources 
of a  people and using them in ways that further the survival of that nation.” 
Similarly, in her history of Spanish colonial Texas, the historian Juliana Barr 
asserted that the “fluidity of native po liti cal configurations . . .  does not ne-
gate their structural integrity or the aptness of characterizing them as 
‘nations.’ ” Networks of kinship, for example, often proved robust enough to 
provide “the infrastructure for native po liti cal and economic systems” and 
to codify “both domestic and foreign relations.”31 And as a 2008 study con-
cluded, indigenous groups like the three discussed herein have had much 
in common with “other emergent and reemergent nations in the world” in 
that “they are trying to do every thing at once— self- govern effectively, build 
economies, improve social conditions, and strengthen culture and identity. 
They are engaged in nation building.”32 Yet nations can be difficult to 
identify, at least for outsiders. The historian Thomas Holt argued that “na-
tion” as a concept has much in common with “race” in that neither is “fixed 
in conceptual space”; both concepts are instead “in motion, their mean-
ings constructed, their natures pro cessual, their significance at any given 
moment  shaped by their historical context.” And it is not unusual for nations 
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to go through a pro cess of reinvention should the need arise to determine 
“who belongs and who does not, who defines the character of the nation 
and who is its antithesis.”33
Challenging the “sub- ness” of indigenous nationalisms in the face of “old” 
nationalisms is not a new trend in American Indian scholarship. In 1976, 
for example, the Yaqui specialist Edward Spicer presented a paper at a 
conference on border studies, held in El Paso, Texas, in which he argued 
that the era of the nation- state “has passed its period of ascendancy” in 
both scholarship and on the world stage. Its dominance, he concluded, “is 
being threatened by new forms of organ ization.” If one defines a nation on 
its most basic level, or, in Spicer’s words, as a collection of  people “who iden-
tify with one another on the basis of some degree of awareness of com-
mon historical experience,” then indigenous groups easily qualify. Indian 
groups, like nation- states, share a unique, common experience, with their 
own set of symbols that “stand for and evoke . . .  the sentiments which the 
 people feel about their historical experience.” Thus,  every modern state 
could be said to contain several or many nations. Spicer counted at least 
fifty in Mexico alone. A glance at an ethnographic map of that par tic u lar 
nation- state makes his point, showing a vast array of linguistic and cultural 
distinctions. In fact, to this day Mexico is peppered throughout with  peoples 
who speak neither Spanish nor En glish, instead still relying on indigenous 
languages such as Triqui, Mixtec, and Zapotec, which are among the 162 
“living languages” recognized by the Mexican government.34 In conceptu-
alizing the history of the Yaqui tribe, one of his specialties, Spicer admitted 
to mistakenly conceiving of Indian tribes and nation- states as two dif fer ent 
entities, both with fixed bound aries. “It only slowly dawned on me,” he re-
vealed, “that Yaqui bound aries  were fluctuating and that the lines on the 
ethnographic maps  were very misleading in many ways.” Compounding 
this prob lem was the fact that many Yaquis “accepted no border defined by 
mestizos.”35
Still, indigenous nationalism as a concept remains problematic. Utiliz-
ing a “borrowed” conceptual framework such as “nation,” one collection of 
scholars warned, could send the message that American Indian studies 
“cannot in de pen dently develop a core assumption or construct a model or 
paradigm based solely on internally generated information,” which could 
doom it to a life as a “tributary” field of history, sociology, po liti cal science, 
and so on. In short, it suggests that Indian studies “is not and prob ably 
cannot become a fully developed, autonomous discipline.” But more seri-
ously, it  saddles indigenous  peoples with a paradigm that fails to paint an 
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accurate picture of “the ways in which [they] act, react, pass along knowl-
edge, and connect with the ordinary as well as the super natural worlds.” 
Instead, it imagines Indians as being on a very specific, very narrow po liti-
cal trajectory, the destination of which cannot but be parity with non- 
Indian nations. It also supposes that Indians lacked that parity prior to 
contact with Eu ro pe ans.36
“Peoplehood” exists as an alternative. It is a conceptual framework that 
emphasizes the centrality of language, religion, land, and sacred history (or 
where they came from in a collective sense) in attempting to account for 
sets of social, cultural, po liti cal, economic, and ecological be hav iors among 
 peoples who are indigenous to par tic u lar territories. By eschewing modern 
po liti cal constructs and emphasizing instead ethnic sameness, peoplehood 
helps us more fully understand why modern indigenous nations, such as 
they exist, are so often built on a foundation of kin networks and village- 
level government, and also why native spirituality often figures so promi-
nently in indigenous notions of national belonging. Fi nally, peoplehood 
reminds us that, in the words of the aforementioned collection of scholars, 
“nations come and go, but  peoples maintain identity even when undergo-
ing profound cultural change.”37
The fact remains, however, that the language of nationhood has been a 
constant in Indian- white relations virtually from the point of contact. The 
application of the word “nation” in an official capacity to describe Indian 
groups both within and on the perimeters of U.S. borders goes back at least 
to the 1830s, when Chief Justice John Marshall famously characterized 
Indians groups as “domestic dependent nations.” Similarly, one can find 
similar references in Mexican government correspondence dating back to 
the earliest de cades of Mexican in de pen dence.38 In the twentieth  century 
especially, Indians and non- Indians alike on both sides of the border 
freely used the term. It is not unreasonable, then, to assume that Indians 
have gradually internalized the concept,  either adopting it  wholesale or 
adapting it to fit their own realities. As  will be shown, the indigenous  peoples 
in this story found the term “nation” to be a rather comfortable fit when 
fi nally forced to articulate their own conception of themselves. And it could 
be argued that the aforementioned four  factors of peoplehood— language, 
religion, land, and sacred history— help explain their determination to le-
gitimize claims to sovereignty via terminology that might not wholly apply 
to their historical experience and/or precise sense of rootedness. Like the 
non- Indians on their peripheries and/or in their midst,  these Indians’ phys-
ical terrain was gradually made meaningful through a history of religious, 
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cultural, socioeconomic, po liti cal, and military engagement that very of-
ten arose from and revolved around a sacred attachment to place.39
A distinction should be made, however, between the “ imagined” real ity 
of nationhood and the more tangible real ity of self- government. Nationhood, 
according to the historians Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford Lytle, “implies a 
pro cess of decision making that is  free and uninhibited within the commu-
nity, a community that is in fact almost completely insulated from external 
 factors as it considers its pos si ble options.” Self- government, on the other 
hand, “implies a recognition by the superior po liti cal power that some mea-
sure of local decision making is necessary but that this pro cess must be 
monitored very carefully so that its products are compatible with the goals 
and policies of the larger po liti cal power.” 40 For most Indian individuals and 
groups, self- government has by and large become the con temporary real-
ity, yet the conception of one’s group as something akin to a nation remains 
a central, transcendent component of indigenous identity. And while reduc-
ing the indigenous nationalistic impulse to something more “subnational” 
in character may be appropriate in some circumstances, especially given 
the real ity and seeming durability of modern geopo liti cal borders,  there are 
also circumstances in which indigenous  peoples have, in fact, managed to 
shed their “sub- ness” in a more “official” capacity. The most notable of  those 
circumstances is federal recognition, which, as  will be shown, the Yaquis 
and Kickapoos both vigorously pursued in the mid- to late twentieth  century 
in an attempt to carve out something more substantial than a mere “sub-
national” existence.
Federally recognized status, at least north of the border, affords Indians 
the opportunity to govern themselves in a more official capacity, with the 
(sometimes reluctant) sanction of neighboring communities and the sur-
rounding nation- state or states. Thus, federal recognition represents a sub-
stantial realization of the impulse  toward nationhood that is so prevalent 
in  these tribes’ histories. Yet it also involved making a difficult choice. While 
recognition by the U.S. government meant an affirmation of at least semi-
sovereign status for Indian groups, the pursuit of this status also meant ac-
knowledging the United States as an arbiter of authenticity, and the only 
arbiter at that. It also meant, by and large, a more constricted existence for 
Indian groups that have historically resisted being bounded within such 
narrow constructs. Federal recognition, then, could prove to be the prover-
bial double- edged sword, complicating, if not ending, hard- won patterns of 
transnational migration, while effectively dividing indigenous  peoples of 
similar cultural affinities, religious persuasions, and nationalistic convic-
Introduction 17
tions. But on the other hand, oftentimes the benefits of that status appeared 
worth the forfeiture of sovereignty, thus the dogged pursuit of a change in 
status under the U.S. government. In fact, federal recognition, as  will be 
shown, was often a last resort, a strategy improvised at a moment of crisis 
and designed to meet a shorter- term goal.
In examining moments of transnational indigenous nation building, it is 
impor tant to remain mindful of the strategies employed by both the U.S. 
and Mexican governments in their efforts to incorporate  these Indians into 
their respective social, po liti cal, and economic arenas. Boasting remarkable 
parallels as well as notable differences, the policies enacted by both the U.S 
and Mexican governments to govern “their” indigenous  peoples met with 
mixed results, to say the least. It  will be prudent, then, to examine both 
 those similarities and dissimilarities in order to contextualize the experi-
ences of the Yaquis, Kickapoos, and Tohono O’odham in the late nineteenth 
 century and throughout the twentieth. Both governments frequently 
changed direction with regard to  those legislative mea sures designed to cat-
alyze change in indigenous communities. Depending on the presidential 
administration, the ideological climate, and, especially, the availability of 
funding, Indian groups  were sometimes celebrated and subsidized, some-
times maligned and marginalized, and sometimes ignored altogether. Yet 
they  were fairly consistently considered social, cultural, and economic bur-
dens and even impediments, and, in turn,  were most often treated as such. 
Although policy climates on both sides of the border did not always directly 
affect the Yaquis, Kickapoos, and Tohono O’odham, they do often explain 
 these groups’ mobility, or their tendency to cross international borders and, 
thus, escape national prerogatives that usually proved detrimental to Indian 
 peoples. Yet federal Indian policies could also serve as tools, or as a con ve-
nient means of pursuing  either an immediate or a long- term agenda. Ap-
pealing to policymakers and/or submitting to prevailing Indian policies, as 
 will be shown, could prove vital to the maintenance of a semiautonomous 
existence. However, it often did so at the expense of broader efforts at nation 
building. Some of  these Indians  were, in the end, forced to choose the lesser 
of the two evils when it came to U.S. and Mexican Indian policies, which 
meant fi nally severing the ties that bind at the increasingly formidable inter-
national boundary.
The stories contained herein all in some way highlight the efforts and 
degrees of success attained by the Yaquis, Kickapoos, and Tohono O’odham 
in negotiating and maintaining a mea sure of po liti cal, cultural, and reli-
gious autonomy given the increasingly pervasive federal presences. This 
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book places par tic u lar emphasis on efforts at transnational movement and 
tribal reconsolidation over the course of the twentieth  century, including 
land acquisition and protection, federal recognition, and economic devel-
opment. The pro gress made by Indian  peoples in  these arenas, in turn, 
prompted the U.S. and Mexican governments to respond by making their 
presence, and especially the weight of their sovereign authority, known to 
 these Indians, sometimes as their benefactors and at other times as their 
hated enemies.  After all, as the historian Miguel Tinker Salas observed, the 
United States and Mexico  were both well aware that the “location of the 
border divided [some] indigenous  peoples” while providing all that called 
the borderlands home “the opportunity to mitigate their situation and seek 
better treatment.” 41
The task confronting both the United States and Mexico, then, became 
preventing the subversion of their authority by protecting the integrity of 
their borders, while also making sure that their efforts to do so meshed with 
broader, and ever- evolving, sentiment about what was and what was not 
acceptable be hav ior in Indian policy arenas. As for the Indians in this story, 
the lure of self- determination and group autonomy proved sufficiently strong 
to justify drastic mea sures, including nearly constant migration and depri-
vation, aggressive  legal and po liti cal activism, and even violent rebellion. 
At the end of the day, however,  these indigenous groups sought  little more 
than a stable, secure existence in which their vision of nationhood was more 
real than  imagined, a strug gle that is just as relevant to the indigenous 
 peoples of North Amer i ca in the twenty- first  century as it was in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth, and even before.
1 The White Man Came and  
Pretty Soon They  Were All around Us
Yaqui, Kickapoo, and Tohono O’odham Migrations
The  people came out of the earth somewhere in the east.  There they 
spent the first night; and the chief said to them, “In the morning we 
 will divide into many groups, so we can occupy the entire earth. Some 
of you  will go to the sea, and  others to the north and the west.” . . .  So 
in the morning they divided as the chief had instructed, and set out. 
All over the country they traveled.
— Papago migration legend, 1919
In the waning years of the Yaquis’ late nineteenth- century bid for in de pen-
dence from Mexico, the Los Angeles– based journalist John Kenneth Turner 
traveled to Mexico to investigate the tribe’s fate. The Yaquis had reportedly 
become targets of a sweeping government- sponsored relocation campaign, 
courtesy of Mexico’s president/dictator, Porfirio Díaz, which government of-
ficials hoped would once and for all end the group’s long history of violent 
re sis tance to Mexican authority. The deportees’ destination, according to 
available accounts, was Yucatán, which many Mexican po liti cal refugees 
often likened to Rus sia’s Siberia. “Siberia,” one told Turner, “is hell frozen 
over; Yucatan is hell aflame.”1 The government sent the Yaquis to  labor in 
essentially slave- like conditions on plantations that produced henequen, 
an agave plant grown extensively in southern Mexico whose fibers can be 
used to produce rope, twine, coarse fabrics, and alcohol.
In order to gain access to the closely guarded plantations of the “hene-
quen kings,” Turner played the part of a wealthy American investor, com-
plete with interpreter in tow. The ruse worked. His imaginary fortune served 
as an “open sesame to their clubs, and to their farms.” He was able to observe 
thousands of Indian “slaves” laboring  under everyday conditions, while 
he slowly but surely won the confidence of the planters. Soon, they began 
supplying Turner with what he must have considered journalistic gold. 
For instance, Turner noted that although the planters referred to their 
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system of  labor as “peonage,” or enforced ser vice for debt, and to their chattel 
as “ people” or “laborers” in public, privately they did not mince words, 
admitting that they  were, in fact, slaveholders. They freely spoke of em-
ploying corporal punishment on uncooperative field hands on a regular 
basis, and viewed their workers as  little more than commodities. In fact, 
one planter offered to sell Turner “a man or a  woman, a boy or a girl, or a 
thousand of any of them, to do with them exactly as I wished.” Turner also 
learned that  these power ful planters had similarly power ful friends. Local 
police, public prosecutors, and judges could all be counted on to protect 
this enterprise. Fi nally, the planters insisted that slavery was actually quite 
common in Mexico. “Slaves are not only used on the henequen plantations,” 
Turner learned, “but in the city, as personal servants, as laborers, as house-
hold drudges, as prostitutes.”2 In explaining his par tic u lar interest in the 
Yaquis given such widespread abuse, Turner stated, “The Yaquis are exiles. 
They are  dying in a strange land, they are  dying faster, and they are  dying 
alone, away from their families.” He concluded, “I went to Yucatan in order 
to witness, if pos si ble, the final act in the life drama of the Yaqui nation. 
And I witnessed it.”3
Turner, however, was premature in his pronouncement. The “Yaqui nation” 
did not die during the early twentieth  century, though one might say it 
entered into a period of dormancy. The Yaquis had been stretched too thin 
to function as a tribal  whole. Aside from  those who suffered through depor-
tation,  others managed to remain near the Yaqui River, masking their Yaqui 
identity so as not to attract official attention. Some used area mountain 
ranges as a base of operations, stubbornly perpetuating the tribe’s rebellion 
against Mexico. Some moved to Sonora’s larger cities— Guaymas, Her-
mosillo, Ciudad Obregón— and dis appeared into the local  labor force. And 
still  others sought refuge in the United States, settling in or near cities such 
as Tucson, Phoenix, and even Los Angeles. Thus, while Turner was enjoying 
im mense success with the publication of his “Barbarous Mexico” series, the 
Yaquis  were testing out a variety of survival strategies.4 And they  were not 
alone. The Kickapoos and Tohono O’odham  were also contending with 
the legacy of attacks on their autonomy, and their responses, as this chapter 
demonstrates, mirrored  those of the Yaquis in significant ways. By the turn 
of the  century, all three groups  were in the unenviable position of having 
to rebuild their socie ties, cultures, and governments from the ground up. 
Geographic space, and even geopo liti cal bound aries, separated families and 
tribal members, interrupted kinship and land use patterns, and complicated 
efforts to maintain tribal cohesion and cultural continuity.
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Yet in the pro cess of confronting  these new sets of challenges, physical 
movement on a transnational scale gradually became, for the Yaquis, Kick-
apoos, and Tohono O’odham, a tribal imperative, the most con ve nient and 
expedient strategy to regain lost autonomy. Further, it was a strategy which, 
although improvised in fits and starts  under less than ideal circumstances, 
meshed well with tribal traditions of movement. The Tohono O’odham’s 
migration legend, cited above, attests to the fact that tribal movement 
has a long history within O’odham culture. And the very name “Kickapoo” 
is Algonquian for “he moves about.”5 In fact, when asked in 1868 if he would 
prefer to live on a reservation in the United States or “become a Mexican,” 
one Kickapoo reportedly replied, “God is my Captain— the world my Camp-
ing ground, and I am at liberty to go where I choose.” 6 One scholar recently 
observed that the Yaquis’ history of displacement and movement has come 
to define Yaqui identity, as evidenced, for example, by con temporary Yaquis’ 
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familiar with  these groups would not be surprised by their assumption of a 
transnational orientation in the pursuit of a tribal agenda or agendas.  After 
all, movement across bound aries that had been defined by outsiders was a 
common historical experience among  these three indigenous groups. This 
chapter explores the myriad  factors that forced  these Indians to “go trans-
national,” in a manner of speaking, beginning with their earliest contacts 
with Eu ro pe ans and concluding early in the twentieth  century. Though often 
viewed by outsiders as last- gasp strategies to postpone the “final act” in 
their vari ous dramas,  these groups’ new patterns of spatial distribution ulti-
mately evolved into broader strategies aimed at maintaining tribal cohesion 
and cultural continuity while negotiating the greatest pos si ble degree of 
sovereignty.
The Yaqui Strug gle for Autonomy
Attacks on Yaqui autonomy had become commonplace by the time Turner 
arrived on the scene, having occurred with a disquieting regularity since 
the beginning of the tribe’s documented history. When first encountered by 
Eu ro pe ans, the Yaquis lived in a cluster of pueblos along the Yaqui River 
delta region, which contained, and still contains, some of the most produc-
tive agricultural land in North Amer i ca. Although their language and 
culture, according to the anthropologist and Yaqui specialist Edward 
Spicer, was “nearly identical” to that of the neighboring Mayos, their respec-
tive responses to the arrival of the Spanish immediately differentiated the 
two. The Mayos, in short, consistently sought to ally themselves with the 
newcomers, while the Yaquis did not. The earliest known conflict between 
the latter and invading Spaniards occurred in 1609, and resulted in the 
Spaniards’ quick and easy defeat at the hands of an estimated 7,000 Yaqui 
soldiers. Rather than risk what would likely have been a long series of vio-
lent clashes with the invading Spanish, however, the Yaquis invited Jesuit 
missionaries into the Yaqui River valley in 1617, and  were ultimately sent 
 Fathers Andrés Pérez de Ribas and Tomás Basilio. Both reportedly received 
an enthusiastic welcome upon their arrival in the river valley. Jesuit occu-
pation, the Yaquis wagered, would be preferable in the longer term to fur-
ther warfare, military occupation, or worse. It was the first in a long series 
of inspired strategies to maintain group cohesion, a cohesion that as of 
the seventeenth  century seemed contingent on proximity to the river and 
the modest bounty that it made pos si ble. Accepting the Jesuits also meant 
reluctantly acquiescing in the invading Eu ro pe ans’ efforts to incorporate 
the Yaquis into what Spicer called “the  great Spanish po liti cal leviathan.” 
The Indians incorporated ele ments of Catholicism into their own belief sys-
tem, learned Spanish, and accepted some strictures of colonial government. 
Unlike the  great bulk of indigenous  peoples who confronted Eu ro pean 
customs, institutions, and military might with trepidation (if not outright 
hostility), the Yaquis adapted surprisingly well. In the 150 years of Jesuit 
occupation, the Yaquis experienced a period of remarkable creativity, revi-
talization, and growth, while also managing to retain their fertile lands 
and avoid taxation. Scholars have gone so far as to question  whether or not 
we can speak of the Yaquis as a tribal unit before the arrival of the Jesuits. 
Through tribal stories the Yaquis have hinted that their conversion to 
Catholicism helped unite disparate  peoples  under the umbrella of a single 
cultural and po liti cal entity. And as the historian Rafael Folsom pointed 
out, “The Jesuits agreed in some sense, claiming to have defined them as a 
distinct nation.” 8
But although the relationship between the Yaquis and the Jesuits ap-
peared to be one of give- and- take, it would not be a stretch to argue that 
the Yaquis  were bargaining from a position of strength, and that all involved 
knew it. In fact, Folsom describes  those Jesuits who lived among the Yaquis 
as “marginal figures,” “pawns,” and “tools” that the Yaquis used “for the 
furtherance of their own po liti cal ambitions.” Still, the Yaquis’ experience 
with the Jesuits helped establish a tradition of advancing their agenda 
“within, not against, the structures of empire.” He explains, “Throughout 
the colonial period the Yaquis pursued their interests through tough nego-
tiation, offers of valuable aid, threats, and tactical vio lence.  These acts  were 
always enveloped in a shared understanding that reciprocal ties with the 
empire would be sustained.” It was a diplomatic attitude and approach, as 
 will be shown, that would outlive the colonial era.  Under the Spanish, then, 
the Yaquis managed to maintain a remarkable degree of autonomy. As Fol-
som concludes, “The fragmentation of the colonial government and the 
swirling rivalries among the Jesuits, secular institutions, miners, parish 
priests, and Franciscans made it impossible to impose colonial rule on the 
Yaquis in a direct and intensive way.” 9
The Jesuit period came to a close in 1767, however, when the Spanish co-
lonial government, acting on the  orders of King Carlos III, called for their 
expulsion, likely in an attempt to remove a formidable obstacle to secular 
reform throughout Spain’s empire.10  Couple this development with Mexi-
can in de pen dence early in the next  century, and the Yaquis’ situation began 
to appear increasingly precarious. Sonora evidently met the distant war for 
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in de pen dence from Spain with a collective yawn. Although fighting did 
take place in New Spain’s far northwest, Sonorans fought, in Spicer’s words, 
“without much intensity, perhaps without much conviction.” As for the 
Yaquis, the handful who participated in the conflict fought on the side of 
the royalists, perhaps fearing that a more invasive government might re-
place the mostly hands- off Spaniards. In fact, by war’s end it would become 
clear that the Indians in the region interpreted the in de pen dence strug-
gle quite differently from the rest of the new nation. Thereafter, periodic 
indigenous unrest would serve to indicate that  these groups considered 
themselves in de pen dent of any and all po liti cal entities with Eu ro pean 
origins, even  those directed by native- born descendants of the Spanish. In 
short, the Yaquis and their neighbors made clear that they would submit 
only to indigenous authority, an attitude held by the tribe long before Mex-
ico’s war for in de pen dence, and one that the birth of a new nation- state in 
their midst only reinforced.11
Thus, new patterns of vio lence among Sonora’s indigenous communities 
accompanied the change in government, as Mexico’s Indians continued to 
resist challenges to local autonomy. The Yaquis, especially, began resorting 
to armed re sis tance more frequently during the early Mexican national 
period. Their first major conflict with the Mexican government occurred in 
1825, only four years  after Mexico established its in de pen dence, and per-
haps not coincidentally it happened at a time when the tribe was becoming 
more mobile. A series of famines during  these years repeatedly forced many 
Yaquis out of their villages for seasonal employment in the regional econ-
omy. The Mexican government, meanwhile, came to view Yaqui mobility 
as a direct threat to internal security, since it had long equated mobile 
Indians with hostile Indians. At the same time, however, the Mexican gov-
ernment recognized Yaqui mobility as an opportunity to weaken the Yaquis’ 
hold on the Yaqui River delta. While it appears that the Yaquis had hoped 
for even greater freedoms  under the new government, including possibly a 
seat in the Mexican Congress, the arrival of tax assessors on Yaqui farms in 
1825 dashed any such hopes. Rebellion soon followed. Led by Yaqui Juan 
Banderas, the uprising had as its primary goal the establishment of an 
Indian confederation in Mexico’s Northwest. Banderas managed to unite not 
just the Yaqui  people, but also members of the Opata, Lower Pima, and Mayo 
tribes. Since the federal government had its hands full with the Apaches on 
Mexico’s northern border, responsibility for quelling the Yaqui rebellion fell 
to the state level, and the state was, at best, ill equipped for the task. The 
Banderas rebellion highlighted the fact that Sonora’s Indian policy overall 
tended to be merely reactionary, confronting prob lems as they arose in lieu 
of devising a long- term plan. It also highlighted the fact that the disor ga-
nized and financially strapped state did not have the clout, military, po liti-
cal, or economic, to enforce any kind of policy mea sure anyway. Luckily for 
local officials, the Banderas rebellion ultimately fell apart. Although it 
failed to give rise to an Indian confederacy, other circumstances intervened 
to help stave off the physical encroachment of non- Indians, at least for the 
time being.12
This is not to say, however, that the Mexican government did not con-
tinue in its efforts to divest the Yaquis of their homeland. In 1828 the gov-
ernment announced that it was officially bestowing citizenship on the Yaquis 
and decreeing that Indians and whites be treated equally  under Mexican 
law and in Mexican society. In so  doing, the Mexican government appeared 
to be extending an olive branch of sorts. Yet, one historian argued, although 
 these new laws “masqueraded as acts of generosity,” they  were, in real ity, 
“attacks on every thing the Yaquis held dear.” Citizenship represented “an 
attack on the special rights, privileges, and cultural peculiarities the Yaquis 
had developed over the course of the colonial period,” while the statement 
of equality essentially served as an invitation to non- Indians to  settle on 
Yaqui lands. In fact, the Mexican government ultimately offered tax incen-
tives to non- Indians to do just that. The Yaqui homeland was clearly  under 
siege, and the situation would only deteriorate in the coming de cades.13
 Those who chose to leave the Yaqui homeland to participate in the 
broader Mexican economy, meanwhile, did not always fare well. At Chihua-
hua’s mining center, La Villa de San Felipe El Real de Chihuahua, for ex-
ample, the Yaquis had established a presence by the mid-1850s. They formed 
their own settlement complete with their own chapel on the outskirts of the 
primary Mexican settlement. Although historians have tended to laud such 
efforts on the part of the Yaquis to maintain their po liti cal and economic 
in de pen dence, this is one instance where at least some tribal members had 
clearly grown dependent on wage  labor. As one scholar put it, “Yaquis used 
to be considered quite autonomous and resistant against colonization, but as 
shown in the case of the mining centers during colonial times they  were 
the ones who suffered the most.”  Because of the back- breaking nature of the 
work, the lack of proper ventilation, and the constant contact with mercury, 
“nobody would be willing to work in the mines,” with the exception of the 
Yaquis. Thus, many suffered a slow death due to lung disease. They remained 
bound to the mine  owners by debts, and could face  legal action if they at-
tempted to abandon the mines.14
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Part of their participation in the non- Indian economy, however, could 
also be explained by a well- documented propensity for travel. Writing in 
1761, for example, a Spaniard described a group of Yaquis who had migrated 
to Chihuahua as being “of a hardworking spirit and inclination, very dedi-
cated to mining, which they love, and for that reason, in distinction from 
other Indian nations, they are hardly rooted, if at all, in their home soil; 
and they are of a spirit so haughty and generous that it impels them to 
travel.” Indeed, another Spaniard observed that although the Yaqui mission 
towns  were more populous than any other mission towns in the region, 
roughly two- thirds of the population of each lived elsewhere, including 
nearby Soyopa, Chihuahua, Parral, and Santa Barbara. Put simply, the 
Yaquis had learned that mobility equaled freedom. Although that freedom 
had its unique pitfalls, it was but one of many strategies designed to help 
maintain their distinctive po liti cal and, especially, cultural identity.15
Then, with Vice Governor José T. Otero’s 1879 announcement before the 
Sonoran Congress that “ there is in this state an anomaly whose existence is 
shameful for Sonora,” significant events in Yaqui history began unfolding 
at a dizzying pace. Otero was referring to Cajeme, the Yaquis, and their 
“separate nation within the state.”16 During the intense Cajeme period, 
from 1875 to 1887, a long tradition of Mexican expansion into Yaqui terri-
tory met an abrupt end as hopeful colonists suddenly found themselves 
unable to wrest lands granted to them by the Mexican government from the 
increasingly determined Yaquis. Aware of Cajeme and the Yaquis’ growing 
stronghold, many colonists simply fled, forfeiting their claims rather than 
risk conflict. The Mexican government, perpetually embroiled in  bitter fac-
tional strug gles during  these years, was unable to give top priority to con-
fronting the Yaqui prob lem. All that changed, however,  under President 
Porfirio Díaz.17
The Díaz regime had as its main objective national economic develop-
ment, which, at least in the state of Sonora, first required the removal of 
“marauding” Apaches, followed by an increase in statewide mining and ag-
ricultural production, improvements in communication and transporta-
tion networks, and, lastly and most significantly, colonization of the fertile 
lands of the Yaquis and Mayos.18 Among  those developments that spurred 
the regime to action  were reports of an 1883 Los Angeles Times article, en-
titled “Seductive Sonora,” which claimed that Mexico would “see Sonora an 
American state within five years if the pres ent influx of Americans contin-
ues.” It was not the only article to play on Mexican fears that another em-
barrassing loss of territory might be imminent. Only days before the Arizona 
Daily Star reported that a New York speculator had recently acquired then 
sold several Yaqui mines to an En glishman.  Needless to say, the recent pub-
licity surrounding Sonora deeply concerned the Porfirian government given 
its tenuous, and ever weakening, hold on the region.19
On March 31, 1885, then, Díaz launched a concerted military campaign 
designed to oust the Yaquis from the fertile river valley, and by early 1886, 
 after less than a year of skirmishes of increasing intensity, federal forces 
fi nally overwhelmed the Indian “rebels.” By this time, yellow fever and gen-
eral malnutrition  were taking their toll on the group, while the high mo-
rale that Cajeme had once inspired seemed to have vanished. In fact, the 
majority surrendered despite Cajeme’s pleas that they continue fighting. As 
for the few who remained committed to Yaqui in de pen dence, Cajeme di-
vided them into small bands and orchestrated a guerrilla campaign against 
federal troops, who, following the mass surrender, mistakenly thought 
themselves victorious. Tribal members sustained the guerrilla campaign, 
however, hiding out in Sonora’s Bacatete Mountains between attacks, well 
into the twentieth  century.20 They would also remain subject to deporta-
tion well into the twentieth  century. An official correspondence from 1904 
estimated that 822 Yaquis had  either already been deported or  were await-
ing deportation that year alone, while in 1908 that number reached 1,198. 
The program evidently peaked in 1908, and although exact figures are 
unknown, scholars are confident that several thousand of the estimated 
30,000 Yaquis suffered through deportation. The tribe now appeared hope-
lessly fragmented, thinly spread across Mexico and the southwestern 
United States. As Edward Spicer observed, “Not even the Cherokees, whose 
deportation in 1835 from Georgia to Oklahoma had initiated a scattering 
over the United States,  were so widely dispersed.”21
The Mexican government launched another campaign to end the seem-
ingly doomed Yaqui insurrection in early 1900, its goal being to wipe the 
Bacatete Mountains clean of rebel Indians. Tetabiate, Cajeme’s successor, 
who had declared war against the Mexican government the previous year, 
managed to escape the onslaught, but several hundred Yaquis died in the 
conflict, with many simply jumping off cliffs to their deaths. Meanwhile, 
troops took approximately 1,000  women and  children prisoner. One news-
paper account reported that Mexican forces actually employed a gunboat 
in the campaign, while the Yaquis employed a Maxim gun. “Such a modern 
weapon in the hands of the aborigines of this continent is a circumstance 
well worthy of passing notice,” the article editorialized. Passengers on a 
train bound for Hermosillo, another newspaper reported,  were treated to a 
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“ghastly sight” in 1905, when from the train they spotted the bodies of six 
Yaqui “chieftains” hanging from trees and telegraph poles. The Mexican 
military, the article claimed, often allowed executed Yaquis to remain strung 
up “for days and sometimes weeks as an example to  others of their tribe.”22 
The campaign had clearly taken a brutal turn.
Mexican officials, however, often bristled at the press coverage north of 
the border, frustrated that it too often assumed an anti- Mexican and pro- 
Indian tone. For example, one Washington Post article characterized the 
Yaquis as “exceedingly peaceful”  unless provoked. In explaining why the 
Yaquis had gone “on the warpath” against the Mexican government, the ar-
ticle quoted one non- Indian American in for mant who claimed, “He may be 
a very bad Indian, and all his friends to whom he took  rifles may be bad, 
but they are methodical in their hardness, and it does not seem entirely fool-
ish to suppose they believe they have been badly dealt with by someone in 
their own country.”23 Another article from north of the border, written in 
response to the Mexican government’s deportation campaign, characterized 
the Yaquis as “the most industrious, the most responsible, honorable, and 
virtuous of the working class in Sonora.”24 Mexican officials, meanwhile, 
claimed that the recent press coverage tended to exaggerate the size of the 
“rebel forces,” often tried to justify the Yaqui rebellion, and, most seriously, 
often “belittled government forces” and their efforts to suppress what they 
viewed as indiscriminate Yaqui vio lence.25 In fact,  there is evidence that the 
state departments in both nations  were working to limit the amount of press 
coverage the Yaqui campaign received.26
Regardless, following this latest campaign, the Yaquis entered into one 
of the most difficult eras in their history, one marked by a sharp decline in 
their standard of living and a sharp increase in both official and unofficial 
harassment. When turn- of- the- century census data indicated that an esti-
mated 15  percent of Sonora’s population was of Yaqui ancestry, officials took 
more drastic mea sures in singling out, then harassing and intimidating, the 
remaining Yaquis in hopes of breaking the resolve of  those who still har-
bored separatist pretensions. In 1902, for example, newly elected governor 
Rafael Izábal ordered that Yaqui Indians over the age of sixteen don “iden-
tification passports,” as one scholar called them, at all times.  Those who 
refused to register and identify themselves as Yaqui, the governor warned, 
would be subject to arrest and even deportation. In 1906, Izábal expanded 
the law, simply ordering the arrest of all Yaquis,  whether they  were abid-
ing by the regulation or not. “Frankly,” the governor claimed, “I  don’t see 
any other solution for  these indios.”27 But as one scholar gleaned from 
survivors of this tumultuous period, one attitude appeared widespread, 
namely, that the Yaquis “might be refugees or displaced persons for years 
and years, but Yaqui culture and the Yaqui homeland would transcend  these 
temporary events.”28
Not only would the Yaquis transcend the Mexican nation’s extermination 
campaign, they would also transcend the Mexican nation itself. Unmen-
tioned in John Kenneth Turner’s Barbarous Mexico are  those Yaquis who 
escaped persecution by turning to the United States for sanctuary. In the 
1930s, Yaquis in Arizona would bitterly recount  these transborder escapes, 
often hastily arranged and executed  under cover of night in anticipation 
of the increasingly frequent raids by rural police on the Sonoran hacien-
das. To many Yaquis the United States appeared to offer the only alternative 
to the threat of deportation and an uncertain fate on the Yucatán planta-
tions or a life of transience and uncertainty in area mountain ranges. It 
was an option that was not on the  table for long, however.  Because of a re-
cession in the United States early in the twentieth  century, officials stepped 
up their efforts to close the border to further immigration. While their ef-
forts did not completely halt Yaqui migration north, they certainly managed 
to slow it. Other Yaquis steadfastly refused to leave the tribe’s homeland. 
For example, when his  family suggested they relocate to Arizona, Manuel 
Alvarez replied, “No. I have to die  here.” The following day he did just 
that. Mexican soldiers located Alvarez and hanged him from a mesquite 
tree for allegedly aiding Yaqui insurgents in the Sierra. Other Yaquis re-
mained in Sonora, but  either masked or completely abandoned their Ya-
qui identity, taking agricultural jobs, or working as artisans or laborers in 
any one of a number of Sonora’s cities. It apparently was not uncommon 
for a portion of their wages to end up in the hands of Yaqui guerrillas.29
Despite the upending of their way of life in Sonora,  those Yaquis who re-
mained ultimately found their proximity to the border fortuitous for reasons 
other than con ve nient access to their Arizona safe haven. While conduct-
ing their military campaign against the Mexican regime, the Yaquis learned 
that they could cross the border into Arizona and easily earn wages to pur-
chase much- needed supplies, supplies that could aid in their long strug gle 
against the Mexican government. Mining enterprises in Bisbee in par tic u lar 
appear to have been popu lar destinations for Yaqui mi grants. Arizona, then, 
became more than just a safe haven for Yaqui refugees. It also became a 
kind of arsenal.30 Although ever more carefully monitored in the early 
twentieth  century, the border was certainly not hermetically sealed. If 
queried by U.S. officials,  these Yaquis sometimes claimed to be Mayos. The 
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Mayos, in the words of one Yaqui,  were “favored by the Mexican authori-
ties”  because of their devout Catholicism, and thus often left alone. Some 
also claimed to be Opatas, which was another far less maligned tribe. And 
still  others simply claimed the nationality of the nearest neighboring 
tribe.31
The United States, however, soon came  under fire by Mexican officials 
as it became increasingly clear that Arizona was serving as an informal base 
of operations for Yaqui campaigns against Mexico and, more specifically, the 
Díaz regime. In fact, in 1904 the Mexican government demanded that 
the United States not only bar the sale of arms and ammunition to Yaqui 
Indians, but also more carefully monitor their movements throughout the 
state. At one point the city of Tucson even hired (with Mexican funds) a pri-
vate detective, an American named Oscar Carrillo, to look into rumors of 
arms sales to Yaquis and to track suspicious tribal members. In the end, how-
ever, he had nothing incriminating to report. The Mexican consul in Phoe-
nix accused the Tohono O’odham of helping the Yaquis acquire arms and 
ammunition,  going so far as to request a thorough search of all area Indian 
reservations for evidence of complicity in the Yaquis’ rebellion. Some Tuc-
son merchants protested the ongoing crackdown on arms sales to Indians, 
such as José Ronstadt from the famous Ronstadt  family, who balked at 
being denied the right to profit from the Yaqui rebellion, especially since, 
he claimed, dealers on the other side of the border in Cananea, Sonora, 
 were happily outfitting Yaquis.32 In short, a crackdown on arms sales to 
Yaquis was a problematic request.  Those selling arms to the Yaquis  were 
not  doing so, in the words of one U.S. attorney, “with any design to provide 
the means for a military expedition or enterprise to be carried on against 
the government of Mexico,” but  were only trying to make a buck. U.S. offi-
cials needed evidence of “intentional equipping” of rebel Yaquis, in other 
words, in order to take action. U.S. officials did, however, agree to step up 
their efforts to enforce a provision of Arizona’s criminal code that prohib-
ited arms sales to Indians, and ultimately instructed a U.S. marshal in Ari-
zona to take action in “breaking up the practice complained of.”33 It was a 
tall order. As one scholar put it, “The U.S. reservation system, the extensive 
social and economic networks of the Yaqui, the Yaquis’ ability to pass as 
Mexican, and the easy availability of arms on the border facilitated Yaquis’ 
participation in transnational cir cuits of power.”34
Arizonan officials initially granted refugee Yaquis safe haven secure in 
the knowledge that mining and railroad companies would happily absorb 
them as laborers. That arrangement changed between 1906 and 1907, how-
ever, when an economic downturn tightened southern Arizona’s  labor mar-
ket. Thereafter, American officials, acting on  orders from the U.S. State 
Department, saw to it that recent Yaqui mi grants  were deported, even know-
ing full well that  these mi grants likely faced, at best, deportation to the 
henequen plantations and, at worse, extermination. Indeed, the Mexican 
government’s coordinated campaign was still wreaking havoc on Sonora’s 
Yaquis in the early years of the twentieth  century. In 1885, the Mexican 
government estimated that the Yaqui population stood at around 20,000 
(which was likely a conservative estimate). In 1900, a government expedi-
tion into the Yaqui River valley counted just over 7,000. In 1907, the first 
census conducted by the Porfiriato counted only 2,723. Another early 
twentieth- century survey found that only 1,680  were engaged in agricul-
tural pursuits, which led authorities to conclude that the Yaquis had  adopted 
urbanization as a survival strategy. It was a development that, in the words 
of one scholar, “signaled a dwindling connection to a Yaqui rural space of 
autonomy.” The trend would not continue, however. With the Mexican Rev-
olution of 1910 and the toppling of the Díaz regime, the deportation cam-
paign immediately became a  thing of the past, and the Yaquis came out of 
the figurative woodwork.35
Not surprisingly, in the wake of Díaz’s ouster in May 1911, the Yaquis 
chose to side with Mexican revolutionaries. And their very vis i ble partici-
pation in the Mexican Revolution, again not surprisingly, was rooted more 
in a determination to advance their claims to sovereignty than in an altru-
istic concern for the fate of the Mexican nation. Put simply, the objectives 
of the revolution, which included first and foremost a more equitable pol-
icy of land distribution, meshed well with Yaqui convictions and gave them 
some hope of reclaiming lost lands. They fought particularly hard on be-
half of famed general Alvaro Obregón, presumably  because rumor held he 
had some Yaqui blood. While the rumor was not accurate, Obregón had, in 
fact, been raised near a Mayo Indian pueblo and was just as fluent in Mayo 
as he was in Spanish.36 Just prior to assuming office as the new Mexican 
president in 1911, Francisco Madero promised a del e ga tion of Yaquis that, 
 because of their ser vice, he would not only restore their lands, but pay them 
a wage of one peso a day to serve as a sort of military reserve; invest in 
school, farm, and church development around the Yaqui River; and decree 
a thirty- year Yaqui tax exemption in return for their support. While the 
Yaquis’  gamble appeared to be paying off, Madero’s assassination eigh teen 
months  later ensured that the well- intentioned agreement never saw the 
light of day, and Yaqui re sis tance to Mexican authority continued.37
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In 1916, Mexican officials negotiated an official armistice with the Yaquis. 
The terms of the armistice  were  simple: the Yaquis would agree to inhabit 
a series of villages selected by the government in the river valley, and the 
government, in return, would see to it that the Yaquis  were well fed. The 
agreement also allowed the Yaquis to keep their firearms— a  great selling 
point from the Indians’ perspective, but one that the Mexican government 
likely regretted, since the armistice was short- lived. The following year, be-
tween 1,000 and 1,500 Yaquis, evidently feeling stifled, concluded that the 
villages  were  little more than Yaqui concentration camps and fled the area. 
They definitely did not go quietly, however, leaving what one scholar de-
scribed as a “trail of destruction” in their wake. The federal government 
then declared war on the Yaquis anew in the wake of this incident, and spo-
radic vio lence once again became the norm.38 “The Indian trou ble is now 
considered more serious than in years,” one observer concluded, adding, 
“The effect of a campaign of many months has thus been lost.” Thereafter, 
however, the Yaquis began slowly filtering back into the Yaqui River valley, 
and the Mexican government, in a perennial bud get crunch, was unable to 
respond in a meaningful way.39
Then around 1919, the Yaquis once again began lashing out at their non- 
Indian neighbors. That year, Yaquis attacked a group of Mexican travelers 
en route to Hermosillo, killing two. They then fled to the mountains west 
of Guaymas. Shortly thereafter, a local found two Mexican woodchoppers 
nearby who had been tortured and killed. The Yaquis also tortured and mur-
dered a Mexican man and his five- year- old son. One official noted that 
“practically all the ranches had been abandoned” in  those areas where 
the Yaquis  were most active. In one instance, an estimated 200 Yaquis 
surrounded the town of Potam, just south of Guaymas, and attacked. Once 
a Yaqui stronghold (and one of the original eight pueblos), Potam was increas-
ingly overrun with non- Indians.  These inhabitants tried to defend them-
selves but fi nally fled the Yaqui onslaught. The Indians then proceeded 
to loot the town. Sensing that an attack on the immediate area’s largest 
city might be next, the American consul in Guaymas warned the U.S. sec-
retary of state, “Guaymas is absolutely without military protection,  there 
being  little to prevent a disastrous raid upon the city if the Yaquis choose 
to make it.” 40
The Yaquis again drew the ire of U.S. officials when, in 1919, they attacked 
and looted an American- owned mine named El Progresso, prompting U.S. 
officials to demand that Mexico step up its efforts to protect American lives 
and property. The Mexican military launched a counteroffensive a  little over 
a month  later to ferret out  those Yaquis responsible for the assault on the 
mine, taking three Yaqui lives and recovering much of what the Yaquis had 
stolen.41 The under lying cause of the latest surge in vio lence is not difficult 
to understand. The Yaquis had simply grown impatient waiting for the Mex-
ican government to deliver on the promise made to them at the outset of 
the revolution, and thus began venting their frustration. As an American 
ambassador to Mexico explained in 1911, “The reasons given for the attitude 
of  these Indians is that certain lands which  were to have been returned to 
them at the close of the recent revolution have not been returned.” 42
Indeed, by the 1920s, thousands of Yaqui exiles had returned to south-
west Sonora only to find the more fertile areas of the Yaqui River valley 
occupied by non- Indians. Still, they returned determined to reclaim their 
autonomy, even if it meant initially settling on the north bank of the river 
and submitting to life as landless agricultural workers. In 1925, Yaqui chief 
Francisco Pluma Blanca petitioned the Mexican government, as the histo-
rian John Dwyer explains, “ under the constitutional provision that provided 
for the restitution of usurped property to indigenous communities.” More 
specifically, the chief called for the return of lands that included Bacum, 
one of the original Yaqui towns established by the Jesuits. The administra-
tion of Plutarco Elías Calles denied the request. Compounding tensions in 
the mid-1920s was a surge in non- Indian migration to the region. Suddenly 
alarming amounts of  water  were being diverted from the Yaqui River 
for what turned out to be mostly American agricultural interests. In 
September 1926 the Yaquis took up arms once again, brazenly, though 
briefly, taking former president Obregón and some 150 federal troops hos-
tage at the Vicam train station. Though freed without incident, Obregón 
vowed revenge. Soon thereafter, the federal government sent some 20,000 
troops to attack Yaqui settlements. Hundreds of Yaquis died; many more 
fled into the Bacatete Mountains. Some  were captured and conscripted into 
the Mexican army, and some  were deported into the nation’s interior. The 
fighting became even more ferocious when the Mexican government or-
dered the bombing of the nearby mountains by military aircraft. By the 
mid-1930s, Dwyer writes, “repression pervaded the Yaqui country, which 
resembled a military camp with thousands of federal troops stationed in 
Yaqui villages.” 43
Meanwhile, although many Arizona Yaquis returned to Sonora  after the 
fall of the Díaz regime, still  others remained in the United States with the 
intention of establishing what Edward Spicer called a “new branch of Yaqui 
society,” bearing a “variant stream of Yaqui tradition.” 44 The convoluted 
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story of Lucas Chávez, relayed to Spicer in the 1930s, exemplifies the expe-
riences of many Yaquis during this period. As a child, Chávez made regular 
trips with his  father from the Yaqui River valley to Guaymas to buy in- 
demand products, such as  needles or handkerchiefs, then would return to 
the Río Yaqui to peddle and barter. Guaymas was evidently not the most 
inviting place for a young Yaqui, and ridicule directed at Yaquis by Mexicans 
was common. “They would say ‘chinga, chinga’ all the time,” he recalled. 
“Yaquis eat  horses” was another popu lar taunt. He also recalled instances 
of Mexicans entering the Río Yaqui valley, violating young  women, and gen-
erally  doing “unjust  things.” In short, he understood the impulse, so preva-
lent among Yaquis, to fight the Mexicans. In fact, the elders of the tribe 
used to tell him, “Better for our lands to go into the hands of any other nation 
than to go into the hands of the Mexicans.”  After the death of his  father, 
Chávez worked as a field hand in vari ous locales  until drifting into the 
United States in the 1890s to work on the railroad. He ultimately settled 
near Tucson, in Pascua,  because of the growing Yaqui population  there. 
Along with Pascua, Phoenix was a popu lar haven for Yaquis, since  those 
willing to pick cotton could earn respectable wages  there.  After the season 
ended, however, many of  these workers returned to Pascua. Chávez recalled 
a string of decent, fair Anglo “mayordomos,” or bosses, one of whom mar-
ried a Yaqui. “She spoke Yaqui all the time,” he remembered. “And her 
 daughters . . .  they spoke Yaqui too.” In the 1930s, he retired from manual 
 labor, opted to stay in Pascua, and reportedly handled the mail for the vil-
lage. Interestingly, when asked  whether or not the Pascua Yaquis had a chief, 
he replied that it was unnecessary since “ here po liti cal affairs are taken care 
of by the state government and Yaquis therefore  don’t need a Yaqui chief.” 
“ After all,” he added, “are we not foreigners  here?” 45
Networks of migrating Yaquis like Chávez, many of whom had already 
worked in the United States, played a vital role in informing  those who re-
mained in Sonora of opportunities north of the border. In his autobiogra-
phy, the Yaqui poet Refugio Savala recounts his  family’s experience  after 
fleeing the “heartless killers” in Mexico. Savala’s  father had already been 
living in Arizona when the Mexican government launched its deportation 
campaign.  After saving enough money, he returned to Sonora not only to 
retrieve his  family, including his newborn son (appropriately named Refu-
gio, or “refugee”), but also to spread word of good wages across the bor-
der. Many followed his example and undertook the trek to the United 
States. Savala’s  family moved their belongings to Arizona on the backs of 
four pack mules, and quickly found shelter, work, and food courtesy of the 
Southern Pacific Railroad Com pany. The railroads apparently welcomed 
the Yaquis, and evidently treated them with a  great deal of civility.46
Even though their unclear citizenship status and inability to speak En glish 
limited their opportunities, at least some Yaquis  later characterized their 
first years in Arizona as carefree, affluent, and stable, standing in stark con-
trast to their  people’s troubled history. Yaqui migration to the United 
States slowed to a trickle  after 1918 or so, however. The reasons for this  were 
myriad. As mentioned above, a tighter  labor market in southern Arizona 
meant that early twentieth- century Yaqui refugees  were no longer welcomed 
with open arms. On top of that, World War I introduced into American popu-
lar culture a more general fear of “foreignness,” or of the potential for non-
native “undesirables” to, in the words of the historian Alexandra Minna 
Stern, “contaminate the body politic.” Not coincidentally, then, the advent 
of the U.S. Border Patrol in 1924, which signaled the beginning of the bor-
der’s militarization, roughly coincided with the end of the war, as did ever 
more rigorous immigration restrictions and new immigration procedures 
that required transborder mi grants to possess passports and visas.47 
Although the Yaquis, in the early twentieth  century, had established only a 
precarious transnational presence, the rest of the  century would find them 
both cementing new ties and at least attempting to renew old ones, all 
against remarkable odds. Still, the existence of the border, at least in the 
wake of their dispersal from the Yaqui River, proved crucial for the survival 
of the tribe. “It seems fairly clear,” concluded Edward Spicer, “that but for 
the U.S.- Mexico border  there could well have been total extinction of the 
Yaqui  people. The border allowed an alternative.” 48 The border would con-
tinue to serve a crucial function well into the twentieth  century, aiding and 
abetting the growth of the Yaqui nation. In this regard, the Yaquis had much 
in common with the Kickapoos.
The Kickapoo Retreat
Although eventually settling in the northern portion of the present- day state 
of Coahuila, Mexico, and Ea gle Pass, Texas, the Kickapoos originated from 
a surprisingly far- flung locale. Eu ro pean rec ords from around 1600 place 
them between Lake Michigan and Lake Erie, thousands of miles from what 
they  today consider their spiritual homeland. By 1654 they had already 
fled the  Great Lakes region in the face of increasing hostility from the Iro-
quois, taking refuge, along with the Sauk, Fox, and Potawatomies, in Wis-
consin among the Menominee and Winnebago tribes. The arrival of the 
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French shook up power dynamics in the region, to the Kickapoos’ ultimate 
detriment. Much  later a tribal spiritual leader would drolly recount, “The 
first white  people we met  were French. We traded them deer hides and 
they said, ‘Ah,  these are very good hides.’ Then they asked us for a small 
place to sleep.” Unlike most Algonquian groups, the Kickapoos shunned 
European- produced goods, including alcohol, and exhibited a con spic u ous 
and consistent hostility  toward French Jesuits and their doctrine of forced 
acculturation. The Kickapoos soon allied themselves with neighboring 
groups, including the Mascoutens and the Fox, and eventually formed a 
confederacy. With their power solidified and Eu ro pean numbers increas-
ing, open war was inevitable. The year 1712 marked the first open conflict 
between the Kickapoos and the French, when tribal members took a French 
messenger prisoner. The Hurons and Ottawas, allies of the French, retali-
ated by capturing a canoe filled with Kickapoos and slaying, among  others, 
their principal chief. A formidable military campaign by the French soon 
followed, forcing the Kickapoos to make peace with the French. It was an 
uneasy peace, however. Loyalties continued to shift, with the Kickapoos 
sometimes at odds and sometimes allied with the French,  until essentially 
reduced to pawns in the French and Indian War.49
Imperial strug gles between the French and the British enveloped the 
Kickapoos during this period, and they deci ded to side with the French. In-
terestingly, in their ultimately successful attempt to gain the loyalty of the 
Kickapoos during the French and Indian War, the French presented the tribe 
with a Louis XV medal, which to this day remains one of their most coveted 
possessions, residing with the tribe in Nacimiento, Mexico, and serving, 
from their perspective, as one of many symbols of Kickapoo nationhood. 
However, the 1763 Treaty of Paris expelled the French from the  Great Lakes 
region, and thereafter hostilities between the Algonquians and the British 
reached fever pitch. The Kickapoos  were among many notable participants 
in Pontiac’s Rebellion, which culminated in the Ottawa leader Pontiac’s at-
tempt to capture Fort Detroit. When British attempts at reconciliation failed 
to inspire the Kickapoos, one band fled the region altogether in 1765, taking 
advantage of an invitation from Antonio de Ulloa, governor of Spanish 
Louisiana, to  settle near Saint Louis.50 Some Kickapoos even worked as mer-
cenaries for the Spanish as a kind of arm of Spanish Indian policy, roaming 
across Louisiana, Missouri, and Arkansas, taking Osage Indian scalps, pris-
oners, and plunder. In exchange, they received all the powder and shot they 
needed, along with tobacco and aguardiente, or brandy.51 From  here, the 
Kickapoos’ history could be characterized as a near- constant retreat. As 
Kickapoo Adolfo Anico explained in 1981, “The white man came and pretty 
soon they  were all around us, so we moved south to what is now known as 
Kansas. Again, once more, the white man came and surrounded us. Again, 
once more, we moved south to what is now known as Oklahoma. Once 
again, we moved south into Texas, what is now known as Texas.  There we 
live, and again we moved fi nally to Ea gle Pass, into another area.”52
Their journey to Ea gle Pass was far more eventful than Anico’s account 
implies, however. Following the American Revolution, the Kickapoos quickly 
identified land- hungry Americans as the new  enemy, and allied them-
selves with the British. They fought American forces at the  Battle of Fallen 
Timbers in 1794, meeting defeat at the hands of General Anthony Wayne. 
The Treaty of Greenville, which concluded the conflict, included a provision 
allocating a $500 annuity for the Kickapoos. Conflict continued, however, 
and tribal stability remained elusive. The group apparently had nothing 
but contempt for the Americans. They negotiated with the new nation only 
halfheartedly, usually engaging U.S. officials only when attempting to 
have some grievance addressed. In fact, an exasperated William Henry 
Harrison, realizing relations with the group had become a one- way street, 
once asked, “My  Children, Why does it happen that I am so often obliged 
to address you in the language of complaint?” Tensions between the Indians 
of the region and Harrison soon boiled over into vio lence. The Kickapoos 
fought alongside Chief Tecumseh’s  brother, the Shawnee Prophet, at the 
1811  Battle of Tippecanoe, and joined British forces during the War of 1812. 
During the latter conflict, 150 Kickapoo families joined Tecumseh and the 
Prophet in Ontario at a newly established intertribal village for Indian refu-
gees. In the wake of this series of setbacks, the Kickapoos, during the pres-
idency of James Monroe, ceded more than thirteen million acres of their 
land between the Illinois and Wabash Rivers in exchange for a tract of land 
in southeastern Missouri. It was a desperate attempt on the part of the tribe 
to, as one journalist put it, “avoid the swallowing  giant called Amer i ca.” 
Roughly 2,000 Kickapoos relocated  there, while two bands, each contain-
ing roughly 250 tribal members, mostly warriors, stubbornly remained 
in Illinois.53
By the 1830s, then, the Kickapoos appeared hopelessly fragmented. Num-
bering about 3,000, the tribe had now split into several bands and lived in 
small pockets from Lake Michigan all the way down to Mexican Territory. 
A group of roughly 350 held on in eastern Illinois; another group settled 
on the Osage River in Missouri; several bands, totaling around 900, 
roamed the Southern Plains; and about 800 settled on the Sabine River in 
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the province of Texas at the invitation of the Mexican government in order 
to assist its Cherokee allies with frontier defense. They  were part of a broader 
trend in which thousands of “immigrant Indians,” as one scholar called 
them, entered Texas  after being essentially pushed  there by American set-
tlers during the 1810s and 1820s.  These Indians, who also included the 
Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks, Seminoles, and Shawnees, sometimes fought 
with and sometimes allied themselves with their non- Indian neighbors 
against Plains Indian raiders. Some had acculturated to the point that they 
kept domesticated livestock. The Texas Kickapoos initially prospered  under 
the newly established Mexican government. In fact, in return for their loy-
alty, the Mexican government promised the Kickapoos the title to the lands 
they  were then occupying. Relations between the Mexican government 
and the Texas Kickapoos deteriorated rapidly, however. The Mexican gov-
ernment instituted a generous land policy that quickly attracted Anglo set-
tlers, the same settlers who, in 1836, rebelled and established the Republic 
of Texas.54 The first group of Kickapoos to enter Mexico  after the Texas 
Revolution did so in 1838. Numbering about eighty, they crossed the border 
to escape the Texas army, eventually settling near Morelos, and began serv-
ing as scouts and couriers within the Mexican military. According to one 
historian,  these Kickapoo “mercenaries”  were “highly esteemed by the Mex-
ican government.” However, they stayed for only about a year before pull-
ing up stakes and relocating to Indian Territory.55
Texas president Mirabeau B. Lamar’s 1839 Indian removal policy was at 
least partially responsible for the Kickapoos’ relocation en masse to Mexico. 
Writing to Cherokee mi grants that year, Lamar explained, “The  people of 
Texas have acquired their sovereignty by many rightful and glorious 
achievements, and they  will exercise it without any division or community 
with any other  People.” He wrote of his refusal to recognize an “alien po-
liti cal power” within Texas’s borders and concluded with the insistence that 
the tribe had “no legitimate rights of soil in this country” and as such would 
“never be permitted to exercise a conflicting authority.” Shortly thereafter, 
he addressed the Kickapoos specifically, ordering their “immediate removal 
out of the country . . .  without delay.” Although many left  after concluding 
that accommodation with the Texans would be fruitless,  others  were evi-
dently recruited by “Mexican Emissaries,” according to one official, to help 
“wage a war of extermination against Northern Texas.” The official predicted 
“more serious border warfare, than any we have ever yet experienced.” By 
the eve of the republic’s annexation by the United States in 1845, however, 
Texas officials had entered into a treaty with the Kickapoos, among other 
Indian groups. It was a decision that at least some Texans considered ill 
advised. Writing in 1847, for example, one Texan argued that the treaty rep-
resented “ great folly and indiscretion” on the part of the Texas government, 
since the Indians would inevitably interpret it as a “sanction to their intrusion 
and a right to settlement.” Had Texas not been annexed by the United 
States in 1845, he continued, Indian numbers would have “alarmingly in-
creased by immigration from the northern tribes of the United States.” 
“Annexation,” he concluded, “has arrested this evil.”56
Just prior to the outbreak of the U.S.- Mexican War, Indian Commissioner 
George W. Bonnell put the number of Kickapoos residing within state bound-
aries at about 1,200. In the wake of the war, the Mexican government be-
gan shoring up its “new” frontier with military installations, partly in an 
attempt to protect settlers from Indian raiders. The government distributed 
some 200,000 pesos it had received via the terms of the 1848 peace treaty 
to frontier governors and ordered the establishment of eigh teen military 
colonies along the border. It also granted lands to the Seminoles, Creeks, 
and Kickapoos in exchange for their vow to participate in frontier defense. 
Soon thereafter at least some Kickapoos relocated to Morelos, Coahuila, just 
south of Ea gle Pass; then, in July 1850, they  were joined by a contingent of 
roughly 500 Missouri Kickapoos, 100 Seminoles, and 100 Mascogos, or 
African Americans, at the behest of the Mexican government. The small 
settlement gradually evolved into a full- scale military colony. Local offi-
cials assigned  these mi grants sixteen sitios de ganado mayor, amounting to 
approximately 70,000 acres, on a temporary basis at the headwaters of the 
Río San Rodrigo and the Río San Antonio near present- day Ciudad Acuña. 
Federal officials threw their full support  behind the colonization proj ect, 
with one describing the mi grants as “industrious,” “hard working,” and of 
good character and habits. The expectation was that they would form a 
“terrible obstacle for barbarous tribes” along the new border. The agreement 
between the mi grants and Mexican president Benito Juárez further required 
that they maintain peaceful relations with citizens of both the United States 
and Mexico and re spect the authority of the Mexican Republic. For a vari-
ety of reasons, the Mexican government, in 1852, relocated the Kickapoos 
and their Indian and African American neighbors to Hacienda El Nacimiento, 
twenty- three miles northwest of what is  today the town of Múzquiz. The 
Seminoles and Mascogos gradually vacated the Mexican tract, many ulti-
mately deciding to relocate to Indian country in Oklahoma, and by 1861 only 
Kickapoos remained on the tract. Then in 1864 their ranks swelled again 
when a contingent of Oklahoma Kickapoos migrated to Mexico rather than 
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choose sides in the Civil War. Their trek was an eventful one. While en route, 
the 600 or so Kickapoo mi grants  were attacked by Confederate soldiers near 
the present- day town of Knickerbocker, Texas, along Dove Creek. The out-
numbered and disor ga nized Confederates  were routed by the Kickapoos, 
with some twenty left dead and nineteen left wounded. In the longer term 
the incident aggravated Kickapoo hostility  toward Texans and further has-
tened their retreat across the Rio Grande.57
 Those Kickapoos who chose not to migrate to northern Mexico typically 
did so  because of several concerns. Some questioned the quality of the lands 
that had been offered by the Mexican government. As one group of Kicka-
poos  later put it, “ There was no grass and the land was no good, and the 
weather was too hot.”58 Some expressed concerns about the cost of moving, 
while  others doubted that securing a claim to lands in Mexico was even 
pos si ble given their migratory tendencies.  Those who did choose to migrate, 
meanwhile, recognized the fact that, as one historian observed, “the ter-
rain might have been forbidding, but that meant a thinner population.” The 
“wildness” of northern Mexico, in other words, made it all the more likely 
that they could “live their lives without so much meddling” from agents of 
the United States government.59 By roughly 1865, then, the majority of what 
are now referred to as the Southern Kickapoos had made their way south 
of the U.S.- Mexico border and put down roots. They apparently greatly ap-
preciated the sympathetic reception they received from the Mexican gov-
ernment, and further admired Mexico’s hands- off approach to Indian policy 
 matters.60
Their agreement with the Mexican government, coupled with their loca-
tion near the border, presented opportunities for the Kickapoos upon 
which they could not resist capitalizing. One U.S. consul observed that “so 
long as the Kickapoos have the protection of the Mexican Government and 
cross into Texas to loot, rob, and plunder, and as long as  these acts are coun-
tenanced by the citizens of Mexico, and as long as the Kickapoo can find a 
ready market for their booty they  will never willingly quit.” 61 In fact, so prof-
itable was raiding into Texas that Kickapoo warriors found they no longer 
needed to rely as heavi ly on agriculture to support their families. They 
sought and obtained the cooperation of local “po liti cal chiefs,” as one his-
torian described them, who would grant the Kickapoos both passports and 
titles to stolen livestock. Mexican customs officials at Piedras Negras and 
Nuevo Laredo rounded out the Coahuila “ring,” helping to collect herds of 
 horses and  cattle transported by Kickapoo raiders across the Rio Grande in 
a canyon near Nacimiento. From  there, a network of locals would assist 
in the disposal of Kickapoo “booty” in nearby Saltillo.  Because of the extent 
of local collusion,  these transactions  were nice and  legal, at least for all prac-
tical purposes. Texans did try to use Mexico’s courts to reclaim their lost 
property, but typically to no avail. As one rancher put it, “It is evident to 
anyone who tries to receive stolen property from  these Indians that they 
are protected by the Mexican authorities and the citizens of [Coahuila], as 
well as the merchants  there, who . . .  conduct an illicit trade with the Indi-
ans, encouraging them to raid into Texas.” This phenomenon tends to be 
typical in border regions up to the pres ent day. As the historian George Díaz 
put it, “Whereas the Mexican and U.S. governments considered smugglers 
as criminals and threats, border  people regarded many of  these same indi-
viduals as  simple consumers, merchants, or folk heroes.” And lest the Kick-
apoo case leave the impression that this was strictly a Mexican phenomenon, 
the historian Peter Andreas argued that the illicit flow of both goods and 
 people, as well as the long string of campaigns to staunch that flow, did no 
less than help define and shape the American nation, while also serving as 
a “power ful motor in the development and expansion of the federal gov-
ernment.” Regardless, the U.S. military was so determined to end  these 
transborder depredations that in 1873 General Phil Sheridan authorized an 
attack on the Kickapoos on Mexican soil. Sheridan of course did not con-
sult the Mexican government before launching this par tic u lar campaign. 
His  orders  were reportedly as follows: “Let it be a campaign of annihilation, 
obliteration, and complete destruction.” The military arrived to find that 
most Kickapoo men  were out hunting, so the campaign did not culminate 
in vio lence.  Those Kickapoo whom they did manage to take captive, how-
ever,  were subsequently forcibly relocated to Oklahoma.62
Failing to dislodge them through military means, the U.S. government 
attempted to legislate the removal of the Kickapoos from El Nacimiento and 
relocate them to the home of their Kansas counterpart. The reasons  were 
myriad. U.S. officials  were evidently upset that so many Kickapoos had 
taken advantage of what one described as the “partial paralysis of the au-
thority of the United States” during the Civil War and slipped out of its bor-
ders, and now sought to return  these Indians “to their condition before the 
war.” U.S. officials  were also evidently  under the impression that Mexico was 
 either unable or unwilling to provide for the welfare of the Indians, and that 
transborder raids would remain a fact of life so long as this remained the 
case. “ There is but  little doubt,” two Texans wrote to President Andrew 
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Johnson in late 1865, “but with the proper inducement held out by the U.S. 
Government they could be induced to return to their Reserve, which would 
be the most eco nom ical and humane way of disposing of them.” Another 
argued that the sole reason a portion of the tribe remained in Mexico was 
in order to provide “a place of safety for [their] stolen property,” including 
 horses,  cattle, and even captives.  Those responsible for the raiding in Texas 
only had to “cross the River to their kindred who remain in Mexico” when-
ever “pushed hard” by authorities north of the border. The resultant legis-
lation, passed in 1874, called for “the removal of the Kickapoo and other 
Indians from the borders of Texas and Mexico,” while also promising sup-
port for the relocated Indians. The U.S. Congress evidently sensed prob lems 
more serious than Indian depredations on the horizon. “The importance of 
restoring peaceful relations within the border infested by  these roaming and 
predatory Indians,” the act reads, “cannot be too highly estimated; and their 
removal to the Indian territory  will, it is believed, relieve the authorities of 
Mexico and the United States from a condition of  things which jeopar-
dizes the continuance of friendly relations between the two governments.” 
Congress predicted that the Kickapoos would, “if encouraged and assisted 
by the government,” willingly join the “three hundred already removed to 
the Indian Territory.” “It is difficult to see,” wrote one U.S. official, “what 
substantial advantage Mexico can expect from retaining  these Indians. So 
long as they remain where they are now, they are tempted to plunder 
and commit other acts of vio lence, not only upon Mexicans but upon the 
American side of the Rio Grande.” In the United States, he claimed, “the 
Indians are kept from harming  others and have a chance of materially ben-
efiting their condition.” When it came time to remove the Indians, how-
ever, the Mexican government was not cooperative, the citizens of nearby 
Santa Rosa  were not cooperative, and the Kickapoos, most of all,  were not 
cooperative.63
One prob lem with removal was that the Kickapoos doubted that the Tex-
ans would let them pass through the state peacefully. When asked what 
would alleviate their fears of passage through Texas up to Indian Territory, 
one Kickapoo communicated his wish that “a del e ga tion from the reser-
vations in the United States [would] come to them . . .  and lead them back” 
in order to ensure their safety. They  were assisted in their recalcitrance by 
Mexican officials and citizens who had their own reasons for obstructing 
U.S. efforts to “repatriate” the Kickapoos.  After arriving in Mexico, the U.S. 
legation sent to coordinate removal ran into a host of prob lems. Local offi-
cials, first of all, demanded that the United States pay for the Kickapoos’ 
 houses, which, they claimed, the Indians  were “wrongly in possession of,” 
according to one member of the legation. Local law enforcement also de-
manded the U.S. legation pay for  horses that the Kickapoos had allegedly 
stolen. Local citizens, meanwhile, according to the same source, “combined 
to put up prices on beef, flour, coffee, corn, and sugar to such outrageous 
prices that I had to send off to surrounding towns for such as the Indians 
required.” “I have absolutely refused to make any more purchases  here,” the 
head of the legation declared. Once the legation managed to acquire flour, 
the Indians who consumed it immediately sickened. “The flour was un-
doubtedly poisoned,” he complained, “with the expectation that the Indians 
would attribute the act to me.” The Mexican government, meanwhile, 
claimed that they simply lacked the authority to assist the U.S. legation in 
their efforts to relocate the Indians, since their laws made no racial distinc-
tions among their citizenry and, thus, all Mexican citizens enjoyed the same 
constitutional protections. Although the legation attempted to appeal to 
what one official vaguely described as a “spirit of internationalism and co-
mity,” cooperation was not forthcoming on any level, and the U.S. ultimately 
made  little pro gress in returning the Kickapoos to their old lands. The funda-
mental prob lem was that Mexican officials gave the Kickapoos the option 
of which nation they preferred to call home. Most Kickapoos  were appar-
ently happy where they  were.64
In one case, however, a group of fifty- five Kickapoos, with “jefe” José 
Galindo as their mouthpiece, notified Mexican authorities that they desired 
to leave Mexico and return to the United States. It was evidently not a com-
mon request. Although a Chihuahua- based Mexican official notified the U.S. 
War Department of the Kickapoos’ wishes, Mexico’s cooperation apparently 
ended  there. Writing in 1878, John W. Foster, a member of a subsequent le-
gation put in charge of repatriating the allegedly wayward Kickapoos, ex-
pressed surprise and frustration over the fact that “upon learning of the 
desire of Galindo and his band to return to their reservations in the United 
States,” Mexican officials did not “indicate a willingness to follow the course 
 adopted by the past administration of Mexico and extend facilities for their 
return.” 65 It would not be the last time U.S. officials would encounter that 
lack of willingness when dealing with Mexico.
Meanwhile, the 1887 Dawes Act divided the Kickapoo reservation in 
Oklahoma into eighty- acre allotments, the idea being to hasten assimila-
tion by replacing tribal with private land owner ship. Allotment as a policy 
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was generally despised by the Kickapoos. As one Oklahoma resident and 
acquaintance of the tribe put it in the late nineteenth  century:
The Kickapoo Indians had been, as we called it, “forcibly allotted,” and 
the “kicking” Kickapoos  were very per sis tent in resisting any effort the 
government might make to reconcile them to accept their land or to 
accept their money, $211. They would have nothing to do with it. They 
 were so prejudiced against the allotment that they even would not 
drive on a wagon road over the land that had been allotted to them.  
If they had been starving to death, they would not have signed for 
provisions for fear they might be signing something that would be an 
ac cep tance. They at that time  were wild and suspicious Indians . . .  
they kicked against the treaty; they kicked against the allotment. They 
 were opposed to anything that the government wanted them to do.
Ultimately, the Kickapoos  were among many Indian groups for whom the 
act proved devastating. In fact, roughly 90  percent of Kickapoo lands ulti-
mately fell into non- Indian hands  because of the new policy. However not all 
of  those who had allotments succumbed to the temptation to make a quick 
buck off of them, however, and a small number maintain allotments to this 
day. Still, this latest assault on their autonomy led many frustrated Oklahoma 
Kickapoos to relocate to Mexico on a more or less permanent basis, further 
swelling the ranks of Kickapoos living south of the border year- round.66
As an Oklahoma- based attorney with a long history as a tribal advocate 
revealed, “From the first I knew of them, and always, their life’s dream has 
been to return to Mexico to be re united with their  children. The first Kick-
apoo I ever talked with said to me—an old decrepit man— ‘If they take my 
allotment, do you think it may in some way lead to my getting away from 
 here?’ ” 67 Relocating from Oklahoma to Mexico could also mean escaping 
more mundane annoyances involving non- Indian neighbors. As another 
Oklahoman familiar with the tribe explained, “If an Indian’s  horse got into 
a white man’s pasture it was $3. If a white man’s  horse got into the Indian’s 
fields and ate up his crops and the Indians took it up, the white man came 
to the corral and tore it up and said, ‘To the devil with you. This is not In-
dian country.’ The Kickapoos can not live in a country like Oklahoma.” 68
Even though south of the border, the Kickapoos  were not beyond the 
reach of non- Indians in Oklahoma who  were determined to divest them of 
what  little land remained theirs. In 1905, U.S. Acting Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs C. F. Larrabee complained to the secretary of the interior that 
white Oklahomans  were conspiring to fraudulently acquire titles to Kicka-
poo lands in Oklahoma by sending negotiators to Mexican Kickapoo settle-
ments. The  U.S. district attorney for Oklahoma had evidently warned 
Larrabee that this latest development was “one step in robbing the Kicka-
poo Indians of all the lands they have and inducing them to remain in Mex-
ico  until the robbery is complete.” Larrabee went on to express sympathy 
for the group, claiming that they  were “less intelligent than the average full 
blood Indian,”  were inhabiting a “tract of worthless land” in Mexico, and 
 were generally in a “very bad way in that country.” Thus, he proposed a two- 
pronged investigation south of the border, one to explore the  matter of the 
land deeds, the other to more generally assess the Kickapoos’ living condi-
tions. In so  doing, Larrabee hoped to avoid a scenario whereby the U.S. gov-
ernment would be forced to “expend considerable money in removing the 
Kickapoos from Mexico.” Larrabee was aware of the implications of conduct-
ing an investigation in a “Foreign State,” and promised to acquire Mexico’s 
consent. Evidently, the Mexican federal government agreed to grant U.S. au-
thorities passage, but only reluctantly. And even then, authorities in Múzquiz 
remained defiant when the investigation commenced, apparently refusing 
to “recognize certain duly appointed persons by the Interior Department of 
the United States,” according to the American embassy in Mexico.69
Investigators traveled from Shawnee, Oklahoma, to Coahuila in June 1906, 
led by Frank Thackery, U.S. superintendent of Indian schools. Upon arrival 
on Kickapoo lands, Thackery reportedly “found the Indians mostly all 
dancing.” Soon thereafter local police asked the Americans to leave the 
Kickapoo village, thereby signaling that local cooperation would not be 
forthcoming. Upon their arrival in Múzquiz, however, the party immedi-
ately located eight men who  were paid representatives of “many other men 
in Oklahoma who have sent the cash  here to pay the Indians for their lands.” 
Sensing that his hands  were legally tied while on foreign soil, Thackery rec-
ommended hiring a Mexican attorney to begin prosecuting  those involved 
in the allegedly fraudulent activity. A Mexican attorney, Thackery also 
hoped, would help ensure that the Kickapoos’ rights  under both Mexican 
and U.S. law  were protected. Should the Kickapoos lose every thing they 
own in the United States, Thackery feared, it was very likely that they would 
ultimately end up “paupers,” and it would then not be long before Mexico 
called upon the United States to remove the group. Thackery also recom-
mended clearing up confusion over the exact nature of Kickapoo land 
owner ship south of the border. “The United States,” he concluded, “should 
have an equal interest in their getting a proper title to lands in Mexico in 
order that [the Kickapoos] may not drift back upon us penniless.”70
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What Thackery did not bother to learn, however, was that the Kickapoos 
had plans of their own for the Oklahoma allotments. According to Oklaho-
man E. W. Sweeney, whom the Kickapoos, in Sweeney’s words, “frequently 
solicited to attend councils . . .  where I did the writing for them,” at least 
some Kickapoos “seemed to have very  little regard for their land in Okla-
homa.” Sweeney continued, “They wanted to return to Mexico and on  every 
available occasion, at their homes and in council, or anywhere that I might 
meet a group of them, their foremost thought seemed to be to get away and 
return to Mexico.” Not only that, but at least some of them “had agreed 
amongst themselves . . .  that they would sell their land in Oklahoma and put 
it all in a pot together and buy a reservation in Mexico.” Clearly, officials 
 were giving the Kickapoos too  little credit. The Indians understood that the 
allotment policy, although almost universally despised, could be used to 
their ultimate advantage.71
Few corners of Mexico remained untouched by the Mexican Revolution, 
and Nacimiento was no dif fer ent. With the outbreak of revolution, the 
Mexican Kickapoos fought for Francisco Madero and then,  after his assas-
sination, for Victoriano Huerta. Huerta’s overthrow by Venustiano Carranza 
proved disastrous for the Kickapoos. Carranza’s soldiers took one contin-
gent of Kickapoo soldiers prisoner in retaliation for their loyalty to Huerta, 
while another group of Carranza’s men forced the Kickapoos to flee their 
village. The Kickapoos evidently spent the balance of the revolution hiding 
out, fearing another visit from the troops. In the 1920s, they returned to 
their tranquil, somewhat isolated existence. However, a seven- year- long 
drought that began in 1944, coupled with the loss of groundwater due to 
excessive pumping by the nearby American Smelting and Refining Com pany 
(or ASARCO), forced many Kickapoos out of their village yet again, this time 
in order to seek employment. As one writer put it, “At Nacimiento they had 
no  water except for barely trickling springs. Their wheat crops failed, their 
 cattle starved, and the mountains nearby  were largely hunted out. Though 
Mexico had been generous with loyalty and land, it offered neither jobs nor 
government assistance.” As they had during crisis  after crisis in previous 
de cades, the Kickapoos looked to the border for a solution. It was during 
 these years that they began entering the mi grant  labor stream north of the 
border, adopting Ea gle Pass, Texas, as their transborder way station, then 
pouring back into Nacimiento during the winter months.72 It was a strat-
egy that would serve them well, effectively sustaining the small group 
throughout the twentieth  century. Still, it presented almost as many prob-
lems as it solved, prob lems that only worsened as the twentieth  century pro-
gressed and transborder traffic came  under ever- increasing scrutiny. But 
even had the Mexican government been more forthcoming with offers of 
jobs or other forms of aid, it is not likely the Kickapoos would have ac-
cepted. Like many of Mexico’s indigenous  peoples, they  were determined 
to stay indigenous. In other words, embracing federal assistance might mean 
inviting federal intrusion and potential overreach. The Kickapoos would 
make it clear again and again that any entrée into the modern economy 
would occur in a limited fashion, on their own terms, and in such a way as 
to not compromise their po liti cal and cultural autonomy.73
The Tohono O’odham Divided
Unlike in the cases of the Yaquis and Kickapoos, the Tohono O’odham’s di-
vision by the U.S.- Mexico border was not the result of forced migration, but 
of the imposition of an international boundary by outsiders. The 1853 Gads-
den Purchase cut the Tohono O’odham in two, leaving half on the U.S. side 
and half on the Mexican side. At one time their lands stretched from present- 
day Phoenix, Arizona, south to Hermosillo, Sonora, and west to the Gulf of 
California.74 The Tohono O’odham  were one of a handful of Sonoran tribes 
who managed to remain aloof from Spanish and,  later, Mexican authority 
and who  were only indirectly affected by missionization efforts. In fact, 
the historian Jack Forbes suggested that the  whole of Sonora was unique 
in that “all or almost all of the aboriginal groups had survived  after some 
288 years of warfare and contact, and 211 years of Christian missionary 
activity.”75 As with the Yaquis, part of their success in maintaining that 
aloofness was due to their efforts to forge a cooperative relationship with 
the Spanish early on. For example, they  were immediate allies in Spain’s 
long war against the Apaches, whom the O’odham simply referred to as 
“ Enemy.” Yet  because of a variety of cultural and po liti cal changes wrought 
by colonialism, they increasingly found themselves viewing the Spanish, 
as one scholar put it, “across a chasm of distrust and misunderstanding,” 
which would strain that relationship and, consequently, strengthen their 
determination to maintain their in de pen dence.76
The Tohono O’odham evidently first beheld Eu ro pe ans in 1540, when 
the Coronado expedition clipped the eastern edge of their lands. The sight 
of hundreds of armed men on  horses no doubt impressed them. The Span-
ish explored their lands further in ensuing years, but  after finding no mar-
ketable commodities they left the O’odham, whom they eventually dubbed 
the Papagos, alone for more than a  century. In the seventeenth  century, 
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mining activity in Sonora increased, and Spanish settlement grew in tan-
dem. Further, missionary efforts gradually reached farther and farther 
north into Sonora throughout the first half of the  century, culminating in 
the arrival of  Father Eusebio Francisco Kino in the far northwestern edge of 
New Spain, a region the Spanish called the Pimería Alta. Spanish mission-
aries eventually encountered a variety of linguistic relatives of the Tohono 
O’odham. For example, the Hia C’ed O’odham lived northeast of the Gulf of 
California, while the Akimel O’odham, whom the Spanish called Pimas, 
lived along the banks of vari ous rivers, such as the Gila. Apparently none 
of  these groups had a sense of themselves as a “tribe” or any other kind of 
po liti cal entity. Rather, their villages and rancherías  were po liti cally semi-
autonomous, though it was not uncommon for  these groups to forge tem-
porary alliances in times of trou ble. In 1697, Kino entered the Santa Cruz 
valley, in the heart of O’odham territory, to launch a ranching enterprise. 
What was initially a business venture evolved by the late 1700s into the 
massive San Xavier del Bac mission, which would  later become the seat of 
the O’odham reservation.  Under Kino’s supervision, the O’odham built a 
string of missions in present- day Sonora along the Magdalena and Altar 
Rivers and the Santa Cruz River in present- day Arizona. Kino remained 
 there, teaching, preaching, and exploring,  until the end of his life. He also 
often acted as a moderator when prob lems arose between the Spanish and 
the O’odham.77
Despite some initial success in administering to their Indian charges, the 
missionaries gradually fell out of  favor with the O’odham. They monopo-
lized the most fertile lands in the Pimería Alta, and as mining activity in-
creased Spanish settlers began hemming in the O’odham. While some 
O’odham stayed near the mission or continued laboring on Spanish farms, 
many who had lost complete use of their land came to depend more heavi ly 
on seasonal migration in the pursuit of game and  water sources. Their move-
ments, however,  were not always eco nom ically motivated. Since the mis-
sionaries could only administer to so many O’odham, a significant number 
of Indians got into the habit of traveling to the missions in the winter months 
so that their  children could be baptized with Spanish names and educated 
in Christian doctrine. This practice gradually evolved into a popu lar annual 
religious pilgrimage that continued well into the twentieth  century. The 
O’odham eventually selected the town of Magdalena, just south of No-
gales, for its final destination.  After Kino’s death in 1711, missionary activity 
waned, and non- Indian settlers, realizing their vulnerability to Apache 
and Seri depredations, began filing out of the Papaguería.78
Up  until Mexican in de pen dence, the O’odham adhered, technically 
speaking, to the Spanish colonial system of government, in that they elected 
a village representative who was then confirmed by the provincial gover-
nor. Yet they had comparatively  little contact with Spaniards. In fact, any 
aspects of Spanish culture  adopted by the O’odham likely came from their 
regular visits deeper into New Spain rather than from their contact with 
Spaniards on their own lands.79  Because of their isolation, the Tohono 
O’odham remained, by and large, at peace with the Spanish and then 
the Mexican government. Although the Mexican government colonized 
O’odham lands west of Hermosillo in order to help control the increasingly 
troublesome Seri Indians, the O’odham lived fairly in de pen dently  until 1853. 
With the Gadsden Treaty, however, the U.S. military rounded up any 
O’odham they managed to locate south of the new boundary, ultimately 
numbering about 1,000, and relocated them north to two small reservations, 
San Xavier and Gila Bend, both near Tucson.80 Even so, many O’odham evi-
dently remained unaware that a change of government had occurred. As 
the historian Winston Erickson explains, “Where other Mexican citizens 
 were located within O’odham lands, information about the change of gov-
ernment was available, but some O’odham still maintained allegiance to 
Mexico de cades  later  because no one had told them about the new interna-
tional boundary.” 81
Although perhaps unaware of the boundary’s precise location, at least 
some O’odham  were aware of parties of boundary surveyors moving through 
their lands during the 1850s. Surveyors moved through the lands of not just 
the O’odham, but also the Apache, Pima, Maricopa, Yuma, Cocopah, and 
Diegueño Indians. Some of  these Indians served as guides, sources of food 
and information, and even ethnographic subjects. When the Americans ar-
rived on the lands of the O’odham, they found a  people who  were mostly 
living in splendid isolation, with one notable exception. “For generations,” 
one scholar explained, “a group of distinct bands known collectively as 
Apaches had raided Pima, Maricopa, Tohono O’odham and Mexican settle-
ments in a cycle of retributive vio lence.” The American surveyors, then, 
would have observed a “border landscape littered with abandoned settle-
ments and barricaded towns” and border  peoples who nursed a deep ha-
tred of the Apaches (a hatred that was mutual, by the way) that lingered 
into the early twentieth  century.  These border  peoples, including the 
O’odham, would go on to cooperate with civil and military officials in pro-
tecting the region from incursions not just by the Apaches, but also by Ameri-
can filibusters who  were intent on violating Mexico’s territorial sovereignty 
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 either for personal gain or to add additional territory to the United States. 
The Tohono O’odham  were actually instrumental in thwarting the efforts 
of one of the most notorious of  these filibusters, Henry A. Crabb, who en-
tered northern Sonora in 1857 with a small army of co- conspirators. Within 
days of their arrival, the O’odham and a collection of soldiers and volunteers 
managed to locate and surround the American invaders. The O’odham then 
reportedly shot flaming arrows at the hay- roofed  houses into which the 
Americans had retreated, thereby forcing their surrender and prompting 
the execution of  every member of the filibuster expedition save a sixteen- 
year- old boy. It was only through the collective effort of Mexican settlers, 
indigenous communities, and civil and military leaders that, in the words 
of one scholar, “the boundary line stayed in place and a sense of Mexican 
national identity continued to develop along the border.82
The O’odham, meanwhile, remained insistent on preserving their in de-
pen dence despite this burgeoning, mutually beneficial relationship with 
non- Indians. While they happily accepted gifts from the Americans, includ-
ing tobacco, beads, cotton cloth, vari ous tools, and American flags, they 
also made it clear that they intended to protect the integrity of their cul-
ture, their po liti cal structures, and, especially, their territorial holdings. As 
one O’odham explained to a group of non- Indians in 1856 or 1857, “ Every 
stick and stone on this land belongs to us. Every thing that grows on it is 
our food . . .  The  water is ours, the mountains . . .  These mountains, I say, 
are mine and the Whites  shall not disturb them.” 83
Perhaps not surprisingly, officials in the United States had a difficult time 
containing the O’odham north of the border, particularly during hard times. 
Between 1871 and 1872, Indian agent R. A. Wilbur, in a series of letters to 
an official within the Bureau of Indian Affairs, warned of worsening condi-
tions around San Xavier brought on by drought and famine. Writing in 
 October  1871, Wilbur described daily visits by O’odham in an “almost a 
destitute condition” with requests that he provide “the necessaries of life.” 
“I have explained to them my inability to extend to them any immediate 
relief,” he wrote, “but promised to represent their case to you.” While some 
O’odham remained on their designated lands, the looming threat of star-
vation forced many to seek employment in Tucson, while “by far the greater 
portion” crossed the border into Sonora “in search of food to keep from 
starving.” The solution to the O’odham’s increasing woes, Wilbur suggested, 
was the establishment of a larger reservation. “The settlers are fast crowd-
ing them around San Xavier del Bac,” he explained, “and taking up the best 
portions of the land.” Wilbur’s letters take on a tone of urgency in ensuing 
months, culminating in a stern warning in December 1872: “I cannot urge 
too strongly the importance of securing a Reservation for  these Indians.” 
Apparently his advice went unheeded. The following year, the O’odham 
 were still on the migratory trail and, in Wilbur’s words, “in the habit of 
crossing the line to aid farmers in Sonora owing to the fact that  there was 
not sufficient work to employ them all  here.” 84
Indeed, they willingly participated in the cash economy when necessary, 
laboring on both Mexican and American ranches, plantations, and mines 
even at the expense of more long- standing subsistence patterns. Some even 
worked transporting and selling salt to area miners from a salt lake near 
the California coast. The so- called salt pilgrimage was, in fact, a long- 
standing tradition in O’odham culture, a practice that now supplied the 
O’odham with a marketable commodity. Increasing mining activity in So-
nora during the nineteenth  century brought many O’odham south of the 
border to work in the expanding agricultural sector. The downside, how-
ever, was that increased demand for land in Arizona meant that, once “aban-
doned,” their lands often fell into non- Indian hands. Meanwhile, the same 
pattern of gradual land loss played itself out on the lands of southern 
O’odham. Opportunities south of the border waxed and waned throughout 
the second half of the nineteenth  century  until, by the turn of the twenti-
eth, very few O’odham chose to live in Mexico. The end result was that the 
O’odham quickly slid into a pattern of de pen dency on both sides of the bor-
der, and regular migration in search of employment became a fact of life. 
And although typically characterized as a peaceful  people, the O’odham 
 were evidently not above raiding and vio lence. In the late 1880s, for exam-
ple, Mexican officials complained that O’odham raiders  were stealing Mex-
ican  cattle from settlements at Sonoita and El Plomo and then retreating 
across the border into the United States. Then in 1889 the O’odham launched 
a transborder raid targeting the Mexican village of El Plomo. The plan was 
to  free a group of relatives that Mexican officials had imprisoned, recover 
lost O’odham  cattle and  horses, and then return to the other side of the bor-
der. It did not exactly go off without a hitch, however, and five O’odham 
lost their lives in a shootout with Mexicans before being forced to retreat. 
One scholar observed that “their self- conscious use of the border,” as dur-
ing the El Plomo raid, “reflected the growing importance of the boundary 
in their lives.” And it would only grow in importance over the course of the 
next  century.85
Compounding their economic woes, the O’odham  were suffering through 
significant territorial losses during the second half of the nineteenth  century. 
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At roughly the same time, both the United States and Mexico initiated 
nationwide programs to transfer public lands into private hands with the 
expectation that this would help spur economic development. The United 
States passed the 1862 Homestead Act and the 1877 Desert Land Act to 
achieve  these ends, while the Mexican government contracted a series of 
surveyors to oversee the transference of so- called terrenos baldíos (or va-
cant lands) to private individuals. In turn,  these surveyors received vast 
tracts of land for their efforts. “ These policies privatized huge amounts of 
land,” one scholar explained, “but  were also characterized by inaccuracy, 
inconsistency, and inequity, leading to the appropriation of millions of acres 
that  were inhabited, used, or claimed by Indians and other borderland 
 people.” The Tohono O’odham in par tic u lar lost an untold amount of terri-
tory in  these efforts at privatization on both sides of the border. It did not 
take long for Mexican and American ranching enterprises to expand to the 
point that they directly intruded on lands actively being used by the O’odham, 
which led to regular conflict over access to the scarcest of resources along 
the western Arizona- Sonora border:  water and grazing land. Many Sonoran 
O’odham responded to the specter of continued, and potentially worsen-
ing, conflict by crossing into the United States, where at least some of them 
followed the lead of many Arizona O’odham and took low- paying jobs with 
area ranching outfits. All the while, O’odham dispossession from tribal lands 
continued.86
 These developments, taken collectively, prompted U.S. officials to fi nally 
discuss placing the O’odham  under the auspices of the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs and, especially, creating a larger reservation.  After all, the harsh, un-
forgiving environment in which the O’odham lived required plenty of room 
to roam.87 Very few O’odham actually lived on  either the San Xavier or Gila 
Bend reservations, likely  because neither reservation contained a govern-
ment agency to administer to the tribe. Nearby agencies, meanwhile, had 
their hands full with the Gila River Pimas and the Salt River Maricopas. 
Further, without proper surveillance of O’odham lands by government au-
thorities, squatting by non- Indians was a constant prob lem. The O’odham’s 
difficulties accelerated when U.S. officials applied the 1887 Dawes Act, which 
had already divided up Kickapoo lands in Oklahoma, to the O’odham’s 
lands. In the early 1890s, officials allotted San Xavier’s lands, then totaling 
roughly 69,000 acres. The 363 O’odham at San Xavier each received be-
tween seventy and one hundred acres (the U.S. government considered the 
excess acreage worthless). Only if the tribe’s agent deemed them compe-
tent in managing their own affairs, the order stipulated, would individual 
O’odham receive the  legal title to their allotment. However, the O’odham 
had  little experience with the concept of private owner ship of land, and just 
as on Indian reservations throughout the United States, prob lems soon 
arose. For instance, officials granted an O’odham named Pedro Eusebio a 
fee- simple title to his plot in 1909, and Eusebio, in turn, quickly sold a sig-
nificant portion of his land to non- Indian outsiders, apparently unaware that 
he was signing away the rights to his allotment. Eusebio died soon there-
after, and his son fought to regain the lost acreage, testifying before the 
Indian Commission that his  father had made an ill- informed decision. His 
son, however, was unsuccessful, so for many years non- Indians owned land 
right in the heart of O’odham country.  These kinds of misunderstandings 
perhaps explain why officials never implemented an 1894 executive order 
calling for the allotment of lands on the Gila Bend reservation. Not surpris-
ingly, then, as the turn of the  century loomed, the O’odham found them-
selves just barely surviving. They  were less able to sustain their former way 
of life and increasingly dependent on the cash economy, working as cow-
boys, railroad laborers, construction workers, and even domestics.88
The obvious difficulties facing the tribe prompted one Tucson news-
paper to query, “What  shall we do with our Indians?” The article, published 
in 1895, assured locals that  there  were, in fact, “some good Indians who are 
not dead Indians,” and that it was the government’s responsibility to tend 
to their welfare “in return for the good done to our  people, by them in the 
dark days of Indian warfare and border strife.” Regarding their meager eco-
nomic resources in the wake of a “change of circumstances,” the article 
asked, “What is  there for the Indian to do but steal or die?” The community 
of Tucson evidently held the O’odham in high regard. “It is common for the 
white man to characterize the Indian as thriftless and good for nothing,” 
the article continued, “but so far as it applies to the Papagos, it is not true 
as  those familiar with them can bear abundant testimony.” The article de-
scribed young O’odham  women being thrust into prostitution and young 
men faring  little better, since perpetual unemployment often reduced them 
to “loafers and bummers on the streets.” “Give the Papagos farms and they 
 will work,” the article concluded, adding, “Beyond a  little  labor it  will cost 
our  people nothing.” 89
The O’odham’s proximity to the border was also proving problematic. 
O’odham cattlemen complained to Indian agents repeatedly that tensions 
across the border, including transborder raiding and the U.S.’s military in-
cursions into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa, had made it too dangerous 
to round up  cattle, particularly  those that strayed across the then unfenced 
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international boundary. O’odham leaders also requested (and actually re-
ceived) arms and ammunition, which they claimed would help them defend 
their property from “pro- German” attacks from south of the border. It was 
an unlikely scenario, but one that nonetheless attracted sympathetic atten-
tion from U.S. officials. They ultimately surmised that a protected land base 
with formally delineated bound aries was the best defense for the precari-
ously located tribe.90
In 1915, the O’odham received a visit from Indian Commissioner Cato 
Sells. While  there, Sells stressed the importance of education and agricul-
tural training for Arizona’s 40,000 indigenous  peoples, not only for their 
own well- being but also so that, in Sells’s words, “it  will be pos si ble to cut 
down the appropriations of the government for the Indians.” Sells went on 
to compliment the O’odham directly, lauding their “genius of necessity” and 
highlighting the fact that they “fought a winning fight” out in the desert, 
utilizing “every thing in order to live,  every bit of  water and even the cac-
tus.” Sells ultimately visited  every reservation in the United States to get a 
firsthand idea of general reservation conditions— a first in the history of the 
office of the Indian Commissioner. Although he met with numerous local 
officials while in the Tucson area, Sells insisted, according to one news-
paper account, that he had “nothing of local interest to announce, as his 
was . . .  entirely an inspection trip.” 91
In January 1916, however, a tele gram arrived in an O’odham village from 
Sells announcing that President Woodrow Wilson had, by executive order, 
established a permanent reservation for the O’odham. It was a stunning 
about- face by a government that still enforced the Dawes Act. Officials ex-
pressed the hope that the reservation, encompassing a staggering 3.1 mil-
lion acres, would provide the 5,500 tribal members ample space to farm and 
keep  cattle in their desert environment. In other words, while the old lands 
at San Xavier and Gila Bend  were, according to one newspaper, a “reserva-
tion to all intents and purposes,” the lands selected for the new reservation 
had been “formally recognized by the government as Indian territory.” 92 
Further, while the former reservations, in terms of allotted acreage, had 
proved insufficient again and again, the new reservation was, and remains, 
among the largest Indian reservations in the United States. It encompasses 
roughly the same area as the state of Connecticut or the country of Belgium. 
“The advantages to the Indians,” one article concluded, “are so evident that 
they scarcely need to be enumerated.” 93 Although it comprises only a por-
tion of the Papaguería, which extended into Sonora, the reservation is in-
deed fairly extensive. It includes lands between the Baboquivari Mountains 
to the west and the Ajo Mountains to the east down to the border and up 
just south of Interstate 10.  There are also small parcels of O’odham- controlled 
lands at Gila Bend, San Xavier, and Florence, Arizona. The reservation 
boasts roughly seventy villages, but only one proper town: Sells, which is 
the capital of the Tohono O’odham Nation. Vis i ble from nearly  every corner 
of the reservation is perhaps the most significant landmark in O’odham 
culture, Baboquivari Peak, which one scholar described as “the Garden of 
Eden and the Promised Land, rolled into one.” It is also regarded as “the 
center of the Tohono O’odham universe,” since the O’odham believe it to 
be the home of their creator, I’itoi. I’itoi is said to live in a cave beneath the 
mountain, and tribal members still visit the site and leave offerings such 
as key chains, rosary beads, cigarettes, and chewing gum. The peak is dif-
ficult to miss. A con temporary of  Father Kino’s nicknamed it “Noah’s Ark,” 
and more recently it has become a popu lar point of reference for undocu-
mented mi grants crossing on foot and heading  toward jobs in central Ari-
zona (they call it el Tambor, or the drum).94
While one newspaper welcomed the reservation grant, suggesting that 
the O’odham fi nally had an “adequate” reservation, another lambasted lo-
cal officials, accusing them of “napping” while Cato Sells seized “500 acres 
of land for each Papago buck, squaw, and papoose.” Aside from pointing 
out that the land grant comprised over one- half of Pima County, some of it 
likely containing the most fertile agricultural lands Arizona had to offer, 
the article was also careful to note that many of the O’odham  were “nomadic 
Indians from the Mexican side.” 95  Those who claimed that the O’odham 
 were American Indians, another article argued, simply had not done their 
research. “The home of the tribe,” it argued, “is at Poso [sic] Verde, Sonora, 
from whence they send their  children ‘across the line’ when they want them 
educated, and from which they come to the Papago country in the benefi-
cient [sic] land of Cato Sells to plant their annual temporals [sic], always 
returning, with few exceptions, to their Poso Verde home.” 96 Policy makers 
evidently heard the uproar, and responded in February 1917 by reducing 
the size of the reservation through an executive order that returned about 
475,000 acres to the public domain.  These lands came to be known as “the 
strip” since they ran more or less through the  middle of the reservation. 
Although the government eventually returned the strip to the tribe, as Win-
ston Erickson noted, “that they  were removed shows the dis plea sure and 
power of  those who did not want the lands in Indian hands.” 97
Although generous by reservation standards,  today the reservation 
encompasses only about a quarter of O’odham lands recognized in  Father 
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Kino’s time. Further, it does not include any O’odham lands in Mexico, 
leaving southern O’odham to fight their own  battles with a dif fer ent— and 
often less sympathetic— government.98 In the end, the creation of a reser-
vation within U.S. borders and U.S. borders alone only further inhibited the 
tribe’s transborder mobility. Even more than the U.S.- Mexico border, it 
clearly delineated where the O’odham could live and, by extension, where 
they could not, at least in the eyes of U.S. officials. Thus, although O’odham 
migration continued in subsequent years, it nevertheless became increas-
ingly difficult. Born in Pozo Verde, Sonora, in the early twentieth  century, 
Rita Bustamante recalled how normal it was to work on both sides of the 
border. “I remember when  there was no boundary,” she stated. “We O’odham 
just came and went as we pleased.” 99 But with the outbreak of World War I, 
suddenly crossing the border became problematic. It had been common for 
both O’odham and Mexicans to round up  cattle along the border  every six 
months or so. In 1916, however, Mexican soldiers prohibited the O’odham 
from entering Mexico for the first time. Soon thereafter, the O’odham be-
gan receiving word that Mexicans  were killing and eating O’odham  cattle, 
while also driving the tribe’s  horses farther south, making their retrieval 
by their O’odham  owners unlikely. The O’odham spent three years  going 
through diplomatic channels in an effort to reclaim their  cattle, but by that 
time their herds  were largely depleted. “They must have longed for the days,” 
Erickson contends, “when, faced with a similar prob lem, they armed them-
selves and retrieved their  cattle by force.” Then in the years following the 
war, the O’odham increasingly began appealing to U.S. officials for help regu-
lating traffic though their reservation, traffic that was resulting in stolen 
livestock and the smuggling of arms and ammunition into Mexico.100 The 
O’odham found the latter trend particularly troubling, in part  because the 
Mexican government, on more than one occasion, had accused them of as-
sisting the Yaquis in their aforementioned strug gles over land and autonomy 
by serving as a conduit for arms and ammunition. Although U.S. investiga-
tors found no evidence of O’odham complicity, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
deci ded that it was high time the border  running through O’odham land was 
fenced. “In theory,” Erickson explains, “they continued to have unrestricted 
access across the border, but as times changed, that access would become less 
 free.”101 The fence, though not exactly an insurmountable obstacle to trans-
border migration, was nonetheless a power ful portent of  things to come.
The Yaquis and Kickapoos assumed a transnational orientation out of 
necessity, as a strategy for survival, effectively adapting long- standing 
migratory patterns to new and ever- changing circumstances. While the 
O’odham found their transnational orientation imposed without their con-
sent and, in some cases, their knowledge, they responded in much the same 
way as the Yaquis and Kickapoos. All three groups turned to the U.S.- Mexico 
border to find solutions to per sis tent prob lems in their homelands,  adopted 
or other wise. And they  were remarkably successful in maintaining tribal 
cohesion, cultural continuity, and a per sis tent vision of nationhood even 
while straddling the borders of the United States and Mexico. Yet increas-
ing contact with  these two power ful, looming nation- states often interfered 
with their hard- won freedom to traverse the border when con ve nient, ex-
pedient, or necessary. In just the first three de cades of the twentieth  century, 
the border would evolve from a minor obstacle (at best) to a formidable 
barrier. U.S. immigration officials especially would step up their efforts to 
control transborder traffic through inspections and literacy tests, and, as 
one scholar explained, “Native  people who had long identified themselves 
on the basis of their ties to places and kinship groups [would strug gle] to 
assert their rights in a new national context in which citizenship was an 
impor tant source of power and privilege.”102 Thus, their often uncertain citi-
zenship and/or  legal statuses, products of their unusual orientation and 
migratory habits, meant that non- Indians more frequently challenged their 
sovereign status as Indians, along with their religious customs, cultural 
practices, and, especially, patterns of economic subsistence that required 
transborder mobility. Legislative and policy trends on both sides of the 
border further complicated efforts at maintaining hard- won transnational 
networks that enabled tribal cohesion and cultural continuity. In sum, all 
three groups found themselves facing obstacles that  were far more formi-
dable than any border fence.  These Indians’ responses to  these myriad 
twentieth- century challenges, however, displayed a level of ingenuity, re-
sourcefulness, and determination that, while remarkable, would not sur-
prise  those familiar with their long, troubled histories. In a sense, their 
early histories had primed them for what lay ahead. The Kickapoos alone 
had contended with, as one historian observed, “dif fer ent native nations, 
the Spanish and the British empires, Mexico, the Lone Star Republic, the 
Confederacy, vari ous states in the US and Mexican federal systems, and 
local officials in places like Coahuila and Ea gle Pass” over the course of the 
nineteenth  century. The relative stability of “bound aries and spheres of in-
fluence” during the twentieth must have come as a relief for  peoples so 
used to shifting po liti cal sands underfoot.103
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2 The Indigenous Race Is Abandoned
Indian Policies
In his 1979 essay “Mexico and the United States,” the Mexican poet Octavio 
Paz attempted to account for the profound social, economic, and psychic 
differences that have plagued relations between Mexico and the United 
States since the  middle of the eigh teenth  century, when, he asserted, Mexi-
cans, then  under Spain, first became aware an emergent national identity. 
He briefly focuses his attention on the question of the Indian presence in 
both countries and its function in their national narratives, concluding:
Mesoamerican civilization died a violent death, but Mexico is 
Mexico thanks to the Indian presence. Though the language and 
religion, the po liti cal institutions and the culture of the country 
are Western,  there is one aspect of Mexico that  faces in another 
direction— the Indian direction. Mexico is a nation between two 
civilizations and two pasts. In the United States, the Indian ele ment 
does not appear. This, in my opinion, is the major difference be -
tween our two countries. The Indians who  were not exterminated 
 were corralled into “reservations.” The Christian horror of “fallen 
nature” extended to the natives of Amer i ca: the United States was 
founded on a land without a past. The historical memory of 
Americans is Eu ro pean, not American.1
Paz went on to examine the influence of Hispanic Catholicism and 
En glish Protestantism on each country’s fundamental assumptions about 
the role indigenous populations would  later play in po liti cal, economic, and 
cultural spheres. With Hispanic Catholicism, he argued, “the notions of 
conquest and domination are bound up with ideas of conversion and as-
similation,” whereas in the En glish Protestant tradition, “conquest and 
domination imply not the conversion of the conquered but their segrega-
tion.”2 In his essay “The Emancipation of Amer i ca,” the Mexican historian 
Jaime  E. Rodríguez O. took this distinction one step further, writing, 
“Whereas educated members of both communities emphasized the unique 
characteristics of their land and  peoples, the Spanish Americans incorpo-
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rated their Indian heritage into their interpretation of American identity, 
while the British Americans did not.”3 While both Paz and Rodríguez O. 
have a point about New Spain’s determination to carve out a place for in-
digenous  peoples within colonial society, neither Spain nor its successor 
 government  were above at least de facto segregation.
In fact, although Paz and subsequent observers have emphasized differ-
ences in how both the United States and Mexico viewed Indian populations 
and conducted Indian affairs, one can locate remarkable parallels in even 
a superficial examination of broader policy currents and patterns of thought 
regarding the Indian presence in both countries. First of all, both the United 
States and Mexico ultimately opted for Indian policy agendas that included 
the forced acculturation and assimilation of Indian  peoples, or the stamp-
ing out of their essential “Indianness.” This required that each nation at least 
attempt to dismantle Indian  peoples’ cultural, religious, and po liti cal insti-
tutions, leaving only  those of non- Indians in their stead. Both nations then 
developed massive, and expensive, bureaucratic machinery through which 
they hoped to accomplish this objective. And fi nally, both nations reached 
a point where they grudgingly admitted that they had failed in their efforts 
and would have to acknowledge and even re spect the determination on the 
part of indigenous communities to maintain at least a semiautonomous po-
liti cal and cultural existence. But above all, both nations have historically 
exhibited a sustained preoccupation with the Indians residing within their 
borders. As the historian Francis Paul Prucha put it, Indians have been “con-
sistently in the consciousness of officials” on both sides of the international 
boundary, and for good reason.4 They had survived seemingly against all 
odds, and it seemed that no  matter how aggressive officials  were in attack-
ing their land base, undermining their subsistence strategies, and promot-
ing their acculturation and assimilation, indigenous  peoples found a way 
to persist in some form or other as separate cultural, and often po liti cal, 
entities.
Yet the question remains why parallel “prob lems” within both nation- 
states failed to produce parallel solutions. In other words, why did Mexico 
not develop the kinds of “blanket” Indian policies that characterized late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth- century Indian policy in the United States? 
And even more fundamentally, why did the Mexican government not opt 
for the reservation system as an arena in which to enforce acculturation, 
as did the United States, despite a similarly strong desire to stamp out more 
overtly “Indian” practices within its borders? Although the historian Clau-
dia Haake argued that “at a most basic level the similarities [between U.S. 
60 Chapter Two
and Mexican federal Indian policies] outweigh(ed) the dissimilarities,” a 
closer look reveals some notable impediments to the formulation and im-
plementation of a coherent, consistent “Indian policy” in Mexico, impedi-
ments that often owed their origin to a dogged determination to forge a 
single nation from what seemed like a dizzying array of extant and com-
peting nations, coupled with a pragmatic realization that any “blanket” pol-
icies would inevitably prove insufficient and even counterproductive in 
accomplishing this task.5
This chapter examines  these similarities and dissimilarities in order to, 
above all, contextualize the experiences of the Yaqui, Kickapoo, and Tohono 
O’odham Indians during the late nineteenth  century and through the 
twentieth  century. Scholarship on U.S. Indian policy is abundant, whereas 
scholarship on Mexican Indian policy is considerably less so. This is partly 
due to Mexico’s aforementioned lack of any blanket policies, which makes 
policy currents difficult to identify and less subject to generalization. But 
much like the U.S. government, the Mexican government frequently changed 
direction with regard to  those legislative mea sures designed to catalyze 
change within indigenous communities in the pursuit of some kind of broad 
policy objective. Depending on the presidential administration, the ideo-
logical climate, and, especially, the availability of funding, Indians  were 
sometimes celebrated and subsidized, sometimes maligned and marginal-
ized, and sometimes ignored altogether. Yet non- Indians in Mexico consis-
tently viewed Indians as social, cultural, and economic impediments to 
national pro gress, and often treated them as such. Although policy climates 
on both sides of the border did not always directly impact the Yaquis, Kick-
apoos, and Tohono O’odham, they do often explain the mobility of  these 
groups, or at least their resolve to maintain control over their respective des-
tinies in the face of policy currents seemingly designed to undermine that 
control. Their resolve, in turn, frequently led them beyond their own borders 
and across international ones, where they knew they could escape national 
prerogatives that too often proved detrimental to Indian  peoples, their 
sense of community and peoplehood, and their nationalizing agendas. Yet 
federal Indian policies could also serve as tools for Indian  peoples, or as a 
means of pursuing an immediate or long- term tribal agenda. Appealing to 
policymakers and/or submitting to prevailing policy currents, in other words, 
could also prove vital to the maintenance of at least a semiautonomous 
existence for at least portions of  these indigenous nations. However, as  will 
be shown, cooperation and compromise came with consequences. For a 
 whole host of complicated reasons, some of  these Indians  were, in the end, 
forced to choose the lesser of the two evils when it came to U.S. and Mexican 
Indian policies, which often meant fi nally severing the ties that bind at the 
increasingly formidable U.S.- Mexico border.
From virtually the United States’ inception, it recognized the  legal legiti-
macy of three types of government: federal, state, and tribal. The Ameri-
cans, like the British before them, relied on the treaty system, a system built 
upon a mutual recognition of national sovereignty, to govern relations be-
tween federal, state, and/or tribal governments. As the Commerce Clause 
(article 1, section 8) of the Constitution puts it, “The Congress  shall have 
Power . . .  to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Although the U.S. government did 
not permit tribal nations to raise armies or issue currency, tribal sovereignty 
other wise remained intact. Native nations had the authority to define 
citizenship, devise law enforcement and justice systems, regulate and tax 
property, and other wise govern the domestic affairs of its citizens.6
The late nineteenth  century would witness an escalation of unpre ce-
dented proportions in federal involvement in Indian affairs in the United 
States, and throughout the twentieth  century that involvement would only 
deepen. Prior to that, however, early U.S policymakers favored a  simple pol-
icy of physical removal and segregation of Indian  peoples, particularly 
 after the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory in 1803 made this strategy 
more  viable. The failure of Indian  peoples to acculturate and assimilate, 
from the perspective of U.S. policymakers, necessitated such drastic mea-
sures. Although the Indians’ physical removal was far from voluntary from 
the very beginning, it was not  until the administration of Andrew Jackson 
(1829–37) that removal became an official government program. Well- 
intentioned reformers promoted the policy as the only means of preventing 
the Indians’ destruction, giving them what reformers believed to be 
much- needed time and space to prepare for acculturation and eventual as-
similation into white Amer i ca. The federal government, meanwhile, en-
thusiastically  adopted the rhe toric of Indian reformers, but tended to harbor 
less noble motivations for implementing removal. Simply put, Indian re-
moval had the added benefit of pushing Indians beyond the perimeters of 
white settlement, thereby opening up their lands for the nation’s expan-
sion. The advent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in 1824 slightly pre-
dated the implementation of removal. Initially situated within the War 
Department, the BIA moved to the Department of the Interior in 1849. 
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Charged with the management of Indian lands and the implementation 
of Indian policies, the BIA would henceforth become a constant, almost 
domineering presence in the lives of Indian  peoples. With the BIA at the 
helm, removal as a policy proceeded with a remarkable rapidity. By 1840, 
in fact, lands east of the Mississippi River had been largely cleared of Indian 
tribes, though some tribal members opted to remain as individuals and 
obtain U.S. citizenship. The government sometimes relied on diplomacy to 
persuade Indians to relocate, though military action was an option that 
negotiators rarely took off the  table and sometimes implemented without 
hesitation.7
Removal and relocation as a policy, however, quickly fell out of  favor. 
With the nation’s dramatic territorial acquisition in the wake of the U.S.- 
Mexican War, coupled with the discovery of gold in California, Indian lands 
once again came  under siege by non- Indians who  were  either passing 
through or slowly expanding in ever- increasing numbers onto lands set aside 
by the federal government. Government policy, then, responded to this turn 
of events with the reservation system, which policymakers sometimes re-
ferred to as the policy of concentration. Pretty soon even the so- called  Great 
American Desert, or the  Great Plains, once thought fit only for Indian in-
habitants, was suddenly re imagined as the nation’s “heartland,” or a land 
of boundless agricultural potential. Concentrating Indians on even further 
reduced landholdings, then, had the dual benefit of making Indians easier 
to supervise, acculturate, and ultimately assimilate while also opening up 
surplus acreage in this “heartland” for white settlement.8
Gradually it became obvious that the strategy of  either isolating native 
populations on reservations or moving them westward was no longer  viable 
given the expense of administering the Indian reservations and the nation’s 
rapid growth. The U.S. government then began implementing a long series 
of mea sures designed to force the integration of Indians into the dominant 
social and economic order, thus relieving itself of the responsibility for their 
well- being. The aforementioned Dawes Act represented perhaps the most 
ambitious federally sanctioned attempt to detribalize and “Americanize” 
Indians.  Under this act, Congress essentially legislated many reservations 
out of existence. It forced select Indian tribes to accept individual allotments 
in lieu of collectively held lands, the goal being, in the words of one re-
former, to “awaken in him wants,” or to encourage private enterprise and 
competition among Indians by undermining communal landholding pat-
terns. Mas sa chu setts senator Henry Laurens Dawes, for whom the law was 
named, along with the majority of his self- styled Indian reformer contem-
poraries, viewed this as the most logical and expedient way to break the 
communal, and thus cultural, bonds between Indians and to force their 
integration into surrounding communities. However, it ultimately resulted 
in the loss of two- thirds of the Indian land base. As the Kickapoo case dem-
onstrated, allotments regularly fell into non- Indian hands, as Indians  were 
 either swindled by speculators or surrounding landowners or sold their al-
lotments for quick money.9
With their focus remaining squarely on a policy of forced assimilation, 
policymakers concurrently experimented with Indian education as a means 
of supplementing the aims of the Dawes Act. Reformers during this period 
(roughly 1875–1928) viewed education as the preferred method for introduc-
ing and instilling Christian values in Indian youths, since the majority of 
reformers shared the sentiment that older generations  were, so to speak, 
lost  causes. Sure, older Indians could be forced to accept allotments, build 
 houses, and submit to Anglo- American laws and customs, the argument 
went, but in their hearts they would always remain Indian, forever bound 
to tribal traditions. Thus, removing Indian  children from the reservation 
and placing them in boarding schools would, reformers hoped, preclude the 
possibility of a tribal identity taking root.10 The fact that the U.S. govern-
ment could legislate its  will over the American Indian population as a  whole 
both without their consent and in a blatant spirit of paternalism illustrated 
the fact that Indians’ collective fate was now at the mercy of ever- shifting 
currents in popu lar po liti cal thought. The BIA, meanwhile, gradually 
emerged as a bureaucratic power house, exercising what one scholar called 
“a nearly unfathomable degree of authority.” This late nineteenth- century 
emphasis on forced assimilation, however, ultimately fell out of  favor with 
policymakers, owing partly to its uneven results, but also to a shift in atti-
tudes among reformers and policymakers that was in part inspired by the 
spirit of the Depression- era New Deal.11
The 1934 Indian Reor ga ni za tion Act (IRA), the legislative arm of the so- 
called Indian New Deal, embodied this shift in attitudes.  Under the direc-
tion of Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier, who served from 1933 
to 1945, the BIA launched a massive campaign to preserve, protect, and 
foster the growth of what remained of Indian land and culture. Essen-
tially, federal Indian policy  under Collier concerned itself with the reversal 
of previous policy mea sures that favored forced assimilation, such as the 
Dawes Act. Through the IRA, Collier hoped to promote notions of cultural 
pluralism and tribal sovereignty, while reinforcing the concept that reser-
vations should be viewed as permanent homelands.12 Although the law did 
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not fulfill all of Collier’s desired aims, it did result in adequate economic 
success and, perhaps more importantly, had a profound psychological im-
pact, leaving many tribes more secure in their identities and more hopeful 
for their  futures. It also ended the allotment of Indian lands and helped 
reconstitute tribal governments, which left Indians feeling more confident 
that their reservations and reservation- based institutions had acquired 
enough  legal legitimacy to withstand  future attacks.13 As for the issue of 
indigenous nationhood in the United States, one study characterized the 
IRA as a “two- edged sword,” explaining:
On the one hand, they gave form and status to tribal governmental 
institutions, ending an era in which many tribes  were  either 
effectively powerless and run as wards of the federal government or 
largely neglected but unable to assert authority that federal and other 
authorities would recognize. On the other hand, they commonly 
proved to be in effec tive systems of government for tribes. For many, 
many tribes, governments or ga nized  under the IRA entailed a fatal 
flaw: they  were boilerplate systems that ignored the wide variety of 
legitimate governing forms tribes had used to rule themselves for 
innumerable years. Perhaps like trying to impose a monarchy on the 
United States  today, foreign systems in Indian Country have generally 
lacked legitimacy and support— and therefore effectiveness.14
It would be yet another challenge nascent indigenous nations like the 
ones discussed herein would face in reclaiming and/or protecting tribal 
sovereignty. Although policymakers never viewed the IRA as a complete 
failure, the act was nevertheless allowed to languish during the war 
years. Congress began the 1950s with yet another legislative about- face in 
the form of a new policy current ominously referred to as “termination.” 
Essentially, termination comprised twelve mea sures aimed at severing 
trust relationships between the federal government and all tribes located in 
Florida, New York, Texas, and California, and individual tribes such as the 
Menominee, Klamath, Flathead, Chippewa, and Potawatomi. The new legis-
lation relegated governmental responsibilities in the areas of social welfare, 
education, law enforcement, and economic assistance to the individual 
states, thereby effectively terminating tribal ties with the federal govern-
ment and abolishing some reservations.15
Termination resembled the Dawes Act not only in its ultimate objectives, 
which included complete cultural and economic mainstreaming and the 
revocation of tribal sovereignty, but also in its ideological origins. The Dawes 
Act reflected prevailing national sentiment in the post– Civil War years, as 
the country united in an attempt to redefine “nationhood” by calling for 
some semblance of national unity in the face of continued cultural diver-
sity. In this environment, the con spic u ous presence of po liti cal and cultural 
“islands” was particularly distressing.16 Similarly, in the post– World War II 
era, with McCarthyism in full swing, reservations came  under attack, with 
pundits claiming that they represented socialist institutions sanctioned by 
and situated within the confines of the self- proclaimed “greatest democracy 
in the world.” The emphasis placed on American Indian tribalism and cul-
tural regeneration and preservation during the Collier era of Indian affairs 
would find an ideological complement in the Indian rights movement of the 
1960s and 1970s. Put simply, termination, much like the Dawes Act, failed 
to bear fruit, instead only deepening the Indians’ dependence on the fed-
eral government while  doing  little to alienate them from their tribal iden-
tities. The second half of the twentieth  century witnessed the formation of 
AIM, or the American Indian Movement, which maintained a presence, in 
sometimes aggressive fashion, in the national po liti cal arena on behalf of 
Indian  peoples across the country. It also witnessed the passage of the 1975 
Indian Self- Determination and Education Assistance Act, which represented 
a further attempt at placing more po liti cal power in the hands of the Indi-
ans themselves.17 In the 1960s, as in the 1930s, the United States found it-
self swept up in a spirit of reform that touched many aspects of federal 
policy, leading many to renew their commitment to the “Indian cause.” From 
 here Indians would experience a surge in cultural pride, a renewed com-
mitment to protecting hunting and fishing rights, an erosion of the author-
ity of the BIA and of non- Indian religious institutions, and the strengthening 
of tribal governments and courts. “It is the  great irony of nineteenth- century 
Indian policy,” the  legal scholar Charles Wilkinson points out, “that the 
sharply reduced tribal landholdings, which Native  peoples bitterly pro-
tested,  later became cherished homelands and the foundation for the mod-
ern sovereignty movement.”18
Pinning down such currents in Mexican thought and federal action is a 
much more difficult task, since pinning down what it means to be an Indian 
in Mexico is more complicated. Being “Indian” in Mexico, generally speak-
ing, has tended to have more to do with economic status than ethnic or 
cultural makeup. Mexicans have often equated “Indianness” with “rural-
ness,” the idea being that isolated populations are more likely to cling to 
“tradition.” Mexicans have also commonly employed the term indio as an 
insult, understood as not quite a racial or cultural category, but more as a 
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suggestion of “otherness.” Or, on another level, it can simply imply a “lack 
of cool.”19 At one time,  these attitudes even pervaded the scholarly commu-
nity. For example, Albert Bushnell Hart, a professor of po liti cal science at 
Harvard University, wrote in 1914, “The fundamental trou ble in Latin Amer-
i ca, and particularly in Mexico, seems to be that the population is substan-
tially of native American origin,” and as a consequence the region had “not 
acquired the coolness and po liti cal reasonableness which are the basis of 
modern civilized government.”20 Over time Mexican thinkers revised and 
refined definitions of Indianness. Writing in 1942, the Mexican scholar 
Ramón G. Bonfil argued that the most “valid” marker of Indianness is the 
existence of a “dif fer ent mentality,” one “which makes [Indians] live beyond 
our laws, creating special patterns of social organ ization, dif fer ent forms 
of  labor than we have, and a cultural tempo distinct from that in which we 
live.” He also added that perhaps as a consequence  these individuals tend 
to be situated at the bottom of the “pyramid of Mexican society,” which has 
historically left them vulnerable to exploitation.21 Another longtime marker 
of Indianness in Mexico has been one’s language. As the anthropologist 
Miguel León- Portilla explained, millions of Mexicans “retain such pre- 
Hispanic survivals as a diet based on corn, and the use of ‘huaraches’ in-
stead of shoes,” so officials had to ignore  these and similar cultural traits 
and instead look  toward language in order to “most easily” identify Indians.22 
Yet, as one historian noted, “Still, more than five hundred years  after 
Columbus ‘discovered’ Indians,  there is confusion  today over what exactly 
constitutes an Indian in Mexico.”23 At least in a  legal, constitutional sense, 
Mexican Indians ceased to be “Indian” in the wake of the Mexican Revolu-
tion. Thus, any special status as “indigenous” was supposed to become a 
 thing of the past. Compounding the difficulties in separating Mexican Indi-
ans from non- Indians is the fact that racial mixing evidently occurred in 
Mexico to a much greater extent than in the United States. And as one 
scholar succinctly explained, “Where  there are no Indians  there can be no 
Indian policy.”24
This was not always the case in Mexico, however. In fact,  under Spain, 
Mexico had a fairly well- defined Indian policy, particularly since Spanish 
colonial officials viewed Indians as childlike and therefore in need of guid-
ance and oversight. The crown considered it a moral obligation to expose 
infidel Indians to Catholicism and Hispanic civilization. This did not mean, 
however, that Indians  were unfit to  labor on the Spaniards’ behalf. Colonial 
Indian policy thus established vari ous mechanisms, including the enco-
mienda and mission system, to extract  labor from Indians while, ostensibly, 
saving them from both themselves and an afterlife of torment.25 Lofty 
goals notwithstanding, in the end the Spanish  were far more successful in 
integrating Indians eco nom ically than culturally, gradually coming to be-
lieve that the former goal was realistic and worthwhile and the latter was 
not.26 The fundamental prob lem was that the Spanish never stopped view-
ing Indians as  children. Although Indian acculturation consistently remained 
the goal of Spanish policymakers  until the end of the colonial period, few 
Spaniards made an honest effort to meaningfully integrate Indians into 
Hispanic communities, instead opting to keep them concentrated in mis-
sions or self- contained Indian communities. Indians, then, had to take it 
upon themselves to challenge their segregation and marginalization, and 
they did so most often by entering the market economy. As the historian 
David Weber explains, “In many places, it seems that exposure to the mar-
ket economy and the workaday world of Hispanic frontier society did more 
than missions to alter Indian society and culture.” Indians learned the 
Spanish language, learned Spanish trade protocol, and even learned to 
“drink, swear, and  gamble in the Spanish way.” Many Indians, however, let 
their “acculturation” go only so far. Some continued to use stone tools, for 
example, despite the general availability of metal tools. And while some 
significantly altered their religious beliefs to accommodate Catholic doc-
trine, the pull of more traditional forms of worship and systems of belief 
typically remained power ful.  After all, religions are often born out of the 
pro cess of assigning meaning to the spaces in which  peoples live and work. 
Catholicism could rarely compete with such so- called emplaced religions. 
While the Spanish could alter be hav iors and even some beliefs, divesting 
 these spaces of meaning was another  matter altogether.27
The 1821 Plan de Iguala, which established Mexican in de pen dence, at-
tempted to further undermine the distinction between Indians and non- 
Indians so firmly established during the Spanish colonial period. It declared 
all Mexican nationals, regardless of their ethnic and cultural backgrounds, 
equal citizens of the newly in de pen dent republic. Although this was a largely 
symbolic gesture, the declaration demonstrated that, unlike the United 
States and Canada, Mexico was determined to break with Indian policies 
that it now viewed as irrelevant and even counterproductive relics of its 
colonial past and thus at odds with the nationalizing proj ect it now had 
to undertake.28 The break, however, often had grave consequences for the 
nation’s indigenous  peoples, since it placed them in an even more vulner-
able position. For example, in 1863, President Benito Juárez announced a 
federal initiative in which terrenos baldíos would be divided up and sold in 
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order to fight French efforts to colonize Mexico. The new laws resulted in 
the loss of 4.5 million acres of land over the course of four years, the vast 
bulk of which belonged to indigenous  peoples who  were unable to provide 
proof of owner ship. Although Juárez’s initiative predated the Dawes Act 
by a  couple of de cades, it had an eerily similar impact on Indian  peoples. 
While intended to provide small farms to members of Indian communities, 
federal and state initiatives aimed at land distribution more often than not 
led to their displacement. Indians, in turn, often ended up laboring on large 
haciendas, the  owners of which had the influence and financial means to 
simply purchase  those lands intended for re distribution. Another funda-
mental prob lem was that land alone did not always deliver on the promise 
of productivity or economic security. Local environments, especially des-
ert environments,  were not always suitable for agriculture, and local indig-
enous  peoples  were not always  eager to be molded into mestizo farmers by 
the Mexican state. Mexico often appeared to be among  those states that 
have been, as the po liti cal scientist and anthropologist James Scott put it, 
“driven by utopian plans and an authoritarian disregard for the values, 
desires, and objections of their subjects.” In Mexico’s attempt to foster 
“huge, utopian changes in  people’s work habits, living patterns, moral con-
duct, and worldview,” it  either failed to note or chose to ignore a  whole 
host of realities on the ground, many environmental in nature, that would 
inevitably complicate  these efforts.29
As in the United States, one can easily detect patterns of anti- Indian 
thinking in nineteenth- century Mexico, at least among Mexican officials. 
They excluded native languages from  legal and administrative discourse, 
and liberals as well as conservatives came to conclude that Indians must 
 either be transformed and assimilated or exterminated altogether. It was a 
pro cess one scholar characterized as an attempt to “whiten the nation” 
through institutional means.30 Near the end of the  century, however, Mex-
ican intellectuals took the lead in defending indigenous populations from 
 these assaults or in encouraging their integration into the Mexican nation 
through a deeper understanding of their cultures and histories. Their ef-
forts, though laudable, would amount to very  little during the Porfiriato 
(1876–1911), when the Mexican government, with the dictator Porfirio Díaz 
at the helm, was far more likely to promote an image of Indians as impedi-
ments to national pro gress. In fact, in confronting  those impediments, Díaz 
attacked their land base first, opening up supposedly vacant lands to for-
eign immigration and cultivation, a strategy that, again, had much in com-
mon with that of Dawes- era reformers north of the border. He also permitted 
individuals operating  under the auspices of his “colonization programs” to 
ignore Indian ejidos, or lands held in common by Indian groups. In the end, 
about two million acres of communal lands fell into non- Indian, and often 
non- Mexican, hands.31 This is one policy development that did profoundly 
impact the Indian subjects of this book, as  will be shown. One con temporary 
noted that Díaz’s reforms made Indians feel like “a son whose  father denied 
him food while at the same time inviting strangers to dine.” Although Díaz 
took a few halting steps in developing a system of Indian education, as re-
formers in the United States  were then  doing, he did so halfheartedly and 
with few successes. Most of the Indian schools established during the Por-
firiato floundered due to the lack of a sustained financial commitment. The 
Indians, too, had something to do with  these early failures. For example, in 
1909 the Kickapoos burned down their new school before it had even 
opened, which, as  will be shown, would not be the last time they would go 
to such extremes in resisting non- Indian education.32
In a nation whose history is peppered with noteworthy indigenous fig-
ures, anti- Indian sentiment in Mexico proved problematic. How could one 
reconcile the Indians’ alleged inferiority given so much historical evidence 
to the contrary? As one historian put it, “Mexico’s historical experience 
demonstrated the absurdity of the racist position. The lives of Juárez, Al-
tamirano, Ramírez, and many  others proved that Indians had the same 
capabilities as white men.”33 Francisco Belmar, a member of Mexico’s 
Supreme Court, acted on this increasingly pervasive sentiment in 1910 by 
founding the Indianist Society of Mexico. He hoped his organ ization would 
encourage the study of Mexican Indians in order to ultimately “redeem” 
them, or in a sense rescue them from poverty and supposed misery. His 
ideas caught on in a big way in subsequent years. In fact, in a brave display 
of defiance, a member of the organ ization, speaking in the presence of Díaz 
himself, stated bluntly, “I come, gentlemen, to confirm that the indigenous 
race is abandoned, and that this is not just.”34
An unpre ce dented official push for Indian assimilation into the Mexican 
nation began in 1910 with the Mexican Revolution, which precipitated Díaz’s 
downfall. In yet another parallel to the Dawes Act north of the border, Plu-
tarco Elías Calles’s government attempted to incorporate Indians into the 
national fold by depriving them of their lands. With the 1916 Decree No. 33, 
the Calles government addressed the Indians of Sonora specifically in the 
form of a thinly veiled threat, warning, “The nomadic tribes and  those of 
the Yaqui and Mayo River  will not enjoy the right of Sonoran citizenship as 
long as their farms and villages maintain their anomalous organ ization.” 
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In return for joining the national fold, the decree promised that  those in-
digenous  peoples who instead lived in “the or ga nized communities of the 
state” would enjoy the “privilege of citizenship.”35 The obvious prob lem was 
one of incentive. The lure of citizenship simply was not power ful enough for 
the nation’s semiautonomous indigenous groups to vacate their lands, for-
feit their autonomy, and relocate to “or ga nized communities.” It was a 
prob lem that had plagued non- Indians in North Amer i ca for centuries: How 
does one go about controlling  those Indians who, in the words of David We-
ber, “successfully maintained their po liti cal and spiritual in de pen dence” 
and “continued to assert their claims, often with gun and powder”?36 In 
some regions of North Amer i ca, this “prob lem” persists to the pres ent day.
Still, as in the post– Civil War years in the United States, internal con-
flict in Mexico in the early twentieth  century encouraged an aggressive pur-
suit of national unity that very often targeted Indian populations. Mexican 
leaders placed a similar emphasis on conformity, declaring that Indians who 
fought in the revolution needed to be reminded that they  were Mexicans 
first and foremost. For example, in 1925 Mexico’s Education Ministry 
founded the Casa del Estudiante Indígena in Mexico City, which attempted 
to “civilize” Mexico’s indigenous  peoples through an education in and ex-
posure to Mexican culture. In the 1930s Mexican officials began opening 
similar schools in vari ous Mexican states, each designed to stamp out tribal 
cultures, teach indigenous  peoples the Spanish language, and replace their 
allegiance to the tribal unit with Mexican patriotism. The program specifi-
cally targeted indigenous boys, calling for their removal from indigenous 
communities and their total immersion in modern Mexican society. It was 
an Indian policy initiative that suggested a familiarity with the boarding 
school experiment in the United States.37
 These efforts  were an early expression of a broader trend in twentieth- 
century Mexican history that Mexican intellectuals termed indigenismo. While 
postrevolutionary Mexico demanded Indian integration into Mexican soci-
ety and the body politic (though, of course, only  after acculturating), it also 
often voiced pride in its Indian heritage. In fact, Mexico’s postrevolutionary 
po liti cal and intellectual elite came to view indigenous  peoples as central to 
the nation’s identity. The historian Rick López explains:
 These urban elites interpreted Mexico as falling horribly short of 
new ideas about what it meant to be a modern nation. They felt 
that to be modern a nation had to be a culturally, eco nom ically, 
and po liti cally distinct and unified  people with deep historical 
roots . . .  Indianness, they argued, was the thread that would unite 
the diverse populations living within the territory of the Mexican 
Republic and distinguish Mexico among a global  family of other 
nation- states. To be truly Mexican one was expected to be part Indian 
or to demonstrate a concern for the valorization and redemption of 
the Mexican Indian as part of the nation.  Those who rejected the 
country’s Indianness  were publicly chastised for their foreignness 
and lack of nationalist zeal.38
Thus, indigenismo was, as another historian succinctly put it, an attempt 
to challenge “the exclusive association of modernity with whiteness.” Yet 
while reformers used indigenous  peoples as a rallying point in jump- starting 
their nationalizing proj ect, they  were also keenly aware that their message 
was not likely to resonate with the very  peoples they  were celebrating. So 
beyond playing up their centrality to Mexican national identity, reformers 
promised to provide at least  those Indians who fought in the revolution with 
a variety of opportunities to participate in the local and national economy. 
Inviting them into the economic fold, the reformers reasoned, might help 
foster the nationalistic impulse that they felt lacking among Mexico’s in-
digenous population, which, in turn, might lessen the sociocultural gap 
between themselves and the nation’s Indian  peoples.39 “We do not accept 
the thesis,” stated one official, perfectly summing up Indigenista ideology, 
“that the Indian’s backwardness is due to innate deficiencies which he has 
neither  will nor ambition to overcome. On the contrary, we believe that 
his backwardness is the fault of  those who have made him an object for 
exploitation.” 40 Another Mexican official stated his case more forcefully, 
 arguing, “That builder, that creator, that patriot is, as we all know, the 
 humble, naked, poor, despised Mexican Indian. The destiny of the nation 
lies  today, as it did yesterday and as it always  will, in the hands of this 
power ful titan.” Before the nations of the Amer i cas could pro gress, he con-
cluded, the Indian must be allowed to “descend from the cross of misery 
and ignorance where the wicked ones mercilessly tied him.” 41 The image 
of Indians as having been callously exploited and marginalized by their 
selfish, greedy, non- Indian countrymen was evidently a power ful one.
It was also an accurate one. As the historian Alexander Dawson points 
out, Mexican Indians in the first half of the twentieth  century “lived in mis-
ery, and  were broadly perceived as a crippling burden to the nation.” Near 
midcentury some Mexican officials began expressing concerns that indigen-
ismo had stagnated and that more aggressive steps needed to be taken to 
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spur Indian acculturation.42 This more urgent emphasis on Indian accultur-
ation coincided with an increasing faith in scientific investigation to ad-
dress such perceived social ills. Following the lead of Indian enthusiasts 
such as Belmar, government officials came to the conclusion that they must 
first understand Indians if they  were to improve their standard of living 
and, ultimately, incorporate them into the Mexican nation. The Mexican 
government had taken the first steps in this mission back in 1917, when it 
created the Department of Anthropology, and the mission gained momen-
tum  under the direction of the influential anthropologist Dr. Manuel Gamio 
in the years that followed. Scientific studies  were one  thing; however, re-
formers soon identified the need to apply  these studies. In the 1930s, the 
government created the National Institute of Anthropology and History 
and the Autonomous Department of Indian Affairs in order to bridge the 
gap between scientific study and practical application. In 1947, the Mexi-
can government placed the Autonomous Department of Indian Affairs  under 
the Ministry of Education, renaming it the Department of Indian Affairs. 
The following year, the government created the National Indian Institute 
and charged it with working in conjunction with the Inter- American Indian 
Institute  toward the establishment of multiple “coordinating centers” through-
out Latin Amer i ca to administer participating governments’ acculturation 
programs. The base of operations for  these vari ous organ izations remained, 
for de cades, Mexico City. A host of journals, including the bimonthly Bo-
letín Indigenista and the quarterly América Indígena, supplemented their 
efforts, serving as what one publication called ‘information organs.”  These 
too  were based in Mexico City.43 As in the United States, the bureaucratic 
machinery that aimed to govern the lives of Indian  peoples was seemingly 
growing more complex with each passing de cade.
Still, Mexico worked diligently to foster the impression that its program 
was hemispheric in scope, even devoting financial resources to international 
outreach. For example, in 1941 the Mexican government invited Pueblo 
Indians from the United States to meet with vari ous Indian communities 
across Mexico. A per for mance at Mexico City’s Palace of Fine Arts, during 
which the Pueblos presented songs and dances, capped off the visit.44 And 
beginning in 1940, the Department of Indian Affairs inaugurated an annual 
Day of the Indian. Held  every April at the Fine Arts Plaza in Mexico City, 
the affair celebrated Indian contributions to broader American history while 
providing the opportunity to reflect on ongoing prob lems facing the hemi-
sphere’s indigenous  peoples. At one such Day of the Indian, in fact, Sonoran 
Yaquis and Kickapoos from Coahuila treated attendees to tribal dances.45 
At the 1953 gathering, Dr. Alfonso Caso, director of the National Indian In-
stitute of Mexico, explained the purpose of the Day of the Indian:
The ceremony we hold  every year on this day is more a symbol than 
an act of remembrance. We are not  here to commemorate the past 
glories of the Teotihuacán, Toltec, Aztec, Maya, Zapotec, Mixtec, 
Tarrascan, Chibcha, Inca and many other  great civilizations that 
used to flourish on the continent . . .  Today’s cele bration is not only 
for the purpose of recalling the greatness of our Indian ancestors;  
it serves to indicate the firm  will of the governments and  people of 
Amer i ca to destroy an often secular injustice that reduced this 
Indian race, at one time lords of the Continent[,] to the state of 
material and cultural impoverishment in which it now finds itself. 
That is why I say that  today’s ceremony is a symbol; it means that 
the  people of Amer i ca have definitely deci ded to solve the prob lem 
of the  great Indian masses of Amer i ca and bring them what they 
lack: communications, schools, health ser vices, land and  water, 
protection of their forests, and protection against non- Indian 
groups that have exploited them for centuries.46
In this mission, Latin Amer i ca also looked to the United States for an ex-
ample. Ec ua dor’s ambassador to Mexico, Dr. Jorge Villagómez Yépez, sin-
gled out the New Dealer John Collier, whom he referred to as the “wise 
president” of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, in praising the United States’ 
activism. Collier, he asserted, “has proclaimed the need for an ‘orderly with-
drawal’ and for the reintegration of the North American Indian into the 
general life of the country. The magnificent idea  behind this is cultural 
pluralism which  favors protecting the distinctive characteristics of under- 
developed ethnic groups and aiding in their special development.” 47 Although 
he seems to have misinterpreted Collier’s broader mission of revitalizing 
Indian cultures through a strengthening of reservation communities and 
tribal governments, his remarks do demonstrate that Indigenistas went to 
 great lengths to promote a mission that they believed had attained an air 
of universality, or at least one that was on the cutting edge of Indian policy 
currents. As Dawson explains, Indigenistas “took the radical view that 
the nation was made up of a plurality of cultures, and called for self- 
empowerment, the inclusion of locals in decision making, and ultimately 
even recognized the right of indigenous  peoples to self- determination.” 48 
Generally speaking, however, Mexican policymakers frowned on the 
reservation system employed by the United States. One Mexican official 
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summed it up nicely, stating, “To imprison [the Indian] theoretically or prac-
tically on ‘reservations’ is to condemn him to a sterile life, and ultimately 
extinction.” 49
Thus, Indigenistas took  great pains to learn from what they perceived to 
be the United States’ Indian policy failures. In the mid-1920s, for example, 
a Mexican official toured Indian schools and reservations in the United 
States, and was troubled by what he witnessed. First of all, despite the long 
push for Indian assimilation in the United States via the Dawes Act and the 
Indian education experiment, Indian  peoples, in his words, “continued to 
form a separate social group,” completely cut off from “the rest of the com-
ponents of the American  union.” Second, Indians obviously resented the fact 
that while pushing for their assimilation, the U.S. government appeared 
si mul ta neously determined to “not make them an integral part, neither as 
citizens nor as social subjects, of the  great national  family.” One must take 
this official’s observations with a grain of salt, however. As the historian 
Stephen Lewis aptly observed, “In a predominately mestizo nation, the idea 
of ‘social separation’ was a disturbing one, even if it existed in practice.”50 
And at least in the case of the Tohono O’odham, Mexican officials put forth 
 little effort in dissuading the O’odham from relocating en masse to the Ari-
zona reservation. As has been shown,  there was in fact a concerted push in 
late nineteenth- century Mexico to, as the historians Andrae Marak and 
Laura Tuennerman put it, “eliminate corporate identities and communities— 
especially  those of the Catholic Church, peasant pueblos, and indigenous 
groups— and replace them with wage laborers and cap i tal ist yeoman farm-
ers who, it was hoped, would view themselves as Mexican citizens.” The 
O’odham watched as Mexican settlers entered their lands in search of pre-
cious metals or a piece of the expanding  cattle industry. They also had to 
contend with a railroad, which had been constructed to connect Guaymas, 
Sonora, and Nogales, Arizona, that now ran through the heart of their ances-
tral lands. It is  little won der, then, that so many opted for life on a reservation 
in the United States, however distasteful and counterproductive Mexican 
reformers found the reservation concept to be.51
In the end, the pro cess of acculturation failed to pro gress to the satisfac-
tion of reformers, despite unpre ce dented efforts on the federal government’s 
behalf. And when elected in 1934, President Lázaro Cárdenas helped many 
of the nation’s Indian  peoples maintain a buffer zone between themselves 
and their non- Indian neighbors through a series of land reform mea sures. 
As Claudia Haake observed, “Cárdenas saw the ejido as more than a transi-
tional device and rather as a model to capitalistic agriculture.” In a very 
real way, then, the ejido designation, as interpreted by Cárdenas, had much 
in common with reservations in the United States, which, at least during 
the Collier era, came to be viewed as permanent homelands for Indian 
 peoples. Also among Cárdenas’s initiatives was the re distribution of roughly 
eigh teen million hectares of land to an estimated 800,000 recipients, many 
of them members of indigenous communities. The number of landless in 
Mexico fell from 2.5 million to 1.9 million.52 As  will be shown, the Yaquis 
in par tic u lar  were beneficiaries of this new trend in the history of Mexican 
“Indian policy.”
Still, not all Indians embraced Cárdenas’s efforts at reform. In fact, in the 
1930s Mexican educators conducted a survey of Indian communities and en-
countered staunch opposition to integration into Mexican national culture 
and the Mexican economy. Thus, as the twentieth  century progressed it 
tended to be the Mexican government and non- Indian mestizos who felt 
“abandoned” by indigenous  peoples, not the other way around. Put simply, 
they  were surprised and dismayed to receive so  little in the way of coop-
eration from indigenous communities. Indians  were, in the words of one 
scholar, “refusing to fall in line with postrevolutionary visions of a mod-
ern Mexican state,” a situation non- Indians found disappointing and, ul-
timately, troubling. For example, non- Indians continued to regard the 
southern O’odham as at best “proto- citizens” who desperately needed state 
tutelage and at worst, at least according to one historian’s assessment, “lazy, 
drunken . . .  thieves,” a “wandering  people,” and an ongoing “prob lem” 
the nation had still not managed to solve despite its best efforts. And the 
clearest sign that the O’odham had “abandoned” the Mexican nation was 
that fact that by the second half of the twentieth  century so many had per-
manently left their lands in Mexico, choosing instead to reside on the Sells 
reservation in Arizona.53
Thus, while the national government had invested heavi ly in a twofold 
strategy that, again much like that of the United States fifty years before, 
during the Dawes era, focused on economic integration and education as 
key to assimilation, Indian populations remained resistant to their efforts. 
And it was through that re sis tance to federal programs that Mexico’s indig-
enous  peoples made their voices heard, and, at least temporarily, forced the 
federal government to reimagine Mexico as more a plurality of nations than 
a single nation. Simply put, Indigenistas  were perhaps overly ambitious from 
the outset in that they attempted to, as Dawson explains, “create a new state 
and extend its authority across a national territory that remained largely 
outside the scope of federal control.” Unlike the indigenous  peoples they 
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 were working hard to reform, early Indigenistas believed that modernity 
and nationhood  were one and the same. Creating a nation, they main-
tained, required the undermining of Mexico’s many pockets of indigenous 
autonomy.54
Mexico’s Indians  were not as malleable or compliant as the Indigenistas 
had anticipated, however, and the goal of assimilating Indians into the Mex-
ican mainstream ultimately proved unrealistic. Simply put, the Indians re-
fused to forfeit their own cultural convictions, and  were growing more and 
more  adept at limiting the reformers’ access to their communities.55 Another 
barrier to their nationalizing efforts involved, again, per sis tent difficulties 
in identifying who was Indian. Dawson explains, “Indigenistas used a vari-
ety of racial and cultural data, along with their own imaginations, [to iden-
tify] both the Indian and the mestizo,” ultimately concluding that Indians 
comprised between 30 and 50  percent of Mexico’s population— figures that 
must have led to a reevaluation of their nationalizing mission. In other 
words, since the Indian population appeared to be growing in tandem with 
the rest of the population, Indians no longer appeared to be a shrinking, 
doomed minority despite de cades of efforts aimed at their acculturation.56
In the end, the prob lems encountered by Indigenistas forced them to 
abandon many of their initial goals and move to a surprising new line of 
thought. Continued diversity within Mexico’s borders, they  were begin-
ning to conclude, was in fact a source of strength. Dawson explains, 
“Mexico, they deci ded, was not one nation but many, each with a right to 
self- determination based upon their distinct histories, geographies, and 
cultures.” They found no reason to eliminate local systems of government, 
such as councils of elders (an institution the Kickapoos once maintained), 
and instead portrayed such systems as a way for indigenous  peoples to exist 
in modern Mexico with dignity. It was a revolutionary new intellectual di-
rection, and one that would have staying power. One intellectual went so 
far as to suggest that more “advanced” Indian tribes should be recognized 
as separate nationalities within Mexico’s borders, and, as such, should be 
allowed to conduct their own affairs in their own language and according 
to their own local needs.57
 Whether or not federal policies affected any real change in indigenous 
areas within Mexico is difficult to ascertain due to the absence of any “blan-
ket” Indian policies, such as the Dawes Act, the Indian Reor ga ni za tion Act, 
or the termination mea sures, coupled with per sis tent difficulties in actually 
identifying Indians. In their efforts to incorporate Indian  peoples into the 
social, economic, and po liti cal orbit of the Mexican nation, officials consis-
tently downplayed the Indians’ separateness, or the socioeconomic gulf that 
stood between them and their non- Indian neighbors. Unlike the United 
States, which differentiated between “recognized” and “unrecognized” 
Indian groups (with the former enjoying a host of  legal privileges and 
exceptions), Mexico made no such distinction. Generally speaking, post-
revolutionary governments in Mexico have largely confined their efforts, 
where indigenous  peoples are concerned, to land distribution. Furthermore, 
their efforts targeted not just landless indigenous  peoples, but all of Mexico’s 
landless poor (even though the government has been well aware that the 
vast majority of Mexicans comprising the “landless poor” are of indigenous 
ancestry). In explaining the government’s continued lack of activity in the 
arena of Indian affairs, at least when compared to the United States, Clau-
dia Haake contended, “It may be that the state was not strong enough for a 
coherent policy  towards the members of the indigenous members of the 
nation, or, more likely, that it was unwilling to face the consequences this 
would have brought.” Furthermore, it has historically been in the best in-
terest of the Mexican nation to ignore the “Indian prob lem” by simply pre-
tending that, at least in an official capacity, Indians did not exist. Policies 
more generally aimed at “peasants,” then, could maintain the fiction of na-
tional unity while relieving the government of additional responsibilities. 
As Haake astutely observed, since the Mexican Revolution, Indians have 
been a “ people disowned,” struggling against a “policy disguised.” Policies 
emanating from the Mexican government, in other words, rarely treated 
Indian  peoples and mestizos the same. The most expeditious way to 
confront the “Indian prob lem,” it turned out, was to acknowledge their 
Indianness, or their po liti cal and cultural uniqueness, and then strategize 
accordingly.58
Luckily for  these reformers, the bulk of the twentieth  century witnessed 
far less dramatic forms of indigenous re sis tance than the previous  century 
on both sides of the U.S- Mexico border. At least in the case of the Yaquis, 
Kickapoos, and Tohono O’odham, new patterns of re sis tance would emerge 
in courts, before congressional committees, in communications with im-
migration or other federal authorities, and in letters to connected politi-
cians, scholars, or even  these Indians’ transborder counter parts. In other 
words, at a certain point the vari ous Yaqui, Kickapoo, and Tohono O’odham 
communities more or less stabilized. Patterns of transnational mobility that 
had so often led to vio lence, instability, and uncertainty during the previ-
ous  century gave way to a new (and, it turned out, more  viable) survival 
strategy: working through the system rather than continuing to operate 
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beyond its purview or in open defiance of its prerogatives. Oftentimes 
 these groups  adopted this new strategy by choice, engaging one or the other 
nation- state in order to meet an immediate or long- term agenda, while 
other times government bureaucrats attempted, with varying degrees of 
success, to impose their  will on  these determined but increasingly divided 
indigenous nations. In the end, transnational networks that had once flour-
ished would, almost across the board, constrict to the point that  little trans-
border  human traffic flowed unfettered. What had once been a symbol of 
opportunity and possibility had become an obstacle that seemed less and 
less worth the effort to confront. Still, indigenous  peoples on both sides of 
the increasingly formidable border would keep their eyes fixed on the ter-
minuses of  these once flourishing transnational networks, always with a 
sense of themselves as part of something larger than a single nation could 
contain.
3 God Gave the Land to the Yaquis
The Beleaguered Yaqui Nation
In the earliest hours of the first day of Lent, 1934, Yaqui Indian Rosalio Moi-
sés had what he described as a “very good dream.” In it, a group of white 
men arrived in the Yaqui River valley to aid the beleaguered group in their 
seemingly endless strug gles with their non- Indian neighbors. In fact, 
Moisés was not the first Yaqui to be visited by this dream. Years prior, José 
María Nóteme often told Yaqui audiences, including a young Moisés, of a 
recurring dream of his own in which the Mexican military began waging 
war on the Yaquis anew, this time threatening to “finish off the Yaquis” for 
good. Then, just when all seemed lost, the white strangers arrived from 
the north and, as Moisés  later recounted, “ask[ed] the Yaquis about all 
that had happened to them and  little by  little help[ed] them to make a 
happy living.” Only days  after Moisés’s dream, a group of white men did, 
in fact, arrive in the valley. “When I heard this,” Moisés remembered, “I 
thought, ‘ These are the white men I saw in my dream, and my dreams never 
lie to me.’ ”1
The “white men”  were actually members of a nine- man expeditionary 
party headed by the anthropologist William Curry Holden and sponsored 
by Texas Technological College in Lubbock. They set out to study, in the 
words of a Lubbock- based publication, “the physical, social, religious, gov-
ernmental, and economic aspects of . . .  the last unconquered primitive 
 people of the North American Continent.” The travelers arrived during a 
precarious peace between the Yaquis and the Mexican military, and on the 
heels of one of the largest indigenous revolts in North American history, a 
revolt that, late in the previous  century, nearly resulted in the tribe’s com-
plete removal from the Yaqui River valley. Meanwhile, in addition to the 
“half- subdued groups in the garrisoned villages,” the expeditionary party 
heard tell of Yaqui “holdouts” still populating area mountain ranges, con-
tinuing the tribe’s tradition of re sis tance to non- Yaqui authority. In fact, one 
member of the party casually recorded in his diary during the expedition’s 
early days, “A Yaqui was killed  today by some soldiers in the mountains.”2 
The Yaqui River valley in mid-1934, then, was still a volatile place.
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In the interest of keeping the peace, the Mexican government evidently 
had the Yaquis on the military payroll, though the Indians possessed no uni-
forms, nor did they ever report for duty. The government was, according to 
one account, simply “paying the Yaqui to be good.” This was, in fact, the 
government’s strategy. Allowing the tribe to maintain at least some sense 
of military pride, as well as a semblance of in de pen dence, they reasoned, 
would make the Yaquis easier to control. In entering Yaqui country, the 
party from Texas had to acquire the consent of both the Mexican military 
and Yaqui leaders. The outsiders reportedly received the cold shoulder from 
the Yaquis initially, since they had requested Mexican cooperation before 
consulting the tribe. It was a minor affront, however, upon which the tribe 
did not dwell. In fact, the Yaquis quickly overcame their initial suspicion 
and befriended the Texans  after realizing that they had once shared a com-
mon  enemy: the Mexican government, whom the Texans, the Yaquis re-
called with delight, had soundly defeated in their own bid for in de pen dence.3
If the party had entered Yaqui country twenty years earlier, they might 
not have survived that initial encounter. The anthropologist Ralph Beals re-
called traveling to the Yaqui River with his  brother Carleton and two other 
American companions in 1917 despite warnings by residents of nearby Guay-
mas that they steer clear of the region altogether. They soon came upon 
what appeared to be a Yaqui war party destroying a railroad bridge. For 
reasons that  were unclear to Beals and his  brother, their two American com-
panions deci ded to approach the Yaquis. Suddenly the situation turned vio-
lent, and Beals and his  brother watched in horror as the Yaquis beat the two 
men to death with clubs. He and his  brother quickly retreated to Guaymas, 
shaken but other wise unharmed. The encounter made a lasting impression 
on Beals, however, and in time he would come to regard the Yaquis as, in 
the historian Ruben Flores’s words, “a power ful symbol of re sis tance to the 
power of the state.” While their fierce determination to “preserve their com-
munity by maintaining clear bound aries to the outside” was put on full 
display that day in 1917, it was their “rabid sense of nationalism” that most 
impressed Beals.4
Holden and crew apparently shared that sentiment. They would  later 
claim to have witnessed firsthand the inner workings of what one account 
characterized as “the only ‘state within a state’ to be found in the western 
hemi sphere.” Although the Yaquis lived within Mexican borders and “ under 
the muzzle of Mexican army guns,” they had maintained their right to “ad-
minister their own justice, obey their own laws, have their own military 
organ izations and— above all— pack their own guns.” One party member 
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characterized the Yaqui military as “like a foreign legion.” “This  couldn’t 
happen in our country” was the general consensus.5 It should be added, 
however, that this was not strictly a “Yaqui prob lem” the Mexican govern-
ment had on its hands. Flores further argued that in early twentieth- century 
Mexico “neither the state nor industry had yet accelerated to the point of 
destroying the panoply of cultural communities that defined the country.” 6 
 These “cultural communities” only needed to remain steadfast in the face 
of the state’s efforts to undermine their uniqueness and even their sover-
eignty, as the Yaquis had been  doing so effectively.
The concerns of  those Yaquis who remained in Mexico, then, diverged 
dramatically from  those of their Arizona- based counterpart. Taking shape 
in Sonora was a more militant Yaqui nationalism, one characterized by a 
marked indifference to and suspicion of outsiders. Their primary preoccu-
pation was the maintenance of the group’s po liti cal and cultural autonomy, 
which required the maintenance of their land base, which just happened 
to contain some of the richest farmland in North Amer i ca. Yaquis in Ari-
zona, meanwhile, mostly inhabited Pascua Village on the outskirts of Tuc-
son, though a lesser number inhabited nearby Barrio Belén. Older Yaquis 
in the region, the anthropologist Edward Spicer observed, lived in “an atmo-
sphere of the recent past.” They gathered often to share stories of Cajeme, of 
vio lence, of flight, and of escape. A favorite was the story of Francisco Va-
lencia, who went so far as to join a circus troupe in order to cross into the 
United States. “They are all refugees, and they do not forget it,” Spicer 
wrote. Pascua formally came into being in 1921 with the assistance of local 
businessmen. It was the first step in their effort to forge, in Spicer’s words, 
a “Yaqui Nation in Arizona.” But although they  were gradually cementing 
their presence in Tucson, they kept a keen eye on developments among their 
southern counterpart, always  eager to reenter at least the cultural orbit of 
their relatives.7
Thus, the Yaquis faced a new set of challenges as they entered a new 
phase in their collective history. While the previous phase was character-
ized by near- constant rebellion, from this point forward vio lence was, with 
rare exceptions, a  thing of the past. Instead, the pro cess of reconciling the 
Yaquis’ presence in both the United States and Mexico with their per sis tent 
claims to nationhood would occur in legislative and  legal circles rather than 
military ones. Yet, as one reporter observed in the 1970s, “Now that overt 
persecution has ended, tribal culture and unity face more subtle, change- 
producing pressure.” Much of that pressure would come in the form of 
mea sures designed to restrict Yaqui movements and blunt their claims to 
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sovereignty. Officials on both sides of the border would begin employing 
new surveillance technologies such as the telephone and relying on emer-
gent institutions such as the rurales, the Arizona Rangers, the Border 
Patrol, and consulates to limit the Yaquis’ ability to subvert national author-
ity.8 Changes wrought by  these efforts would, in the end, dramatically com-
plicate the maintenance of the Yaqui nation.
This chapter, then, examines the new role the boundary between the 
United States and Mexico played in Yaqui life over the course of the twen-
tieth  century as the tribe gradually solidified its transnational presence. 
This pro cess would entail not only continued re sis tance south of the bound-
ary, but also the continued insistence that Yaqui settlements in the United 
States contained much more than dwindling contingents of temporary so-
journers. However, while the border symbolized opportunity for some, 
 whether in the pursuit of economic security or spiritual and/or cultural 
sustenance, for most it increasingly came to represent  little more than a 
barrier, an obstacle that kept some Yaquis in, some Yaquis out, and, in the 
end, stymied the efforts of Yaquis on both sides to fully reclaim lost sover-
eignty. It also created cultural rifts between  these two centers of Yaqui life, 
often steering patterns of life and  labor down two separate, and sometimes 
incompatible, evolutionary paths. Thus, while the tribe initially began 
rebuilding on two separate foundations, one in Arizona and the other 
along the Yaqui River, the new priority, at least for most of the twentieth 
 century, became bridging the gap between  these two centers, or forging 
a reconstituted, autonomous Yaqui nation that transcended international 
borders. First, however, they would have to contend with what the histo-
rian Oscar Martínez called the “troublesome border,” which was also enter-
ing a new phase in its history. Keeping transborder lines of communication 
and physical movement open would prove easier said than done.
In his autobiography, written in the late 1960s, Yaqui Rosalio Moisés re-
counted in further detail his  people’s initial meeting with Holden and his 
nine- man crew during that 1934 Lenten season, a crew that included a 
physician, an ethnobotanist, an ornithologist, an archaeologist, and a histo-
rian. The party approached the village of Torim and explained to a group of 
Yaqui officials that, in Moisés’s words, they “wanted to learn what had hap-
pened to the Yaquis in their own land, and they wanted to put every thing in 
a book for  people to read. This, they said, would help the Yaquis make a 
better life in the Rio Yaqui.” The introduction reportedly put the Yaqui chiefs 
at ease, and they allowed Holden and crew to visit Pluma Blanca, or the 
group’s primary chief. Pluma Blanca, however, responded to the new-
comers’ book proposal somewhat angrily, exclaiming, “Are we not like 
other  human beings? We [all] have five fin gers on each hand and five toes 
on each foot.” 9
Eventually the Yaquis allowed Holden and his crew to begin their field-
work, though one cannot help but imagine the consternation the Yaquis 
must have felt watching their men submit to an invasive series of anthro-
pological mea sure ments using, variously, a spreading caliper, a sliding 
caliper, and a steel mea sur ing tape. The party mea sured the Indians’ height, 
weight, arm span, torso length, shoulders, hips, and, fi nally, heads, then had 
each of their subjects pose for a headshot in order to draw conclusions about 
Yaqui facial characteristics  later. They also managed to secure, according 
to Holden, 144 “museum specimens,” a small collection of botanical speci-
mens, roughly 600 photo graphs, 1,200 feet of movie film, and countless 
sketches before leaving the valley.10 One member of the 1934 expedition, in 
fact, described a typical day during the first expedition, observing, “Again 
Ethnology is being pursued lustily.”11
The party also demonstrated the practical benefits of allowing the new-
comers to have access to their communities. Dr. Charles Wagner, for exam-
ple, ultimately performed operations on more than a few Yaquis. “Their 
confidence and gratitude  were delightful,” he  later wrote. One particularly 
memorable experience involved the removal of a cancerous tumor from the 
back of a fourteen- year- old Yaqui boy. Had it been left untreated, he likely 
would have died. Wagner also removed a bullet from Yaqui Juan Serrena, 
one of several Serrena acquired  after a “ little misunderstanding” with 
Mexican soldiers, and that had been lodged in his back for nineteen years. 
Wagner no doubt felt out of his ele ment, performing the surgery in front 
of a large crowd, while his assistants had to contend with insects, dust, 
and “emaciated, omnipresent dogs.” The operation was a success, however, 
and won the expeditionary party additional goodwill.12
Holden and crew returned  later that year to resume their fieldwork, and 
ultimately gathered a  great deal of information on Yaqui history and 
culture while also making off with a large number of tribal artifacts. They 
also, evidently, spent time in discussions with Yaqui leaders in an effort to 
better understand their relationship with the Mexican government. Shortly 
 after this second expedition, in fact, Holden wrote to Moisés with encour-
aging news: he had personally been to Mexico City to discuss the Yaquis 
with government officials, and had found a receptive audience. “I guess he 
explained  things very well,” Moisés  later recalled, “ because soon some 
Mexican officials came to the Yaqui villages.” They listened while the Yaquis 
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aired their grievances, and then shortly thereafter assigned a new Mexican 
general to police the so- called Yaqui Zone, a general who was ultimately 
far more effective in maintaining calm in the region. Then, in February 1935, 
a boxcar arrived at the village of Vicam that contained pants, jackets, 
huaraches, blankets, and agricultural tools, all courtesy of the Mexican 
government. Unfortunately for Moisés, however, the shipment had already 
been picked over by local Mexican soldiers, and Yaqui chiefs and govern-
ment officials hoarded the rest for themselves and their families. “All day I 
stood  there watching,” Moisés remembered. “I did not get a single blanket.” 
Still, Moisés could not help but laud Holden’s efforts on the Yaquis’ behalf, 
and in fact gave Holden full credit for the Mexican government’s sudden 
interest in their well- being. “Dr. Holden had got the government officials in 
Mexico City to listen about the plight of the poor Yaquis,” Moisés con-
cluded. “But the torocoyoris [Yaqui traitors] and Mexican soldiers stole 
every thing, and nothing was changed for the poor Yaquis.”13
In a series of correspondences with Yaqui Ramón Torry, who served as 
an interpreter for Holden and crew, we can best see Holden’s sustained, 
though sometimes reluctant, efforts to defuse the volatile atmosphere 
along the Yaqui River. For example, writing in the wake of the first expedi-
tion, Torry complained to Holden about worsening conflicts with their 
Mexican neighbors, conflicts that usually involved access to Yaqui lands. “I 
remember you,” Torry wrote in somewhat broken En glish, “ because when 
you  ride around  here with me, you  were speaking a lovely voice with my 
 peoples and that we got a  little hope from you.” He asked Holden to take 
the Yaquis’ complaints straight to “the American governor of U.S.A.”14 
Holden replied to Torry the following month. “Your letter makes us very 
sad,” Holden wrote, adding, “I am afraid that I am not much good at giving 
advice to your  people.” In what was likely an attempt to put Torry’s mind at 
ease, however, Holden continued, “I was in Mexico City last Christmas and 
talked with a number of the high officials about the Yaquis. They all seemed 
to want to do the right  thing by the Yaqui  people. They have plans to help 
all the Indians of Mexico.” He concluded with the somewhat vague assur-
ance that “every thing  will turn out alright.”15
Torry wrote Holden again the following year with word that the Yaquis’ 
relationship with their Mexican neighbors was not improving. This time, 
Torry asked Holden to return to the Río Yaqui to personally assist the tribe 
before  things turned violent.16 Holden responded soon thereafter, urging the 
Yaquis to avoid resorting to vio lence, instead encouraging them to appeal 
directly to Mexico’s president. “[Lázaro] Cárdenas seems to be a good man,” 
he wrote, “and if the grievances of the Yaquis  were put up to him squarely 
he would perhaps see that they received justice.”17 Only days  after urging 
Torry to take  matters into his own hands, however, Holden forwarded Tor-
ry’s complaint to Ramón Beteta, the head of Mexico’s Statistics Agency of 
the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce. “From [Torry’s] letter,” Holden 
wrote to Beteta, “it seems that trou ble is brewing in the Yaqui country . . .  
I am in a delicate situation as an outsider and a foreigner taking note of 
 matters which are strictly internal prob lems of the Mexican government. 
My purpose is to let you know the nature of the friction which may, if al-
lowed to go on, terminate in trou ble both for the government and the 
Yaquis.” Yet  after presenting himself as an unwitting participant in this on-
going drama between the Yaquis and the Mexican military, Holden politely 
but firmly asked Beteta to do what ever he could to clear up the “misunder-
standing” between the Yaquis and the Mexican government.18 Although this 
would not be the last exchange between Holden and Beteta, it would take 
nearly four years for Beteta to relay encouraging news. “As you know,” he 
wrote to Holden in 1938, “the Government fi nally deci ded to take a firm 
stand in the Yaqui question once and for all. They have already received 
their lands which  will insure permanent peace in the Yaqui Valley.”19
Beteta was referring to a series of presidential decrees, courtesy of Pres-
ident Cárdenas, that, taken collectively, sanctioned the return of  those 
“mountain holdouts” to the river valley and officially designated the Yaquis’ 
lands a Zona Indígena. Thus, Cárdenas was instrumental in reformalizing 
the Yaqui presence in Sonora, guaranteeing their right to inhabit the valley 
through the establishment of agricultural cooperatives, and even affirming, 
with some conditions, their right to govern themselves by designating the 
tribe an “indigenous community.”20 The extent to which Holden influenced 
this decision,  whether or not his advocacy forced the Mexican government’s 
hand, is difficult to ascertain. But, as already indicated, at least some 
Yaquis gave Holden and his crew credit for their dramatically changing 
fortunes. Holden remained involved in the lives of some Yaquis on a per-
sonal level as well. It was not unusual for him to provide assistance in 
acquiring immigration papers or arranging work in the United States, for 
example. In fact, Holden hired Moisés to help with the construction of 
his new home and,  later, with the construction of a Yaqui- style ramada for 
Texas Tech’s museum. And when the Yaqui River valley suffered a devas-
tating flood in 1949, Holden and several other members of the university 
community donated a few dollars each to help Moisés and his  family re-
cover. It was also not unheard of for Moisés to request small loans during 
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other tough times. One particularly lean summer, for example, he sent 
Holden a request for twenty dollars, and  later remembered, “[Dr. Holden] 
must have mailed the money as soon as he received my letter,  because a 
letter containing two ten- dollar bills came right away.”21 The friendship 
between the Yaquis and Holden and his crew did not end in 1934. In fact, 
subsequent expeditions, also sponsored by Texas Tech, took place in 1938, 
1940, both spring and winter of 1953, and 1955, all culminating in a “com-
memorative” expedition in 1984.22
While  these expeditions came and went freely, Yaquis who wished to 
migrate on a transnational scale  were not always as unfettered, and became 
even less so as the  century progressed. The Yaquis, like the other indige-
nous groups discussed herein, would have to strug gle with immigration 
authorities and policies that, over the course of the twentieth  century, be-
came increasingly inflexible. Put simply, the early de cades of the twentieth 
 century marked the arrival of a new phase in the history of the U.S.- Mexico 
border, one in which officials on both sides focused their efforts as never 
before on managing transborder migration. Yet the border, at least tempo-
rarily, remained what one scholar characterized as a “social fiction.” Al-
though border inspection stations lorded over formal crossing points by the 
late 1920s, having now become permanent, ever more imposing features on 
the new border landscape, mi grants had  little trou ble skirting  these cross-
ing points and identifying alternate routes to and from their transborder 
destinations. As the historian Patrick Ettinger explains, “Rural, remote, and 
mostly uninhabited, the southwest border invited subversion of the national 
border.” Individual mi grants only needed to expend a bit of “creative en-
ergy” in order to ensure that the border remained permeable. Officials 
did go to  great lengths to fortify the border during the early de cades of the 
twentieth  century, but, as Ettinger concludes, the border “could only be as 
strong as its weakest point, and it still largely consisted of weak points.”23
One new trend was that officials (particularly north of the border) would 
periodically crack down on transborder migration, especially during 
periods of economic turmoil and/or when the supply of  labor exceeded 
demand. The economic depression of the 1930s, for example, spurred a 
massive “repatriation” of Mexican workers, while Operation Wetback dur-
ing the 1950s encouraged a similar trend  under the guise of ferreting out 
potential po liti cal subversives. Yet another crackdown occurred during the 
recession of 1974–75, a crackdown characterized by what Oscar Martínez 
called “Gestapo methods” at U.S. border inspection stations.24 All of  these 
changes in po liti cal and  legal dynamics sent shock waves throughout the 
region’s indigenous communities, which had come to depend on, and in fact 
expect, unfettered transborder movement. Although this trend is less obvi-
ous in the Kickapoo case, the Indians discussed herein would find their 
interests diverge considerably depending on which side of the border they 
happened to reside. This forced  these nascent nations to acknowledge that 
the border drawn by the United States and Mexico could ultimately prove 
insurmountable in the face of their efforts to forge some semblance of na-
tional unity.
Thus, although Yaqui migration between the new place and the old place 
never stopped altogether, it had slowed to a trickle by the early twentieth 
 century, and remained so thereafter. How many Yaquis ultimately migrated 
to Arizona during the late nineteenth  century and the first two de cades of 
the twentieth  century is difficult to ascertain, but Edward Spicer, the lead-
ing expert on Arizona’s Yaquis at midcentury, speculated that it was possi-
bly as many as 5,000, while only about 2,000–3,000 Yaquis remained 
scattered throughout Sonora. The rest, amounting to an estimated 8,000, 
evidently submitted to forced relocation, ultimately assimilating into the 
broader Mexican social milieu.  Others simply dis appeared. The Yaquis  were 
not entirely unused to  family members seemingly falling off the map, and 
the disappearance of loved ones was particularly common early in the 
 century when the tribe’s presence in Mexico had not entirely stabilized. In 
the 1930s, Juana de Amarillas reflected on  these years. She recalled losing 
her husband shortly  after arriving in Sonora, adding, “The soldiers took him 
away. We  didn’t know anything about what happened to him . . .  I  don’t 
know where he got killed or  whether they sent him to Yucatán or what 
happened.” She also lost her son  under similarly mysterious circumstances. 
“He was taken [to La Paz] by the soldiers,” she claimed. “He died and they 
sent me a paper saying he was dead. That was all I ever knew about it. That 
was a sad time. That’s the way it is in Sonora.”25
Further, the move from the old place to the new, and vice versa, was not 
always a permanent one, as the somewhat aty pi cal story of “General” Gua-
dalupe Flores illustrates. Flores was the self- proclaimed “jefe” of Barrio Pas-
cua during the early twentieth  century, and served as a key link between 
Sonoran and Arizona Yaquis. He left Sonora in 1928 with a small band of 
Yaquis who  were fleeing yet another period of violent conflict with the Mex-
ican government, only to face detainment by Border Patrol agents shortly 
 after entering Arizona. The Border Patrol,  after several days, allowed Flores 
and his band to remain in Arizona as refugees, and officials in Washington 
eventually granted the band refugee status, alongside their Yaqui brethren 
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already in Arizona. They initially labored on small farms in the Santa Cruz 
valley before settling in Pascua, which by then contained a stable, and even 
burgeoning, Yaqui population. According to one report, they  were able to 
lead “the same life they  were accustomed to below the border, except for the 
absence of their farms.” Instead, they found employment on  others’ farms. 
Flores was dif fer ent from his fellow Yaquis, however, in that he purportedly 
never “stooped to the menial  labor engaged in by his followers.” Oddly, ru-
mor held that his subsistence depended on the generosity of a mysterious 
benefactor. “At regular intervals when nights are dark,” one local paper 
reported, “an automobile is said to stop at the general’s door, leave several 
large sacks of food, and depart. No one has shown a willingness to investi-
gate this mysterious source of food.”26
Flores served an impor tant function in Arizona. He frequently sent run-
ners into Sonora to maintain open channels of communication with the 
tribe’s southern counterpart, who, still fearing deportation, kept to “the 
highest ridges in their travels” and who often went without food and  water, 
instead eking out an existence “from the meager offerings of the desert,” 
according to one newspaper account. Flores actually attained prominence 
in Arizona  after befriending a local Border Patrol agent named Ivan Wil-
liams and, at Williams’s request, producing what became known as the 
“shirt- tail” history of the Yaquis. Flores reportedly sent his runners to So-
nora through trails between the Bacatete Mountains and the border, and 
shortly thereafter they would return with portions of the tribe’s history 
written on their shirts, often, oddly enough, in blood. When Border Patrol 
agents apprehended one of Flores’s “historians” in the desert, then noticed 
the writing, the “shirt- tail” nickname was born.27
Evidently, however, Flores did not wish to remain in Arizona, nor did at 
least some of his fellow mi grants. In 1931, in fact, the city editor of the Arizona 
Daily Star appealed to the Mexican consul in El Paso on behalf of  these mi-
grants, writing, “According to their chiefs, headed by Guadalupe Flores, the 
Yaquis wish to return to their own country along the Yaqui River. However, 
due to their status in part as po liti cal refugees, they wish first the assurance 
of protection and guarantees of the Mexican government that they  will not 
be molested if they return to their own country.” “At the pres ent time,” the 
letter continues, “the status of  these  people might be termed as a parole from 
the military authorities of the United States, to whom they surrendered their 
arms when they entered the United States.” He assured the consul that the 
small group of Yaquis had been living a “peaceable quiet life” and promised 
to “remain at peace if permitted to return to their own valley.”28
In July 1936,  after ten years of exile, Flores got his wish. By this time the 
Mexican government had actually begun appealing to expatriates and en-
couraging their return in an effort to shore up the economy and implement 
a broader “nationalizing” campaign among its indigenous  peoples. The 
request also, perhaps fortuitously, corresponded with the aforementioned 
Depression- era repatriation campaign in the United States, in which author-
ities subjected Mexican (and even some Mexican American) workers to 
forced deportation in hopes of alleviating the nation’s economic crisis. As 
incentive, the pro- Indian administration of Lázaro Cárdenas promised that 
returning Yaquis could participate in government- sponsored agricultural 
proj ects. Small farms, their thinking went, just might produce self- sufficient 
Yaquis while also stoking the regional economy. Flores, for one, appears to 
have welcomed the opportunity to return. While he evidently had no farm 
of his own in Sonora, he maintained that several friends in the Yaqui pueblo 
of Torim would provide assistance. Flores’s “lieutenant,” Luciano Alvarez, 
and his  house keeper, Guayvi de Olivas Epifania, ultimately accompanied 
him on the trip home, as did his dog Lobo. “He is muy malo,” Flores said 
with giddy excitement, “and  will make  those Torim dogs run like hell.”29 
However, even though the Mexican po liti cal climate turned in the Yaquis’ 
 favor during the 1930s, it appears that few Arizona Yaquis followed Flores’s 
lead. The younger generation of Yaquis, especially, had  little desire to re-
turn to the Yaqui River. As Yaqui Cayetano Lopez remembered during the 
1930s, “ there  wasn’t anything to do in Sonora. This is the only country we 
know.” Further, as he had heard tell from more recent Sonoran Yaqui 
immigrants, “the Yaquis down  there is [sic] all just the same as  here,” so he 
did not feel as if he was missing much.30
In Sonora, Yaquis  were filtering back into the Yaqui River valley in increas-
ing numbers following the aforementioned Cárdenas reforms of the 1930s. 
Cárdenas had emerged as a major champion of the Indian cause. While 
traveling the country during his 1934 presidential campaign, he could not 
help but notice the dire poverty in which indigenous  peoples lived. He 
 actually passed through Yaqui country that year and called for land resti-
tution, the establishment of agricultural zones, and the shoring up of irri-
gation infrastructure, all in an effort to, as he put it, “resolve definitively 
the eternal Yaqui prob lem.” He considered them “a strong and pure race that 
should fully expect vindication for the despoliation of their lands by past 
governments.”31 Cárdenas used his presidency to launch a concerted effort 
to improve social and economic conditions in the nation’s indigenous com-
munities more generally, ultimately calling for the formation of a federal 
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 department devoted to harnessing the expertise of Mexico’s intellectual 
community to address  these perennial prob lems.32 It should be pointed out, 
however, that Cárdenas had  little interest in preserving Mexico’s many in-
digenous cultures, and instead envisioned their acculturation and assimi-
lation into the Mexican nation. But the Yaquis  were dif fer ent. Dwyer argues 
that it was the Yaquis’ “resilience, militancy, and tendency to side with any 
po liti cal faction that endorsed the return of their homelands,” coupled with 
Cárdenas’s “po liti cal weakness in Sonora,” that resulted in the tribe receiv-
ing “more material largess and po liti cal autonomy” from the administra-
tion than other indigenous groups. Further differentiating the Yaquis from 
many other Indian  peoples in Mexico was the fact that, again in Dwyer’s 
words, “the Yaquis had a written literary tradition and preserved their in-
stitutions outside of the religious cargo system, which made their cultural 
restoration more acceptable to Cárdenas and other revolutionary leaders.”33 
Although his incorporationist notions slowly fell out of  favor among Indig-
enistas, Cárdenas still felt that the methods favored by his administration 
 were far superior to  those of the U.S. government, which treated Indians as 
separate from the mainstream.34
Cárdenas’s broader plan called for the initiation of a “vigorous develop-
ment proj ect” along the Yaqui River  under the departments of agriculture, 
economy, and defense. It promised federal funding for potable  water and 
irrigation, road construction, the construction of power and light plants, 
credit for agricultural workers, the clearing of timber, the planting of co-
conut, orange, and lime trees, and the distribution of 10,000 hectares of 
“high- grade” land on the right bank of the Yaqui River to tribal members, 
among other goals. Ultimately, the Yaquis received livestock, farm machin-
ery, trucks, tools such as shovels, machetes, and hatchets, barbed- wire 
fencing, and, fi nally, seeds and fertilizer. The decrees also promised credit 
and guaranteed that the price of wheat would remain steady and high. The 
objective of this “generous experiment,” according to one decree, was to 
bring “work and prosperity to a sizable nucleus of the Yaqui population” 
while also incorporating “a zone,  until now ignored, into the nation’s pro-
duction.”35
The government no doubt had less altruistic motives as well. As one 
scholar explained, “The greatest fear of any government was that the Yaqui 
tribe, with an estimated population of 8,400 to 9,600 in 1937, would join 
a regional rebellion to defend their ancestral lands and culture, as they 
had done on many occasions, as recently as 1927.”36 The 1927 rebellion had 
required a yearlong effort on the part of the Mexican military to suppress, 
with the army even employing bomber planes in an effort to ferret Yaqui 
rebels out of the Sierra de Bacatete. The 1927 campaign also, incidentally, 
produced another temporary surge in Yaqui migration to Arizona. Mean-
while, centuries of conflict with the Yaquis had left their non- Indian 
neighbors with an irrational fear of the Indians that bordered on the 
absurd. The Indians, for example,  were thought to possess mysterious 
powers, such as immunity to rabies, and  were also believed to have an in-
humanly long life span.37 It was in this context that the Mexican govern-
ment instituted what one Yaqui referred to as a “bi- weekly money gift,” 
mentioned above, that they hoped would help keep the peace in the region. 
It turned out to be an effective strategy. One Yaqui told Edward Spicer that 
the Yaquis “would all be back in the hills in a few weeks” if the payments 
ceased, since “they are far from conquered.”38 Still, by the mid-1930s the 
Yaquis  were so closely allied with the Mexican government that the fed-
eral army employed a Yaqui battalion in a campaign against Mayo Indian 
rebels as well as, surprisingly enough, against Yaqui  cattle rustlers in the 
Sierra de Bacatete. It was an unusual arrangement, but one that seemed to 
be working.39
Cooperative Yaquis also benefited from an economic boom of sorts in 
Sonora during the Cárdenas years. By the mid-1930s, Sonora had become 
Mexico’s breadbasket, so to speak, producing about 11  percent of the nation’s 
wheat. Assisting this growth was a series of government- sponsored recla-
mation proj ects that gradually brought thousands of hectares of land into 
production. In fact, the Yaqui River valley had only 10,000 hectares of ar-
able land in 1911. By 1943, that number reached 70,000— a startling figure 
considering that as late as 1890 the region was, as one scholar put it, “a 
largely uninhabited wasteland,” with the exception of small strips along the 
river.40 Part of Cárdenas’s strategy became incorporating the Yaquis into the 
regional economy as industrious and virtuous farmers, and in this he ini-
tially appeared to be succeeding. Yet he also realized that the group would 
remain peaceful only as long as they  were able to maintain some ele ments 
of Yaqui culture. Another component of his strategy, then, involved estab-
lishing boarding schools throughout Yaqui country staffed by teachers who 
spoke the Indians’ language. Yaqui students learned about tribal history and 
the spiritual significance of their land base, all while surrounded by murals 
celebrating tribal culture. Cárdenas also instituted a ban on alcohol, over-
consumption of which had long plagued the Yaquis, in the Zona. His efforts 
 were warmly received. As one scholar put it, “If  there is any Mestizo whom 
the Yaqui regard as a tribal hero, it is Lázaro Cárdenas.” 41
God Gave the Land to the Yaquis 91
92 Chapter Three
The Yaquis themselves acknowledged that, as one told Spicer, “ after 
Cárdenas came in  things  were better and the Indians  were allowed to work.” 
They  were also fi nally able to begin openly reconstituting Yaqui culture 
along the Yaqui River without fear of persecution, and evidently did so with 
a  great zeal. In a 1947 newspaper article, Spicer insisted that Yaqui cul-
ture, at least in Mexico, was “as distinctive and vigorous as it was in the 
19th  century.” The article continues, “The old ways of life . . .  throughout 
Yaqui land are strong enough to influence the tribe’s members who are com-
ing back to the ‘reservation,’ and the culture is being revitalized.” Yaqui 
religious groups also began cultivating relationships with the Catholic 
Church, a notable development considering the tribe had more or less 
shunned the Church since the end of the Jesuit period. The Yaquis’ govern-
ment also appeared more vital than ever at midcentury, though authority 
tended to flow up from the village level rather than down from some cen-
tralized authority. Spicer described village organ ization as a blending of 
“unmistakably Medieval Eu ro pean” traditions with preconquest Yaqui tra-
ditions. For example, the Yaquis recognized two dif fer ent sets of authority 
figures: village governors and village elders. Spicer observed that the two 
groups “always meet, and transact business together, but generally their 
members perform dif fer ent functions.” The governors  were responsible for 
chairing meetings and administering decisions, while the elders  were re-
sponsible for advising the governors and serving as spokesmen for the villa-
gers. He also noted that the titles for official positions, positions that  were 
analogous to, for example, governor, sheriff, captain, and sergeant, often 
sounded like “Yaqui modifications of Spanish words.” Fi nally, he could not 
help but notice that the Yaquis regarded their government as “quite in de-
pen dent of the state- municipality organ ization of Sonora,” and that it ap-
peared to function as such.42
Shortly  after Mexican in de pen dence, the new government had ordered 
the Yaquis (among other indigenous groups) to create municipal govern-
ments staffed by demo cratically elected local officials and to adopt their 
policy of individual land owner ship. The Yaquis had already or ga nized town 
governments  under the Spanish, however, and by the nineteenth  century 
had established a pattern of po liti cal autonomy and what Spicer called 
“vigorous Yaqui separation” that proved too power ful for the Mexican gov-
ernment to overcome. Spicer continues: “The two features on which the 
Mexicans focused as necessary for bringing the Indians into the nation— 
individual land holding and po liti cal hierarchy— flew in the face of the pre-
vious two centuries of development. Po liti cal equality with Mexicans was 
meaningless in the limited context of the Yaqui River communities.” 
Thus, through a sustained interest in a “Yaqui nation,” effective patterns 
of re sis tance, and what Spicer referred to as “an unusual combination of 
circumstances,” the Yaquis managed to avoid true po liti cal and economic 
incorporation into the Mexican nation up to the era of the Cárdenas 
 reforms.43
However, even with this sudden surge of interest in their well- being, the 
group was far from confident that hard times  were  behind them. Yaqui Pau-
lino Valenzuela revealed to Spicer in 1942 that “ there may be another revo-
lution shortly,” since some Yaquis  were demanding “a U.S. protectorate, like 
Cuba, where the U.S. helped every body get more freedom.” 44 Although the 
Yaquis believed they  were moving closer to what a Sonora- based military 
official described as “a Yaqui Indian Reservation as in the United States,” 
in the end the Cárdenas administration, like so many administrations be-
fore it, proved unresponsive to  those concerns that most preoccupied the 
Yaquis. For one, Mexicans continued streaming into the Yaqui River coun-
try despite official government property protections. One Yaqui explained 
to Spicer, “Fifteen years ago  there  were no Mexicans . . .  now  there are hun-
dreds,” ultimately forcing them to contend with a “gradual encroachment 
on their lands.” Further, the Cárdenas administration did not return all of 
the tribe’s old territory. Although the decrees returned about 1.2 million 
acres of land to the Yaquis, two of the original eight pueblos had been per-
manently lost to Mexican settlers during the very tumultuous previous 
de cades, namely, Cócorit and Bacum. The decree also left the physical 
bound aries of the Zona hopelessly vague, though most likely by design. Still, 
six of the eight original eight pueblos, including Vicam, the po liti cal center 
of the pueblos, remained intact, with Potam emerging as the most popu-
lous. Further, the Yaquis had managed to retain or reclaim  those lands with 
the most spiritual significance. The left bank of the river, the side that con-
tained the most fertile agricultural lands, simply did not hold as much spir-
itual import. Interestingly, communities of Yaquis also managed to establish 
permanent villages in the Sierra Bacatete, once a popu lar haven for Yaqui 
rebels and refugees, and began openly producing beef, cheese, and liquor 
for the regional economy.45
Despite some pro gress, in the end many of the programs promised by the 
decree  either failed to materialize or did not last. In the 1940s, one Yaqui 
asked Cárdenas, “Tata Lázaro, do you remember the hospitals, the schools, 
and the lands that you gave us? The hospitals are now cantinas, the schools 
are occupied by soldiers, the lands belong to the newly rich.” Another asked 
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Spicer if he would mind presenting their case to the U.S. government. They 
 were disappointed when he refused.46 By the end of the 1930s, then, it was 
clear that Cárdenas’s plans to develop the Zona had stalled. Roads and 
canals  were not being maintained and had thus fallen into disrepair. All 
the boarding schools had closed save one, and the majority of its students 
 were non- Indians. Alcohol still flowed into the valley unabated,  cattle rus-
tling remained a fact of life, and state- sponsored governments had ceased 
to function. A 1939 government- sponsored report concluded, “Complete 
anarchy reigns in the administration of the Yaqui Colonies.” 47 Although 
Mexican bureaucrats  were evidently failing in their mission to civilize and 
integrate the Yaquis, their efforts did usher in a long period of peace and 
relative stability in the region, as well as modest economic growth. The 
Yaquis, meanwhile,  were able to enjoy near- total autonomy within a 
more or less secure Yaqui enclave, imperfect though it may have been.48
The Mexican government did not give up on the tribe, though, and came 
back with a similar, though considerably more ambitious, development plan 
in 1951. The Inter- Ministerial Commission for the Yaqui River Valley Region 
had a bud get of over fourteen million pesos to implement a broad program 
aimed at shoring up the economy of the valley and, in turn, improving the 
tribe’s standard of living. Like the earlier development plan, the 1951 initia-
tive also promised potable  water and credit for agricultural proj ects, while 
including provisions for a series of “welfare units,” schools, and even sports 
fields. “We cannot yet say,” one official reported, “that the Yaqui prob lem is 
solved, for many of the proj ects and plans for economic reconstruction are 
at pres ent in the pro cess of being carried out, but we can say that all the 
impor tant and necessary steps have been taken for the felicitous and ratio-
nal incorporation of  these tribes, which used to be rebellious and are now 
dedicated to their own pro gress and that of Mexico.” 49 Reporting on the pro-
gress of the initiative in 1962, however, one Mexican official stated, some-
what vaguely, “In practice, for vari ous reasons, the action of  these bodies 
has been limited.”50
The status of their “incorporation” into the Mexican nation remained 
somewhat unclear thereafter, and Yaqui control of the valley, once relatively 
secure, seemed increasingly tenuous. One observer described po liti cal life 
within the Zona as “complex,” explaining that while the Yaquis  were “the-
oretically” entitled to govern themselves, the army considered the Zona 
merely a “sub- zone” of the military district headquartered at nearby Espe-
ranza, a district that included all of the Yaqui River valley. As such, they 
claimed that martial law trumped Yaqui law within the Zona. The state of 
Sonora also claimed governorship of the Yaquis, and thus repeatedly tried 
to extend its authority over the Zona. However, although the state collected 
taxes on both motor vehicles and wagons, kept a handful of “functionar-
ies” in the main pueblo, and occasionally sent road scrapers to maintain 
major thoroughfares within the Zona, the task of governing the Yaquis 
continued to be performed by Yaqui governors within each pueblo. In other 
words, despite claims of authority emanating from both the local military 
apparatus and the state, Yaqui governing institutions remained intact. The 
Yaquis, meanwhile, largely stayed out of Mexican politics. Even though they 
enjoyed the right to vote in state or national elections, they expressed “ little 
or no interest in national or international politics,” as one observer claimed.51
Although not much changed po liti cally that would have sounded alarms 
throughout Yaqui country, the economic and demographic situation was 
much dif fer ent. In 1952 a federal highway officially opened that bisected 
the Yaquis’ land. Men, machinery, crops, and livestock  were now easier to 
transport to and from the Zona. Mexican middlemen began arriving in 
Yaqui country to purchase firewood, charcoal,  cattle, and  horses. Similarly, 
non- Indian storekeepers, blacksmiths, bakers, mechanics, carpenters, sa-
loon keepers, and the like began filtering into the Zona to cater to Yaqui 
businesses and communities, while the federal bureaucratic machinery in 
the Zona necessitated the presence of even more non- Indians. In fact, one 
scholar estimated the Mexican population of the Zona to have reached be-
tween 6,000 and 7,000 by the end of the 1950s, a number nearly matching 
the number of Yaquis, which the 1959 census estimated to be just below 
8,000 (though scholars believe this estimate to be quite conservative). It was 
a development that the Yaquis found troubling. However, the new highway 
also made pos si ble the development of Yaqui agricultural socie ties, and the 
resultant (admittedly modest) economic pro gress meant that Yaquis could 
often afford trucks. This con ve nient mode of transportation facilitated the 
movement of Yaquis to fiestas, such as the Fiesta of Saint Francis at Magda-
lena or the Fiesta of the Virgin near Bataconsica, as well as to urban cen-
ters in the region, such as Guaymas and Ciudad Obregón, where they often 
sold cheese, goats, and garden vegetables. This development provided a re-
newed opportunity for tribal members to  either forge or strengthen trans-
border tribal ties through interactions with their Arizona counterpart.52
Like the new highway, the completion of the Alvaro Obregón Dam in 1952 
also produced mixed results for the tribe. In years past, the Yaquis engaged 
in subsistence farming and cultivated their fields manually. Irrigation came 
via biannual flooding courtesy of the Yaqui River or shallow, temporary 
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channels that delivered the river’s  waters to Yaqui agricultural sites. This 
meant a predictable and plentiful source of irrigation for Yaqui subsistence 
farmers and thousands of acres of Yaqui land, but with a  couple of caveats. 
First of all, non- Indians often diverted the bulk of the  water well south of 
Yaqui territory, while the narrow canals constructed to deliver  water to the 
Yaquis lacked adequate capacity. Even so, Yaqui elders would later remember, 
in the words of one scholar, “idyllic country scenes in which  children played 
alongside the river, of fields where watermelons, beans, sweet potatoes, 
bananas, and sugarcane grew in abundance.” The situation post-1952, how-
ever, prompted one Yaqui to lament, “The Rio Yaqui is dead.”53 Second, and 
perhaps most significantly, Yaqui farmers now had to pay for the  water 
from the river, which left many in dire financial straits. As one scholar ex-
plained: “The Yaquis now found themselves fully integrated into the cash 
economy. Beholden to the bank and overextended in their credit, they 
became extremely vulnerable to disruptions in the harvest. Loans  were 
defaulted on at an alarming rate. Many Yaqui farmers, no longer able to 
obtain credit from the bank, found themselves forced to work as wage la-
borers on their own land, now rented out to non- Yaqui farmers who could 
afford the substantial capital input required for modern agriculture.”54
But  there was a much more fundamental reason why the Yaquis simply 
 were not content with their arrangement with the Mexican government at 
midcentury. Put simply, their desire for their old lands trumped their inter-
est in participating in the regional economy. They mobilized in the 1970s 
to reclaim their lands and towns on the other bank of the river, but  were 
ultimately unsuccessful. The historian and anthropologist Thomas McGuire 
contends that their failure was due in part to their rather complex po liti cal 
situation. The tribe was, in his words, “constrained by its own autonomy.” 
Their economic dependence on external, non- Indian financiers left the tribe 
vulnerable, internally divided between  those who sought assistance from 
the state and  those who feared this would bring about an acceleration of 
state control. Still, tribal members remained united in their determination 
to claim lost lands, partly out of habit and partly  because, as McGuire con-
cludes, “that demand does not implicate the more crucial and rupturing 
issue of finance.”55
As for their Arizona counterpart, the bulk of  these Yaqui mi grants slowly 
but surely secured their presence in their  adopted homeland. In 1909, in 
fact, they formally announced their intention to begin rebuilding Yaqui cul-
ture in Arizona by requesting, and ultimately receiving, a permit from the 
local sheriff that would allow the tribe to conduct their annual Lenten and 
Easter Ceremony north of the border for the first time. Although Mexico 
would still figure prominently in the ceremonial lives of many Arizona 
Yaquis (for example, the annual fiesta de San Francisco, held  every October 
in Magdalena, Sonora, continues to lure Yaquis from both sides of the border), 
the Lenten and Easter Ceremony would, in ensuing de cades, increase in 
significance and, in the pro cess, become a regular event on the Tucson 
community calendar as both a local and a tourist attraction.56 The U.S. 
government, meanwhile, proved to be alarmingly proactive in identify-
ing Yaqui aliens within its borders, a practice that was consistent with the 
aforementioned early twentieth- century trend  toward tightening border 
traffic. Immigration officials twice launched regional “alien” registration 
drives, one in 1918 and the other in 1940. In the latter year, local newspa-
pers ran an announcement by the local director of alien registration de-
manding that Chinese and Yaqui immigrants register with local officials. 
“Many of the latter,” the announcement read, “have lived in this country 
for years  after fleeing from Mexico, and are actually a  people without a 
country, no longer being citizens of Mexico, and unable to become citizens 
of the United States.”57
As the  century progressed, then, this popu lar perception of the Yaquis 
as “men without a country” meant that immigration officials  were especially 
wary of waving tribal members through border crossings, as they once had. 
They also evidently went one step further, regularly sending immigration 
agents to Yaqui communities throughout Arizona in order to identify any 
unregistered mi grants from Sonora. Ironically, however,  these agents often 
emerged as advocates on behalf of tribal members. As Spicer explained in 
the 1940s, “ These officers frequently become trusted friends of Yaquis, 
if they can speak Spanish, and often help them in vari ous ways in their 
relations with state and city agencies. It may be said in this connection 
that it is only the border patrolmen who fully understand the citizenship 
status of the Yaquis.”58
The first clarification of  these Yaqui mi grants’ status north of the border 
came in 1940, when the U.S. government instituted a series of regulations 
to address Mexican immigration more generally. The regulations declared 
that all persons who migrated from Mexico prior to 1924, regardless of 
 whether they possessed papers demonstrating that their entrance had been 
 legal, could not be deported  unless they could be classified as “criminals.” 
However, law- abiding immigrants  were eligible for citizenship only if 
their date of immigration occurred before July 1, 1906, and they had not 
returned to Mexico and re entered the United States in the interim. The latter 
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provision, then, meant that roughly 75   percent of Arizona’s Yaquis could 
not obtain citizenship. And even  those Yaquis who migrated prior to 1906 
still faced obstacles in acquiring U.S. citizenship. For example, one Yaqui 
man applied for citizenship in 1937  after having resided in the United States 
since 1903. On his application, however, he noted that he was “a real Yaqui 
Indian.” The immigration office rejected his application, since at this time 
only  those classified as Caucasians or as individuals of African descent  were 
eligible for citizenship. Oddly, if he had listed his nationality as “Mexican,” 
the office explained, he would have been approved, since Mexicans qualified 
as Caucasians  under U.S. immigration regulations.59
Meanwhile, mobility, though not always of the transborder variety, re-
mained the norm among Yaquis in Arizona. While the Yaquis claimed to 
have “roamed the country even before the coming of the Spanish,” Spicer 
argued that they  were actually not all that exceptional in their migratory 
habits. Much like Spanish- speaking Mexican Americans and English- 
speaking Anglo- Americans in the borderlands region, the Yaquis had 
“shifted residence from town to town, moved from town to cotton ranch 
and back again, worked where work was available, gone on relief, and 
helped to build the railroad, the highways, and the irrigation centers.” Spicer 
acknowledged a certain sense of distinctness among Yaquis that is appar-
ent not only to tribal members but also to non- Indian neighbors, yet he also 
characterized them as “very much a part of the conglomerate, mobile soci-
ety of the rapidly growing southwestern state in which they have lived for 
more than fifty years.” Although one Mexican scholar claimed that constant 
warfare was to blame for forcing the Yaquis onto the migratory path, Spicer 
argued that they possessed a variety of motives, many shared by both Indi-
ans and non- Indians in the burgeoning American Southwest. Further, in the 
fifty years between the Yaquis’ settlement in Arizona and the time of Spic-
er’s study, the Yaquis remained relatively scattered, with some living with 
and even intermarrying with the Tohono O’odham both on and off the 
O’odham reservation, some residing on the nearby Pima reservation, and 
some intermarrying with African Americans and Anglos. In this dizzying 
variety of social, po liti cal, and cultural contexts, maintaining an emotional 
attachment to their Yaqui heritage proved challenging, but it did happen. 
For example, in his study of the Yaqui village of Potam, Spicer observed a 
vigorous pattern of correspondence between  these far- flung settlements, 
noting that “knowledge on the part of the Potam  people of living conditions 
and events in the non- river settlements is often very detailed as a result of 
the interchange of letters.” Some Yaquis, he discovered, divided their time 
between Potam and Arizona, with some even expressing homesickness for 
Tucson or Phoenix, cities where some had spent their youth and/or buried 
their parents. He estimated that perhaps several hundred Potam residents 
had spent at least a few years in the Arizona communities. Sporadic, volun-
tary migration out of the community and across the border, thus, was not 
uncommon, and  those Yaquis who did not regularly return to the Yaqui 
River evidently remained very much in the emotional orbit of their south-
ern counterpart.60
In the realm of employment, from the outset Yaquis in Arizona gener-
ally gravitated  toward a somewhat narrow range of occupations. Between 
the late 1800s and the early 1940s, Yaquis worked on railroad gangs, made 
adobe bricks, and worked on farms and ranches. The latter had become the 
occupation of choice by the World War II years, when cotton picking, as 
Spicer explained, became “a feature of the agricultural rhythm which af-
fects almost all Yaquis.” Most Yaqui families (90  percent according to a “con-
servative” estimate) resided in a string of cotton camps all across southern 
Arizona for three to four months at a time, resulting in the virtual depopu-
lation of Yaqui settlements across the state.61 The Bracero Program, imple-
mented during World War II to both encourage and control the flow of 
mi grant workers across the border, opened up additional employment op-
portunities for Indians in the United States. Employers began recruiting 
Indians for agricultural work in increasing numbers, since the new program 
restricted the number of Mexican workers allowed in the United States. This 
practice was particularly prevalent in Arizona, though the primary benefi-
ciaries tended to be Navajo Indians.62 Spicer noted, however, that the Yaquis 
largely shunned steady employment. “Habits of steady work,” he explained, 
“are regarded as a handicap to anyone who aspires to village prestige, 
 because they get in the way of activities necessary for the latter.” Quitting 
a job, therefore, could earn a tribal member more re spect than the wages 
one could earn through steady work.63 As long as work remained relatively 
easy to come by, then, Yaquis avoided more than a tenuous commitment to 
any one job.
Yaquis in Arizona thus recognized two distinctly dif fer ent forms of work: 
that for wage  labor and that for ceremonial purposes. Steady employment 
for wage work would obviously translate into a more comfortable lifestyle, 
but it did not necessarily translate into a higher social status within the 
group, nor did the size of one’s income or the extent of one’s possessions. It 
was ceremonial participation that  really counted within the tribe’s prestige 
system. Although Yaqui laborers constantly strug gled to balance their 
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employment obligations with their ceremonial life, the latter most often 
won out in the end. Their employers, however, typically valued the Yaquis 
as laborers, and thus tolerated their seeming eccentricities. While they 
 were periodically absent and, according to some employers, had occasional 
prob lems with alcohol, their honesty and commitment to quality work typ-
ically outweighed  these minor prob lems.64
Unfortunately, for  these Yaqui workers the post– World War II years wit-
nessed a downturn in cotton production, which left growers with massive 
surpluses. Decreased demand for  labor, coupled with the mechanization of 
the cotton industry by the mid-1950s, meant that Yaqui families no longer 
enjoyed this predictable source of income and instead had to transition into 
jobs outside of the agricultural sector. This sudden downturn in employment 
opportunities also forced many Yaquis to seek government assistance for 
the first time as they  adopted new subsistence patterns.65 Adding to  these 
difficulties was the fact that, as Spicer put it, “the typical Yaqui is a squat-
ter.” Few owned immovable property, and few even paid rent. Instead, they 
typically lived in villages established by growers who valued their  labor, 
or,  after its establishment in 1910, in the village of Guadalupe. The federal 
government set aside the roughly forty- acre Guadalupe plot for Yaqui ref-
ugees with the understanding that they would eventually pay for their 
plots. Few ever paid, however, since few possessed the means to do so. “The 
conditions  under which they may continue to live  there are not clearly de-
fined by law,” Spicer observed. The city of Tucson or, more specifically, a 
real estate com pany, allowed Yaquis to occupy another village site, which 
became Pascua, on Tucson’s immediate outskirts, but  these plots  were 
not tax- exempt, and thus initially not particularly desirable. As mentioned 
earlier, however, Pascua would evolve into a kind of population center 
for Yaquis in Arizona as the  century progressed.  Others squatted along 
the banks of the Santa Cruz River in South Tucson, and still  others man-
aged to purchase lots  either south of Pascua, in the aforementioned Barrio 
Belén, or in Tucson proper.66 At least for the time being, then, the Yaqui pres-
ence in Arizona was fairly diffuse, a fact of life that hindered the growth of 
the nationalistic impulse that was so strong south of the border.
While the movement to Arizona provided a wealth of new opportunities 
for Yaqui mi grants, their southern counterpart regularly alleged that life 
in the United States was exacting an unacceptable cultural toll, an asser-
tion that consequently complicated relations between the two groups. Even 
area ranchers, who enthusiastically employed Yaqui laborers, noticed a 
gradual change in be hav ior among  those Yaquis who resided primarily 
north of the border. One rancher and frequent employer of Yaqui laborers 
observed, “The first ones that came in  were first- class workers, better than 
any Mexicans . . .  But now they  aren’t so good anymore. The young ones 
drink a lot.  They’re getting too Americanized.” 67 The real ity was more com-
plex than the rancher suggested. Yaquis in Arizona found themselves oc-
cupying what one historian described as a “liminal cultural and po liti cal 
space between two nations and their status as Mexican and Indian.” They 
often lived and worked alongside ethnic Mexicans, shared the uncertainties 
that came with their precarious  legal status, and conversed in Spanish, 
which all suggested a retreat from tribal culture. Yet Anglo- Americans often 
viewed them as American Indian  because of their connection to Arizona’s 
broader indigenous community. As mentioned earlier, the Yaquis also lacked 
a formal governing body, which further suggested a kind of disconnect with 
tribal traditions. But as one tribal member explained, “We live  under the 
law of the United States.” For many Yaquis, a governing structure was sim-
ply unnecessary. Tensions emerged over time, with some Yaquis wishing to 
safeguard their presence north of the border by pushing for a  legal status 
as American Indians, and  others fearing that  doing so would compromise 
both their culture and their autonomy. It was the latter group that was most 
likely to cultivate transborder cultural ties to challenge  those lines of eth-
nicity and culture they saw being drawn in the United States, lines that did 
 little to acknowledge the transnational nature of their Yaqui identity.68
Despite  going to  great lengths to adapt to life in the United States, many 
still lived with a well- founded fear of deportation. Local officials periodi-
cally ( every three to four years, according to Spicer) revived plans to send 
the Yaquis back to, in the words of one senator, “their wild hill- life in Mex-
ico.” Such plans always fell by the wayside, but not before making Arizo-
na’s Yaquis understandably ner vous.69 Such deportation plans also emanated 
from south of the border. During the 1930s Pluma Blanca, who, as mentioned 
earlier, served as the liaison between the Yaquis and the Mexican gov-
ernment, proposed a complete repatriation of Yaquis living north of the 
border. One Yaqui who had spent time in Oregon, Arizona, and Califor-
nia, however, reported to Sonoran Yaquis that tribal members  were actually 
better off in the United States, and thus argued against forced repatriation. 
Tribal elders in Sonora also argued against forced repatriation, but did so 
out of a fear of returning Yaquis’ American influence. Put simply, they 
believed  these returnees would swell the ranks of Yaqui “progressives” 
who, according to one account, sought to “introduce  those ways into the 
stronghold of the fierce fighters of Mexico,” and thus possibly corrupt 
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them. Pascua especially seemed to stand in stark contrast to Yaqui villages 
in Mexico.  There, at least according to one account, “the old ways have 
been disappearing as better  houses, more stable  family life, and better edu-
cation have evolved.” This was not the first time Yaqui elders expressed a 
fear of the potentially contaminating influence of outsiders. They had, for 
example, steadfastly resisted  those efforts by President Cárdenas to, in 
his words, “fuse their high civilization with that of Mexicans,” and at one 
point actually demanded that Cárdenas remove the Southern Pacific 
Railroad from the Yaquis’ homeland, fearing that with the railroad came 
the potentially dangerous Mexican influence. But as Spicer put it, “ Those 
extreme demands have not, naturally, been met.”70
The assertion that they might somehow contaminate Yaqui culture 
tended to put Arizona’s Yaquis on the defensive. A  later history written in 
conjunction with the tribe and published in En glish, Spanish, and Yoeme 
singled out religion. It claimed that Yaqui spirituality actually thrived in the 
United States, since “the religious ceremonies, which the  people refused 
to give up,  were practiced more openly in the United States than in So-
nora,” while in Sonora  these same ceremonies “had to go underground 
for survival.” Further, they insisted that ties to the homeland remained 
strong. “ Whether in the new place or the old place,” they concluded, “the 
Yaquis have a place of their own.”71 Spicer agreed, arguing in the 1970s 
that the cultural foundation laid by Arizona’s Yaqui population “[had] now 
persisted for three- quarters of a  century and [seemed] more solid than at 
any time in their existence,” despite its deviance from the cultural norm.72
Indeed, over time the fears experienced by new arrivals that they would 
somehow be “discovered to be Yaquis” abated, and distinctly Yaqui customs, 
including religious observances, reemerged. As mentioned above, tribal 
members reestablished the all- important Lenten and Easter Ceremony, 
which was a central Catholic- Yaqui event that the tribe had suppressed in 
earlier de cades in an effort to conceal their Yaqui identity from Mexican 
officials. The revival of at least this aspect of the Yaqui faith in Arizona even-
tually inspired a similar revival in Mexico, signaling a growing trend 
 toward bridging the cultural gap between the old and new Yaqui homelands. 
Put simply, the fact that the Yaqui faith now spanned two nation- states pro-
vided an impetus for the renewal of transborder tribal ties. Attesting to the 
growing influence of the Arizona settlement, this trend emanated from a 
far- flung locale that had once been  little more than a haven for Yaqui refu-
gees. Now Arizona’s Yaquis  were having a decisive impact on the tribe’s 
ancestral home.73 In ensuing years, the ceremony would prove impor tant 
“not only to the Yaqui sense of self but also as an identifying symbol for 
outsiders,” as one historian put it. In other words, it “demonstrated through 
public per for mance their ‘Indianness,’ thus serving to define them as some-
thing other than Mexicans.” For Yaquis in Sonora, this was advantageous 
in that it served to remind non- Indians how  little they understood of Yaqui 
society and culture and thus helped maintain and even reinforce bound-
aries between Yaquis and their Mexican neighbors. For Yaquis in Arizona, 
the ceremony similarly helped differentiate them from Mexicans, which 
proved fortuitous during, for example, the Depression- era repatriation 
campaign that targeted Mexican laborers for deportation. It also helped 
strengthen their case that they merited a special status as Indians. The 
Lenten and Easter Ceremony thus became, according to Thomas McGuire, 
“entertainment put to the ser vice of efficacy” on both sides of the border.74
Though increasingly comfortable and secure in Arizona, many Arizona 
Yaquis evidently still nursed a desire to return to the tribe’s homeland, and 
returning to the river, according to one scholar, remains a “positively val-
ued practice” up to the pres ent day. Arizona Yaquis would return to Sonora 
to witness more elaborate versions of the dances they perform, the ceremo-
nies they observe, and the fiestas they attend in their smaller settlements. 
 Others trek north to attend baptisms, first communions, weddings, and 
funerals. And Sonoran Yaquis evidently take a  great deal of pride in seeing 
Yaquis return to “the cradle of Yaqui culture and society.”75 Even de cades 
away from the Yaqui homeland, it turned out, did not extinguish the desire 
to return for some Yaquis. For example, just as soon as she could regularize 
her immigration status, Yaqui Antonia Valenzuela returned to the valley in 
1960,  after having been away since 1904. She enjoyed her time  there so 
much that she extended her stay to three months,  after having initially 
planned to stay only a few days. She got acquainted with new relatives and 
reacquainted with old, and attended two fiestas, which  were reportedly “the 
only ones she ever enjoyed.” Her husband, although somewhat upset with 
her for staying so long, made his own long- anticipated trip to Sonora three 
years  later.76
Sadly,  others remained alienated from both centers of Yaqui life. In the 
1970s, Yaqui and longtime Hermosillo resident Chepa Moreno was debating 
the merits of remaining in Hermosillo versus returning to the Yaqui River 
valley. She was at an advanced age, and feared that remaining in Her-
mosillo would mean that upon her death she would be buried in a name-
less pauper’s grave. If she died among Yaquis, however, she knew she would 
be buried in front of a church and given a proper farewell. In the end, 
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Moreno deci ded to remain in Hermosillo, where a small income she still re-
ceived from employers allowed her to indulge in her favorite luxury: a 
fresh pack of cigarettes each day. She also did not want to abandon her cat, 
a rarity in Hermosillo’s lower- class barrios. Unfortunately, Chepa’s worst 
fear ultimately came to fruition. Her death was, according to one anthro-
pologist who was familiar with Chepa’s life history, “devoid of any Yaqui 
ritual,” and her beloved cat was senselessly and violently killed shortly  after 
Chepa’s passing.77 Chepa seems to represent a small minority of Yaquis, 
however, since the vast majority appears to have gravitated  toward  either 
their older settlements along the Yaqui River or their new settlements in 
Arizona.
Although Yaquis in Arizona appeared to have been making pro gress in 
stabilizing their presence,  those who remained in Sonora, despite their 
recognition by the Mexican government as an autonomous po liti cal entity, 
found their admittedly limited freedoms eroding in more recent de cades. 
Though they had managed to remain more or less ethnically, culturally, and 
even po liti cally distinct from surrounding Mexican communities, they  were 
nonetheless increasingly bound up in the regional system of commercial ag-
riculture, a system that did not always accommodate the Yaquis’ complex 
and rigorous ceremonial schedule. Reconciling their unwavering commit-
ment to a demanding religious calendar with their increasing domination 
by market forces has proved to be a tall order. As McGuire succinctly put 
it, “Yaquis are as po liti cally autonomous as they are eco nom ically de-
pendent.”78
Their circumstances may have been less than ideal, but Yaquis south 
of the border  were not exactly in dire straits. Fast- forward to April 1984, 
when Texas Tech University hosted a symposium, entitled “The Year of the 
Yaqui,” to commemorate and reflect upon its fifty- year relationship with 
the Yaqui Indians. The university’s intentions could not have been better. 
For the symposium, a group of anthropologists, historians, archaeologists, 
and Yaqui Indians from both sides of the border gathered to assess the tribe’s 
po liti cal, economic, and cultural evolution, to investigate historical and con-
temporary challenges faced by Yaquis in both Sonora and Arizona, and to 
enjoy per for mances by Yaqui dancers and exhibitions by Yaqui artists.79 
Shortly thereafter, university faculty and other employees launched a final 
expedition to Sonora. The party included the historians John Wunder, Wil-
lard Rollings, and Dan Flores, the archaeologist Robert Campbell, and two 
members of the university’s mass communications department. Their 
objective was, as Flores wrote in a diary of the expedition, “to observe cul-
tural change [and] continuum since the first expeditions,” an objective that 
he privately admitted was “not  really clear- cut.” More concretely, they 
hoped to film the group’s annual Fiesta de Gloria, or Easter ceremony, as 
previous expeditions had done. Incidentally, they also brought with them 
cartons of cigarettes and groceries to assist in preparations for the fiesta, 
per the advance instructions of the Yaquis.80
But when the party arrived in the river valley, the Yaquis refused to allow 
the taping of their ceremony. As Flores wrote, “What we have discovered . . .  
is that Yaqui culture, in the 20 years or more since the last filming . . .  
has under gone many radical changes, and among them is a growing dis-
like for being the subject of camera lenses and curious gringo ethnogra-
phers.” Somewhat ironically, however, hundreds of Yaquis attended the 
screening of a film from an earlier Fiesta de Gloria. Flores described delight 
and frequent laughter among the many Yaqui attendees as they watched 
their relatives in action. Still, the Yaquis remained firm in their refusal to 
allow further filming. Much had changed, then, since the last expedition. 
Yaqui homes by and large contained electrical power, which the Mexican 
government provided in the 1960s, although the Yaquis still refused indoor 
plumbing, which they considered “unnatural and unnecessary,” according 
to Flores. He noted that the Yaquis in the 1980s  were far more “corpulent” 
than the earlier, “wasp- waisted” generation observed by Holden.81 He also 
noted the presence of schools, automobiles, tractors, and barbed- wire fences 
where  there had once been only Carrizo fences, as well as the use of pro-
pane gas and the substitution of brick for adobe in construction. He even 
noted the presence of a crop- dusting plane. Flores mused, “I yet find it 
most incongruous to see a traditional Carrizo cane lodge with a John Deere 
tractor and a tele vi sion antenna on the flat roof! Nonetheless, the sight is 
common.” In sum, then, he considered cultural change among the Yaquis 
to be “considerable.” 82 Regardless, the Yaquis appeared to have stabilized, 
with some perhaps even prospering.
In fact, by the turn of the twenty- first  century, the Yaquis had acquired 
a reputation as, in the words of one scholar, “the richest tribe in Mexico.” It 
was an assertion, she continues, “made to me by nonindigenous Mexicans 
in casual conversations and during interviews, on buses and at parties. It 
was something I heard repeatedly.” The Yaquis possessed an enviable 
amount of land and at least theoretically exclusive rights to abutting ocean 
resources. Some non- Indians also could not help but “speculate aloud, imag-
ining a wealth of mineral resources lying dormant, unexploited in the foot-
hills of the reserve’s Bacatete Mountains.” The Yaquis acknowledged  these 
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economic advantages over Mexicans in the region, but often claimed, in the 
words of one Yaqui, “The real ity is that the Yaquis are not rich. They have the 
land but not the means to work it.” 83
Indeed, a closer look betrays the fact that the Zona was an eco nom ically 
depressed area within a largely prosperous region. Underemployment and 
unemployment  were endemic. Vast tracts of Yaqui lands  were being rented 
out to non- Indians (as much as 90   percent, according to one estimate). 
“Anyone who has traveled International Highway 15, which passes directly 
through the Yaqui Zona,” one scholar noted, “has witnessed the crumbling 
walls of wattle- and- daub  houses, their trapper roofs held down with rocks 
and  bottles and soil, the dirt roads that wind away from the main thorough-
fare, the conglomeration of cramped, dusty stores, rusty bicycles, and 
limping cars.” But even more seriously, economic conditions  were catalyz-
ing yet another pattern of out- migration, with many crossing the border into 
Arizona. As Yaqui Indian and Vicam resident Luz García put it: “The Yaqui 
youth are once again nomads. They are leaving their pueblos  because they 
need work . . .  Many, many modern young  people . . .  are leaving the coun-
try, to the tribe which we have over  there, in Tucson . . .  They are no longer 
working in [professions related to] what they have studied, mind you . . .  
Many of them studied to be agricultural engineers, architectural engineers, 
ecological engineers . . .  [Now] they have come to know this work of wait-
ers, restaurant workers, or they simply work picking lemons or oranges or 
vegetables  there in the United States.” 84
As for transborder movement, although border crossings  were never a 
 simple affair for tribal members, they became more difficult as the  century 
progressed. The roadblocks encountered by a party of Yaquis en route to a 
wake are illustrative. In December 1984 the Pascua Yaquis lost a young tribal 
member to leukemia. Following Yaqui religious tradition, the deceased’s 
 family scheduled a cele bration and extended invitations to Yaqui relatives 
and dancers, some of whom happened to reside on the other side of the 
border. Tribal members considered such gatherings a religious imperative, 
having been decreed, in the words of one Yaqui, “not by Federal Recognition 
but . . .  by our Creator [eons] before what the white man called Chris tian-
ity.” However, as relatives from the Río Yaqui attempted to cross the U.S.- 
Mexican border into Arizona, an immigration officer flatly denied their 
entry on the grounds that they  were not immediate  family, an action the 
tribe  later characterized as not just insensitive, but “anti- culture, anti- 
Indian, and offensive to Indian religion.” In a letter of complaint submitted 
to the United States Immigration and Naturalization Ser vice just days  later, 
the tribe stated, “Many of our  people who have come to visit on religious 
and other occasions have had their passports confiscated for no reason at 
all.” “If officers . . .  who seem to have anti- Indian attitudes are left in charge 
of the temporary entry of Yaqui Indians into the United States,” the com-
plaint continues, “then our Yaqui Pueblos in Arizona are  going to have a lot 
of prob lems this coming Lenten Season.” To allay the evidently common fear 
that  these Yaqui pilgrims might take up permanent residence in the United 
States, the letter assures officials that only about “one  percent” of Mexico’s 
23,000 Yaquis had ever expressed a desire to live and work in the United 
States. Instead, the vast majority visited on a temporary basis, if at all. 
“Yaquis in Mexico are too attached to our land in Mexico  after fighting and 
 dying for [it] from 1533 to 1927,” the letter concludes.85
A more in- depth account of the episode surfaced a few days  later, one 
authored by its Yaqui participants, Andres and Rebecca Flores and Guada-
lupe Valenzuela. They had traveled from Tucson to Vicam, one of the eight 
pueblos on the Yaqui River, to notify relatives of the death in the  family, 
and returned with Vicam Yaquis Leonardo and Francisca Buitimea to at-
tend the wake. Unfortunately, Francisca had not completed the application 
pro cess for entry in advance. “Rules are rules,” the guard told the travel-
ers, “and I’m not about to break any rules for anyone.” When one of the of-
ficers allegedly assumed a “rude and angry tone of voice,” the Yaquis asked 
to speak with a supervisor. “That  won’t do any good,” was the officer’s re-
ply. When one of the Yaquis attempted to explain that as Native Americans 
the travelers had certain rights, the officer interrupted, exclaiming, “You 
guys  aren’t American Indians.” He paused for a moment, then corrected 
himself, explaining, “I mean they  aren’t,” motioning to the Yaquis from 
Vicam. Shortly thereafter, the officer’s supervisor arrived, whereupon one of 
the tribal members attempted to explain that immigration officials normally 
let Yaquis pass for religious ceremonies. A quick call to the tribe’s chairman 
in Arizona, David Ramírez, they assured the supervisor, would iron  things 
out. “It  wouldn’t do any good,” he reportedly replied, adding, “It’s just a 
waste of time.” When one of them asked for the supervising officer’s name, 
he responded: “Intimidating us  won’t do any good. We  people who work 
have to deal with  people like you  every day.” Although the officers eventu-
ally spoke with Ramírez, they remained steadfast in denying the Indians’ 
entry. Both Leonardo and Francisca Buitimea took a bus back to Vicam that 
same day. “I and the  others signed below,” the complaint concludes, “would 
like to submit this affidavit as to the type of torment Our  People have to go 
through in order to practice Our Religious Rights as Yaquis.” 86
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The frustration  these Yaquis felt at the port of entry could also cut the 
other way. Yaqui Rosalio Moisés described one such encounter that occurred 
while he was traveling from Arizona to the Río Yaqui. When Moisés reached 
the port of entry, a Mexican official asked for his passport. “I  really do not 
know what you mean by a passport,” he replied in all seriousness. The of-
ficial then asked a series of questions concerning his place of birth, his des-
tination in Sonora, and the date he had originally crossed into the United 
States, which had been about thirty years prior, or while he was still a child. 
When asked for the exact date that he migrated to the United States, he ex-
plained, “That I do not know,  because my grand mother could not read or 
write.” Convinced that his queries  were getting him nowhere, the exasper-
ated official eventually waved Moisés through.87
 Until the second half of the twentieth  century, Yaquis residing in Arizona 
simply lacked the  legal clout to demand any kind of right to migrate, un-
fettered, across the U.S.- Mexico border. They  were essentially landless, 
often, again,  little more than squatters, well into the twentieth  century. Most 
possessed an unclear citizenship status, along with an even more unclear 
tribal affiliation; they  were not exactly American Indians, having originated 
in Mexico, but  were undeniably indigenous. Officials, then, often could not 
help but won der if that alone entitled them to certain rights. Further, the 
Yaquis had clearly established a permanent presence in the United States, 
venturing south only on occasion. Meanwhile, their Mexican counter parts 
evidently had no interest in immigrating, having long since stabilized their 
presence on lands to which they felt spiritually rooted. As one scholar ob-
served, “According to the Indian’s deep- seated beliefs, God gave the land 
to the Yaquis. As a result of this view, it is unlikely that any group of ab-
original Americans have protected their land more tenaciously or consis-
tently.” 88 Increasingly, however, the same could be said of Yaquis on the 
other side of the border. In the 1960s, tribal members in Arizona, with state 
government assistance, acquired yet another small plot of land, this time 
in a more formal fashion, on the outskirts of Tucson. They used the land to 
create several farming cooperatives. The acquisition represented, from the 
tribe’s perspective, yet another step  toward forging a Yaqui homeland in 
Arizona. The following de cade they would initiate a drive for federally rec-
ognized status, an effort that reflected the desire of many Yaquis to further 
formalize their presence in their  adopted homeland, straighten out their 
citizenship status once and for all, and continue the pro cess of negotiating 
the greatest pos si ble degree of autonomy.89 Their experiences with the fed-
eral recognition pro cess would mirror, in revealing ways,  those of the Kick-
apoo Indians, who employed a similar strategy in their search for stability.
 Until then, true stability remained elusive, while the hard- won patterns 
of transnational migration, though somewhat modest in scale and scope, 
became more and more difficult to maintain, as tribal members crossing for 
the wake learned. And although  there  were  those tribal members who in-
sisted on living  under the laws of the United States and devoting themselves 
to religion rather than self- government, Yaqui elders, especially,  were quite 
vocal about the fact that they, in the words of one Pascua Yaqui, “wanted 
to be like they had been on the Río Yaqui, that is, a nation within a nation, 
living according to their own laws within the United States.” 90 For the 
Yaquis, claims of sovereignty  were not the product of a “we  were  here first” 
mentality. Rather, sovereignty was earned over time through an ever stronger 
connection to place that took effort and commitment to forge. As the 
scholar David Delgado Shorter put it, “The strongest [Yaqui] claim of sov-
ereignty is not that they lived in a specific place the longest, but that they 
have been making that place their own through the  human  labor that con-
stitutes all ritual activity.” It is through ceremonial acts, in other words, that 
they “make the land significant” and “affirm the community’s value.” 91 
Yaquis in Mexico have, from the Spanish colonial period on, behaved as, at 
the very least, a nascent nation. If the “essence of national belonging” is, as 
the historian Thomas Holt argued, the willingness to “kill or die” to further 
a collective cultural or po liti cal agenda, then the Yaquis have long expressed 
a keen understanding of what national citizenship often entails. They have 
had a seemingly innate ability to, as another historian put it, “mobilize large 
numbers of  people for collective proj ects, military or other wise,” as well as 
a penchant for “establish[ing] dominance” through “spectacular displays of 
force” and “ostentatious collective discipline.” 92  Later generations of Yaquis 
living in Arizona would express a similar understanding of national citizen-
ship, though in a less aggressive fashion. As far back as 1930 they began 
employing the rhe toric of nationhood in helping establish their sovereignty, 
declaring the existence of a “Yaqui Nation in Arizona” in a display of unity 
while  going through a change in tribal leadership. They went so far as to 
create a Yaqui flag, perhaps the ultimate symbol of nationhood.93 Though 
some non- Indians found that assertion somewhat preposterous, a bid for 
federal recognition north of the border in the 1970s would find  those Yaquis 
in Arizona closer to making it a  legal real ity.
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The Mexican Kickapoo
In 1948, the anthropologist Edward Spicer wrote a letter to a friend, pre-
sumably an immigration official, in which he relayed an in ter est ing story 
about a Kickapoo Indian named Pesiskea Matapulla. A gradu ate student of 
Spicer’s encountered Matapulla while traveling in Sonora, and Matapulla 
quickly volunteered a  great deal of information about himself. He had been 
born near Shawnee, Oklahoma, to Kickapoo parents and migrated to Mex-
ico as a child. Since then, he had visited Oklahoma only once. Matapulla 
was about fifty years old, the husband of a Mexican  woman and the  father 
of five. He claimed to have lost any documentation that might have con-
firmed  either his U.S. citizenship or his affiliation with the Kickapoo tribe, 
however, and immigration officials repeatedly denied him reentry to the 
United States. Even though Matapulla occasionally received money from 
Oklahoma authorities in connection with his deceased  father’s estate, he had 
been unsuccessful in convincing U.S. authorities to wave him through. He 
asked the gradu ate student for assistance in getting himself and his  brother, 
Namarsik, across the border. Evidently, the two wished to relocate to the 
United States permanently. “What should Matapulla do,” Spicer asked, “to 
return to the United States? Could you help him in any way? If  there is any-
thing that can be done to establish his citizenship, could you get in touch 
with him? Does he appear in the agency rec ords?”1 What ever became of 
Matapulla is unclear, but his story is emblematic of the awkward position 
in which transnational Kickapoos found themselves, a position made all the 
more awkward by increasingly rigorous efforts to control transborder 
traffic.
Spicer relayed the story of Matapulla in 1948. As the  century progressed, 
the Kickapoos watched their right to migrate on a transnational scale 
steadily erode, much like the Yaquis. Still, contrary to what Matapulla’s 
story suggests, the tribe retained a remarkable degree of freedom to pass 
and repass the border, a degree of freedom few North American tribes en-
joyed and one that required a  great deal of tenacity on the tribe’s behalf to 
maintain. Even more so than the Yaquis, the Kickapoos exploited holes in 
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the immigration system and capitalized on their uncertain citizenship 
status and tribal affiliation, all in the interest of solidifying their hard- won 
transnational presence. Although the parallels between the two groups are 
myriad, one distinction merits mention. The Kickapoos, throughout the 
twentieth  century,  were among the most mobile indigenous groups in 
North Amer i ca. They forged a vast migratory  labor network throughout the 
American West, Southwest, and Midwest that covered thousands of miles; 
founded a sort of transborder way station literally on the northern banks 
of the Rio Grande that the tribe increasingly considered home; and main-
tained a ceremonial center, a sort of spiritual homeland, in a remote pocket 
of Mexico at Nacimiento, Coahuila, where Kickapoo culture and religion 
could flourish in the open. The tribe also hammered out an arrangement 
with the Mexican government in the mid- nineteenth  century that not only 
helped secure their land base, but also specifically allowed them to pre-
serve and practice their unique culture. Thus, unlike Mexico’s other indig-
enous  peoples, the Kickapoos did not have to live with the threat of forced 
assimilation. They would also prove notoriously suspicious of and resistant 
to any government initiative that looked like an attempt to undermine 
their cultural autonomy, however well- intentioned it might have been.2 But 
perhaps most significantly, while the Yaquis had essentially split into two 
groups, connected only by periodic sojourners, the Kickapoo tribe man-
aged to move, with only a few exceptions, as a tribal  whole, pouring into 
Nacimiento during the winter months, filing out en masse during the spring 
months, merging with and nearly disappearing into the mi grant  labor stream, 
and periodically regrouping in Ea gle Pass, all the while encountering sur-
prisingly few obstacles.
Efforts by immigration authorities to more meaningfully govern trans-
border traffic, however, threatened this delicate balancing act. As a case in 
point, in early 1966, Kickapoo Indian Pancho Salazar Garza and his  brother 
 were returning to Mexico following their annual trek to vari ous harvests 
throughout the western and central United States. Prior to his departure 
from Mexico the previous spring, Garza had acquired a six- month tourist 
permit and a second hand automobile. While in the United States he acquired 
a .32 automatic pistol, a nonfunctioning .22  rifle, a hunting knife, and sev-
eral boxes of ammunition. Also on his person was a card, issued by the 
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser vice (INS) to the Mexican Kicka-
poos, which read as follows: “Member of the Kickapoo Indian tribe, pend-
ing clarification of status by Congress.” Stamped across this document 
was the word “Parolee,” a misleading classification that could, and did, 
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lead uninformed authorities to assume  these men  were somehow parol-
ees from prison. About ten miles north of Lamesa, Texas, a highway pa-
trol officer stopped Garza and his  brother, searched their vehicle, and then 
promptly took them to police headquarters for interrogation.3
Apparently, the officer had reasonable cause for suspicion. First of all, 
Garza claimed Mexican residency, but possessed a Utah driver’s license. 
He initially claimed to have been en route from Utah, but  later claimed to 
have been working in Brownfield, Texas. Second, one of Garza’s docu-
ments, presumably his tourist visa, appeared to have been altered, the date 
of issuance having been changed from 1962 to 1964. Fi nally, the Garza 
 brothers  were unable to establish owner ship of the firearms, obliging the 
officer to confirm  whether or not they  were stolen.  After interrogating 
Garza and his  brother, the officers fi nally confirmed both their identity and 
their owner ship of the firearms. Authorities released Garza and his  brother 
shortly thereafter, and for reasons that are unclear forwarded their fire-
arms to the tribe’s attorney in Austin.4
While the officer’s concerns may have been valid given the series of red 
flags, among officials along the border it was evidently common knowledge 
that the Kickapoos did, in fact, spend part of the year in Utah (where they 
picked cherries) and part of the year in Brownfield (where they manned the 
cotton harvest). They also typically harvested apples and onions in Colo-
rado and worked the beet- thinning period in Montana and Wyoming for 
part of the year. Thus, Garza could accurately claim to have been en route 
from Utah, or Texas, or any other of the many stops along their annual mi-
gratory route. Further, it was not unusual for an American employer to 
assist tribal members in purchasing automobiles and acquiring driver’s li-
censes, since they valued their ser vices. In this instance, while Garza was 
not a year- round resident of Utah, his employer, who was, took it upon him-
self to make sure Garza had all the proper documentation.5
For much of the twentieth  century, the Kickapoos participated in this 
seasonal migratory cycle, one that usually began in the month of May and 
terminated in the month of October. Only the el derly or ill stayed in Mex-
ico, charged with caring for the tribe’s  cattle, so Nacimiento could appear 
deserted for months at a time. Tribal members or ga nized themselves into 
patrilineal  family groups, with the  father acting as a crew chief of sorts. 
They typically traveled nonstop from Mexico in camper- equipped pickup 
trucks, reportedly dispensing with road maps  because of their knack for re-
membering landmarks, and carried  little more than bedding, clothing, and 
cooking utensils.6 The mi grants typically stayed in communal housing pro-
vided,  free of charge, by the farmers. One reporter provided a detailed de-
scription of Kickapoo housing on a farm in Brighton, Colorado. It was a 
former dairy barn, partitioned off into several “apartments” by whitewashed 
plywood. The quarters contained a single win dow, a single lightbulb, and 
“fly strips thick with insects.” As for furniture, each unit contained nothing 
more than a few mattresses, a stove, and a refrigerator. “When it comes 
time to pick apples,” he said, “it’s time to go home.” Even as late as the 1980s, 
most Mexican Kickapoos continued to participate in the annual migration, 
with many expressing a general contentment.7
American employers  were typically enthusiastic accomplices in helping 
the Kickapoos maintain  these seasonal migratory patterns. A rancher in Big 
Bend colorfully expressed an attitude shared by many Kickapoo employers: 
“ They’re the greatest barbed wire fence builders and repairers I’ve ever had. 
You just tell them what to do, or rather tell their leader. And  they’ll start 
building fence like a bunch of Swedes laying railroad track.” 8 However, al-
though their livelihood depended on seasonal employment, the Kickapoos 
would not tolerate an overly demanding or unsympathetic employer, nor 
would they neglect their ceremonial duties for employment obligations. 
“Last year I was unable to go to work for you,” wrote Pancho Jiménez to 
George Schuman of Clearmont, Wyoming, “as you did not help me out when 
I wrote you for a small allowance of $40.00.” He expressed a desire to 
return to work for Schuman, but only if he received a sixty- dollar advance. 
“We do not work in the winters,” he explained, “and money gets very scarce 
around  here about this time of the year and our employers usually give us a 
hand.” 9
The anthropologist Dolores Latorre, who, along with her anthropologist 
husband Felipe, lived near the tribe’s Mexican settlement for several years, 
elaborated on the difficulties faced by Kickapoos during the winter months, 
difficulties stemming in part from the tribe’s ceremonial commitments. “The 
Kickapoos are very busy with their New Year ceremonies,” she wrote to one 
planter, “and  there is  little time left for them to attend even to the essen-
tials of earning a living.” She described  these tribal customs as “more impor-
tant to them than anything  else,” even making a living. Kickapoo  women 
constructed a new winter  house each year, beginning usually around 
November, and maintained the winter residence  until the end of the New Year 
ceremonies, which typically corresponded with the first week of March. 
Next, they tore down their winter  houses and then repaired and, fi nally, 
reoccupied their summer residences. “If a Kickapoo  woman owns a  house,” 
Latorre wrote, “she is duty bound to observe  these rules and nothing  will 
Almost Immune to Change 113
114 Chapter Four
keep her from carry ing them out.” Meanwhile, the husband was not al-
lowed to leave the village, even for employment,  until the  family had fully 
transitioned from the winter to the summer  house.  There is some evidence, 
however, that the Kickapoos did not entirely ignore their nonceremonial 
responsibilities during  these periods. For example, Latorre revealed that due 
to some early work- related commitments among the men one season, the 
Kickapoos’ chief, Papikwano, was “rushing the ceremonies.”10 Interestingly, 
the Kickapoos often relied on their employers to directly fund their cere-
monial observances through payday advances. “Now we have to give a fiesta 
for one of our relatives,” wrote Fernando Jiménez to his employer, “and we 
would like very much for you to advance us about $50.00 US in order that 
we can be able to perform that impor tant ceremony which should be be-
fore the 12 of March.”11 As the Latorres once wrote to some acquaintances, 
“ These  people  will do nothing  until they finish their ceremonies and let’s 
face it!”12
The Kickapoos’ letters to vari ous employers, a  great many having been 
written by Dolores Latorre on their behalf during the 1960s, also reveal that 
the tribe had a certain rapport with their bosses, a rapport that went much 
deeper than an employer- employee relationship and even bordered on 
friendship. In early 1965, Jesusita Valdes wrote a C. S. Dawson in Provo, 
Utah, requesting fifty dollars to pay for groceries purchased on credit. 
“Through Lonnie Salazar,” she wrote, “I was supposed to receive part of the 
money he received from you, but Lonnie drank it up, so I got nothing.” Thus, 
she requested that Dawson “not send the money through anyone, but send 
it directly to me at [Múzquiz].”13 Another Kickapoo, named Margarito Trev-
iño, asked S. C. Carranza of the Holly Sugar Com pany in Sidney, Montana, 
for fifty dollars “to buy cigarettes.”14 Their employers evidently granted the 
Kickapoos’ requests more often than not, and also commonly expressed a 
more personal interest in their well- being. “Thank you for sending me the 
money I requested,” wrote Pancho Valdes. “My wife is better,” he continued, 
“and I hope she  will be almost completely well by the time we get to your 
country.”15 John Mohawk wrote to a Mrs. Dick Burr of Provo that he and 
his  family  were fine except for his wife, who was “suffering considerably 
from her knee as  water accumulates in it and is painful.” He requested that 
she fill his wife’s prescription for pain medi cation, sending it to Ea gle Pass, 
since, he explained, “the Mexican customs might stop the medicine at the 
border like they have done for other Kickapoo.” Tribal members  were 
also in the habit of having employers acquire their automobile license plates. 
They insisted, however, that plates be sent to Ea gle Pass instead of Múzquiz 
in order to, in the words of one Kickapoo, “avoid customs complications.” On 
at least one occasion Mexican customs tried to charge a Kickapoo Indian a 
five dollar duty for plates shipped to Mexico, money that he did not have. 
He promptly returned the plates and asked his employer to reship them 
to an address in Ea gle Pass.16
In addition to migrating for employment purposes, the Kickapoos also 
migrated to be near  family. “Thank you for the $15.00 in cash which you 
sent me,” wrote Kiehtahmookwa, or Cecilia Jiménez, to her husband, Jim 
Katakyaha, who was then residing in Jones, Oklahoma. “I am feeling much 
better,” she continued, “and am brown as a nut from this wonderful sun-
shine in Mexico.” She went on to request that her husband come to Mexico 
and take her back to Oklahoma. She concluded, “We  shall all be very glad 
to get back to you and our home,” suggesting that perhaps the  family main-
tained their Mexico residence strictly for seasonal, ceremonial purposes.17
The Kickapoos, thus, had a long history of crossing the U.S.- Mexico bor-
der unfettered, only occasionally encountering prob lems like Matapulla’s 
at ports of entry. If questioned by immigration authorities, at least prior to 
the 1950s, they simply presented to guards at border crossings copies of a 
document that read as follows: “This is to certify that the families of the 
Kickapoo Indians, thirty seven in number, are to be protected by all per-
sons from any injury what ever, as they are  under the protection of the 
United States and any person violating  shall be punished accordingly.” A 
“Wm. Whittlee, Mj., 2nd  Inft., Fort Dearborn” signed the document on 
September 28, 1832.18 Although  there are regular references in the histori-
cal rec ord to the Kickapoos’ knack for acquiring “passes” or “permits” 
from “Commanders of ports,” Indian agents, or other U.S. officials in order 
to remain relatively footloose and fancy- free, the 1832 document in par tic u-
lar became a kind of tribal institution unto itself.19 In fact, the tribe contin-
ued, in the words of one report, “cling[ing] with a childish faith to copies 
of a document which [they] cannot read, and which has been handed 
from  father to son” well into the twentieth  century. Border guards, mean-
while, made a habit of honoring the document, prob ably not so much out 
of a fear of being “punished accordingly,” but  because they had gradually 
developed a familiarity with and a re spect for the Kickapoos’ work habits.20 
 Whether or not the document still carried the force of law was evidently a 
question no one bothered to ask, though the tribe certainly considered it a 
treaty, negotiated government- to- government, which exempted mi grant Kick-
apoos from immigration regulations. Thus, the tribe’s unfettered movement 
appears to have been an unwritten rule along the border.
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Still, tribal members  were careful about keeping certified copies of the 
document handy. In fact, one Ea gle Pass notary claimed to have made at 
least a hundred certified copies from a copy of the original in his fifteen 
years in the business. One can imagine his surprise, then, when a young 
Kickapoo wandered into his office with the original. It was a development 
that, according to one report, touched off a “flurry of speculation and light-
ning research,” since  those familiar with the document had often wondered 
if the original still existed. “When questioned,” the article continues, “[the 
Kickapoo] said his ‘abuelito’ in Nacimiento had given it to him. It was tat-
tered and worn, and mended with cellophane tape.” The notary made the 
copies, but not before cautioning the young man that  great care should be 
taken with the document.21 At midcentury, however, the document had 
been copied by both Kickapoos and non- Kickapoos alike so many times that 
immigration officials increasingly began calling its validity into question. 
Their suspicions  were understandable, since, as Dolores Latorre explained, 
“Mexicans began to avail themselves of the many times copied document 
and  were crossing as Kickapoos and not as Mexican nationals whose entry 
into the U.S. is very complicated.”22 And more trou ble was on the horizon 
for Kickapoo mi grants.
 Under Operation Wetback, which was a 1953 legislative initiative de-
signed to curtail undocumented Mexican migration northward, the tribe 
faced increasing scrutiny. For the first time, the issue of the tribe’s nation-
ality began to preoccupy and even trou ble officials within the INS.  After 
reviewing the Kickapoo case in the mid-1950s, the INS concluded, “The 
Ser vice must, on the basis of the situation known to it, take the position that 
Kickapoo Indians residing in Mexico are to be treated the same as other per-
sons residing  there and that they are not entitled to any special rights or 
privileges  under the immigration and naturalization laws  because of their 
tribal membership.” Thus, in 1957 the INS designated the Mexican Kicka-
poos “aliens,” which would complicate, if not completely curtail, their trans-
border movement. This development evoked protests from a contingent of 
sympathetic Ea gle Pass residents, who urged their local congressman 
to challenge the ruling.  After taking the tribe’s case to the INS in San 
Antonio, the local representative returned to Ea gle Pass with encouraging 
news.  After considering the Kickapoo case, the immigration ser vice con-
cluded, “A review of all available information would indicate the Kickapoo 
should be permitted to cross and recross the Mexican border.” They cited 
the 1794 Jay Treaty, signed by the new United States and  Great Britain, 
which protected all Indians’ right to migrate across the U.S.- Canada bor-
der, as justification. Although local officials predicted that the INS’s deci-
sion would not sit well with Congress, it ultimately went unchallenged.23
The invocation of the Jay Treaty may seem anachronistic and, given its 
focus on the U.S.- Canada border, irrelevant. Article 3 of the treaty states, 
“It  shall at all times be  free to His Majesty’s subjects, and to the citizens of 
the United States, and also to Indians dwelling on  either side of the said 
boundary line, to freely pass and repass by land or inland navigation, in 
the respective territories and countries of the two parties on the continent 
of Amer i ca.” The United States and  Great Britain reaffirmed the provisions of 
the Jay Treaty in the 1796 Explanatory Article in the wake of the Treaty 
of Greenville. In fact, it mentioned the Kickapoos, at this time only pre-
cariously established in the  Great Lakes region, by name. Along the U.S.- 
Canada border, Indians passed freely  until the 1924 Immigration Act. 
 After its passage, immigration officials in the United States required Cana-
dian Indians to register as aliens and obtain immigrant visas or  else face 
deportation proceedings. A few years  later, and in the wake of a series of 
 legal challenges, officials  adopted a provision stating that the 1924 act “ shall 
not be construed to apply to the right of American Indians born in Canada 
to pass the borders of the United States; Provided, that this right  shall not 
extend to persons whose membership to Indian tribes or families is created 
by adoption.” The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act altered this provi-
sion somewhat, establishing a 50  percent blood quantum requirement for 
 those claiming an exemption from the usual rules governing immigra-
tion.24 Still, taken collectively,  these developments seemingly affirmed, in a 
somewhat convoluted manner, the Kickapoos’ right to traverse the northern 
border at  will, so long as they could prove tribal membership. The ques-
tion remains, though, if the Jay Treaty applies to the southern border, as 
the Kickapoo claimed. The  legal scholar Richard Osburn argues that while 
“Indian interaction between tribes separated by Amer i ca’s northern border 
is safe,” along the southern border it is not, with the exception of the Kicka-
poos and Tohono O’odham (with the latter experiencing somewhat less 
freedom than the former, especially in recent years).  These exceptions, how-
ever, have nothing to do with the Jay Treaty and every thing to do with  those 
anomalous aspects of their histories discussed herein, including, especially, 
historical pre ce dent.25
At midcentury, the INS implemented a new system designed to govern 
the tribe’s movements in a more formal fashion, one that was more “offi-
cial” in nature but still comparatively lax. They began issuing the Kicka-
poos what immigration officials called “annual parolee papers,” which 
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mi grant tribal members had to renew from year to year. “Paroling Kicka-
poos,” one official clarified, “is an immigration term. It’s not a criminal 
 thing. The Immigration Department is not sure of the citizenship of  these 
Indians.” According to the enrollment rec ords of the Oklahoma Kickapoos 
from this period, about half of their Mexican counterpart was likely 
born in the United States, an understandable figure given the fact that 
the tribe spent most of the year migrating within U.S. borders. However, 
few Mexican Kickapoos bothered to rec ord births, partly  because the tribe 
had never considered such official documentation impor tant and partly 
 because of a characteristic reluctance to register themselves anywhere. 
Thus, for de cades their citizenship status remained unclear, and mostly by 
design.  Until officials clarified that status, they had  little choice but to con-
sider the Kickapoos American citizens when in the United States and 
Mexican citizens when in Mexico— a far from ideal arrangement  unless 
you  were a Kickapoo.26
Migrating Kickapoos considered themselves, variously,  either dual citizens 
or citizens of neither country. A 1957 INS study included a telling conclu-
sion that perhaps best summed up the Kickapoos’ sentiments. “It is a con-
sensus,” the report contended, “that the Kickapoo consider their tribe a 
nation unto itself.” When uninformed authorities forcibly detained Kicka-
poo mi grants, as in the Garza case, the official response could be surpris-
ingly swift. For example, in the 1960s, an immigration official asked a 
Kickapoo from Múzquiz, who was attempting to cross into Mexico, for his 
papers. Since the Kickapoo was unable to produce sufficient proof of his 
citizenship status, authorities detained him. “The U.S. government was in-
formed of this,” reported a journalist from Ea gle Pass, “and  there was a 
tremendous fuss in Washington. They even sent a high immigration official 
from Washington to the Texas border.” Oddly, that same official seized the 
reporter’s file on the Kickapoos, in what was likely an attempt to keep the 
incident out of the news.27 Evidently, the U.S. government, as surprising as 
it may be, had no objection to tribal members asserting their right to mi-
grate, a right that, at least from the tribe’s perspective, went back to 1832.
The Kickapoos also enjoyed a host of notable  legal and po liti cal excep-
tions while living in Mexico. First of all, the Mexican government recog-
nized the tribe’s right to govern itself. The Kickapoos’ government has 
traditionally consisted of a “chief,” or capitán, who serves as the civil, po-
liti cal, and religious leader of the group, and, at least  until the late 1930s, 
when they evidently stopped meeting, a council of elders that worked closely 
with the chief. Mexican officials have historically interfered with the work-
ings of the Kickapoo government only when serious crimes  were commit-
ted, such as manslaughter, robbery, and  cattle rustling. Government officials 
also excluded the tribe from several national censuses. They counted the 
Kickapoos for the 1930 and 1970 censuses, but not for  those conducted in 
1940, 1950, 1960, or 1980. Their exclusion was apparently at the urging of 
local officials, who  were uncertain  whether or not the tribe could properly 
be considered Mexican citizens, since, put simply, they  were not treated as 
Mexican citizens, particularly when it came to the favoritism they received 
at border crossings. Immigration officials also did not inspect their vehicles 
upon their return from the United States, nor did they require that the Kick-
apoos pay duties on items brought back from the United States. Fi nally, the 
Mexican government did not require that tribal members register their ve-
hicles in Mexico.28 The Kickapoos honored the terms of their arrangement 
with the Mexican government, and Mexican officials, in turn, allowed their 
very unusual relationship to persist.
This is not to imply, however, that the Mexican government ignored 
the Kickapoos when it came to broader discussions of Indian assimilation, 
discussions that, as detailed earlier, had become commonplace by mid-
century. For example, writing in the 1960s for an official publication, the 
anthropologist Miguel León- Portilla lumped the Mexican Kickapoos together 
with other Mexican tribes, including the Yaqui and Tohono O’odham, that 
he considered among the least acculturated of Mexico’s Indians, or  those 
who had witnessed only “sporadic attempts to raise their living conditions 
or to scientifically study their [language].” However, he nonetheless con-
sidered the Kickapoos a special case. He explained, “Note should be taken, 
as a case of almost complete isolation, of the Kikapoo [sic] group that lives 
on the ‘ranchería’ ‘El Nacimiento,’ located in the Municipality of Múzquiz, 
Coahuila.” Unlike other Mexican Indian groups, he continued, the Kickapoos 
“form a part, from an ethnic and linguistic point of view, of the Algonquin 
 family” from the United States, and had only comparatively recently estab-
lished a presence in Mexico. Still, although León- Portillo differentiated the 
Kickapoos from other Mexican Indians, he did not imply that this distinc-
tion meant anything when it came to the question of acculturation. In other 
words, Indigenistas would not exempt the Kickapoos from their national-
izing proj ect.29 He also singled out the Mexican O’odham as a special case. 
“It should be explained,” he wrote, “that the Papagos, located near the U.S. 
border where  there are also individuals of said group, receive certain influ-
ence from the United States, principally  because some of their  children at-
tend Papago reservation schools in the state of Arizona.” Yet again, however, 
Almost Immune to Change 119
120 Chapter Four
he did not imply that their unusual history and/or orientation exempted 
them from the Indigenistas’ larger mission to acculturate Indians living 
within Mexico’s borders.30
Regardless, Mexican policy as applied to the Kickapoos has generally 
been one of noninterference, leaving them with considerably more auton-
omy than their Oklahoma relatives. And much as in the Yaqui case, the 
Cárdenas administration had a lot to do with institutionalizing this hands- 
off approach to managing the tribe’s presence. In yet another presidential 
decree, Cárdenas “officially” recognized Papiquano and Minonina as chiefs 
of the Kickapoo tribe, and in 1939 he amended the decree, directing that 
their hunting rights be recognized without the oversight and interference 
of government authorities. They  were permitted to hunt, unfettered by 
federal or state hunting laws, in the Sierra Madre nine months out of the 
year. It further allocated a small salary for the tribal chief from the Mexi-
can government (though successive leaders appear not to have received 
the same perk). Evidently, however, the tribe was not entirely comfortable 
with the sudden attention from Mexico City, and tribal elders, in turn, 
strongly discouraged tribal members from participating in Mexican politics 
and elections, fearing that  doing so might make them vulnerable to an ero-
sion of their rights and incursions on their lands. And unfortunately for the 
Kickapoos, the agreement struck with Cárdenas regarding hunting rights 
did not outlive his presidency. Over time the wilderness on their perimeters 
was subdivided and doled out as ejidos and ranches. The non- Indians who 
worked  these parcels, not surprisingly, had  little interest in the Indians’ his-
toric agreement with the Mexican government. President Carlos Salinas 
was the first to flat- out ignore the Kickapoos’ hunting rights, and although 
they reached out to successive presidents to right  these wrongs, as one Kicka-
poo put it, “Es perdido.” It’s lost.31
The hunting rights issue may seem to be a minor one, but the Kickapoos 
considered it a serious affront to the tribe’s religious freedom. Put simply, 
the deer hunt is a sacred activity. As one journalist explained  later in the 
twentieth  century, “A  father cannot baptize and bestow a tribal name on 
an infant  unless he can contribute to the rite four slain deer.” The animals 
 were scarce around Nacimiento and “rare as polar bears” in Ea gle Pass. 
Hunting regulations imposed by both private landowners and government 
officials became increasingly restrictive by the end of the  century south of 
the border, and in Texas  these restrictions  were “unrelenting.” With most 
Kickapoos earning only a few thousand dollars a year by  century’s end, few 
could afford seasonal hunting leases. Besides, a hunting lease would not 
have fully addressed the prob lem anyway.  After all, babies are born year 
round, and leaving them nameless was simply not an option. Many Kicka-
poos thus turned to poaching, but  were likewise unable to pay fines that 
could run into hundreds of dollars when caught. Thus, many ended up work-
ing  these fines off on county road gangs.32
Still, relations between the Kickapoos and Mexican local and national 
officials have mostly been comparatively positive. One notable exception, 
however, concerned education. Efforts to provide a non- Indian education 
to the Kickapoos  were rarely well received. In the early 1920s, for example, 
the administration of Alvaro Obregón installed a school and a teacher at 
Nacimiento. Fearing the impact that a non- Indian education could have 
on their culture, the Kickapoos burned down the school and purged their 
community of all government agents. Federal officials reached out to the 
Kickapoos again  later that decade, and this time enjoyed the smallest of vic-
tories.  After refusing a federal educator’s request that they send five of 
their  children to the aforementioned Casa del Estudiante Indígena board-
ing school in Mexico City, the Kickapoos, evidently trying to meet the of-
ficials halfway, agreed to allow a leatherworking specialist and an and 
agricultural adviser to  settle among them. President Cárdenas also tried to 
bring the Kickapoos into the Mexican educational system. In a meeting 
with Cárdenas in 1938, however, Kickapoo chief Papiquano advised, “I am 
the head of my  people; you are the head of yours. I  don’t interfere with you; 
you  don’t interfere with me.” The Kickapoos’ recalcitrance when it came to 
education persisted throughout the twentieth  century. “As of the 1980s,” the 
historian Andrae Marak observed, “only the parents of about twelve Mexi-
can Kickapoo  children  were sending their  children to school for fear that 
the education offered in Mexico (or in the United States for that  matter) 
would lead to their  children’s acculturation.”33
All the while, the Mexican counterpart of the Kickapoo tribe maintained 
a rather curious relationship with their Oklahoma relatives. The boundary 
between the two contingents actually remained quite diffuse throughout the 
twentieth  century. Intermarriages  were not uncommon; movement be-
tween the two locales was, of course, common; and it was actually relatively 
easy, though evidently uncommon, for a Kickapoo to “switch” from one 
group to another. Ceremonial visits to Mexico and Oklahoma from both 
sides  were a constant, and a layover in Oklahoma while on the migratory 
trail was similarly common.34 Yet barriers between the two Kickapoo con-
tingents remained. Although the two groups always considered themselves 
products of the same tribal heritage, both recognized that  those residing 
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south of the border  were considerably more culturally conservative. Then 
 there was the fact that in 1937,  under John Collier’s Indian Reor ga ni za tion 
Act, the Oklahoma Kickapoos  adopted a form of government and constitu-
tion that their southern counterpart found somewhat stifling. Mexican 
agrarian law classified the Mexican Kickapoos’ land as an ejido, a much less 
formal, looser designation that left the Kickapoos with considerably more 
freedom to govern themselves within their communally held lands as they 
saw fit. The ejido organ ization required only that the Kickapoos elect a jefe, 
or president, a trea surer, and a secretary, all serving three- year terms. Other 
positions included a judge, a post often held, at least among the Kickapoos, 
by a religious leader, and a consejo de vigilancia, or investigator, who dealt 
with livestock and other economic  matters. Although the ejido organ ization 
sounds quite formal, the Kickapoos’ broad interpretation of  these require-
ments and posts left it considerably less so. Thus, they enjoyed a degree of 
freedom and in de pen dence that, at least in their estimation, their Oklahoma 
counterpart did not.35
The status of Kickapoo lands in Mexico, in fact, seemed to have gradually 
evolved over time in a way that granted the tribe even more freedom and 
in de pen dence. The Kickapoos’ original designation upon their arrival was 
that of a “military colony,” a classification that carried with it much less 
government interference than ejido, and thus more autonomy. Military 
colonies, however, have obviously become a  thing of the past. Mexican of-
ficials have also, at times, referred to Kickapoo lands in Mexico as compris-
ing a ranchería, a designation that carries with it economic connotations. 
But ejidos, which are still fairly common arrangements in Mexico, bring with 
them the maximum amount of autonomy available  under contemporary 
Mexican law. In fact, the ejido distinction has throughout Mexican history 
been an exemption, and even a privilege, reserved, generally speaking, for 
Indian communities that possess some preexisting governing structure. How-
ever, although the Kickapoos’ status, officially speaking, remained that of an 
ejido for most of the twentieth  century, their original “military colony” des-
ignation, which implies an even greater degree of autonomy, may have more 
accurately reflected the real ity. In fact, the Latorres gleaned that  because 
of a failure to “comprehend the complicated laws” surrounding  these vari-
ous designations, some Kickapoos  were  under the impression that at least 
part of their lands still had antiquated colonia status  under the Mexican 
government and thus considered themselves an “autonomous nation.”36
Descriptions of Nacimiento by outsiders have tended to emphasize the 
freedom and splendid solitude in which the group evidently lived. A traveler 
 later in the twentieth  century recounted seeing a few  houses made of 
cinder blocks, but “the dominant architecture was the traditional loaf- 
shaped wickiups made of cattail reeds.” He observed the Kickapoos  going 
about their daily activities, some strolling about, some reclining on straw 
cots  under front porches, some clumped into groups engaging in conserva-
tion, all seemingly in a state of relaxation. It was “a scene of leisure,” he 
wrote. The village itself, he noted, was surrounded by “dramatic rock cliffs” 
and mountains blanketed with oaks. It also boasted a stream,  running cool 
and clear through the small cluster of  houses and buildings. When asked if 
the “sacred stream” had a name, one Kickapoo replied, “No. We just call it 
river.” As of the late twentieth  century, the village did not have  water 
pipes or a sewage system. In fact, electricity had only recently arrived in 
Nacimiento. The Kickapoo evidently  were not looking to significantly alter 
this pattern of life. As one explained, “Texas is where we work. Nacimiento 
is where we go to live our lives as Kickapoo  people.”37
A third Kickapoo contingent, it should be added, resided in the state of 
Kansas, though in dwindling numbers. Originally established in 1832 and 
consisting of roughly 768,000 acres, the Kansas reservation had been sub-
jected to allotment in 1887 and had dwindled to just  under 4,000 acres 
of allotted land and just  under 1,000 acres of tribal land by the end of the 
1930s. The Kickapoo Tribe of Kansas or ga nized  under the auspices of 
the Indian Reor ga ni za tion Act in 1934. As of 1962, the tribal roll listed 498 
persons. In just seven years that number had fallen to 250 (though Bureau 
of Indian Affairs officials believed the number was more like 1,000, and 
 were working with Kansas Kickapoos to produce a more accurate count).38 
They appear to have been left to their own devices by their relatives, how-
ever. “I’ve been waiting a long time for a Kickapoo from Oklahoma or Mex-
ico to come up to Kansas,” one told a reporter in 1973, “but none of the 
southern Kickapoos ever come to this part of the country.” The result was 
that the Kansas Kickapoo had lost “nearly all” of their Kickapoo culture. It 
is unclear why tribal members bypassed Kansas, since the Mexican Kicka-
poos  were known to venture as far north as Michigan to visit even more 
distant relatives.39
 Those Kickapoos who permanently resided in the United States and en-
joyed federally protected status often expressed and even acted upon an 
interest in strengthening ties with their Mexican counter parts. Yet their 
efforts did not always sit well with their southern relatives. In the 1960s, 
for example, Oklahoma Kickapoos initiated a drive to add Kickapoos in 
Mexico to their tribal rolls. Although motivated in part by the Oklahoma 
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Kickapoos’ desire to receive the maximum amount of compensation for 
tribal lands lost earlier in the  century, the enrollment drive may also have 
represented a sincere effort to help their relatives, then widely perceived 
as poverty- stricken and uneducated. The Latorres appear to have assisted 
the tribe in its efforts, claiming to have been, in Dolores’s words, “up to our 
necks in work” in the pro cess. Two representatives from the Oklahoma 
group visited Mexico in 1966, but managed to sign up only a “handful” of 
Mexican Kickapoos. The Latorres then took over.  After a few days the Lator-
res had forty- nine signatures on applications for enrollment in the Kicka-
poo tribe of Oklahoma. However, the pair ran into a  couple of serious 
obstacles. First of all, only a few Kickapoo  children had birth certificates, 
namely,  those who  were born in the United States while their parents  were 
on the migratory trail. Second, few could remember if they had already reg-
istered in 1937, when the tribe last formulated a tribal roll. A comparison of 
the current membership roll with the 1937 roll helped the Latorres solve the 
latter prob lem, which left only the birth certificate prob lem. They proposed 
a compromise with the BIA whereby, in lieu of a birth certificate, they would 
send an affidavit signed by two other tribal members confirming the indi-
vidual’s Kickapoo identity. The BIA, in the end, agreed to this somewhat 
unusual request.40 The Latorres also assisted officials in estimating the age 
of tribal members, which proved to be no small task. Dolores explained:
We have developed several “tricks” for estimating the ages of the 
Kickapoo by combining their personal estimation of their age (some 
actually know the exact date of their birth) plus certain historical 
“landmarks” such as the year they arrived in Mexico, Mc Ken zie’s 
raid, the coming of the Kickapoo group who arrived in 1907, the 
Mexican Revolution, “la gran gripa” (1918 Influenza epidemic), the 
big drought of the 50’s when they began  going stateside to work,  etc. 
Then by asking them such personal questions as: “ Were you a 
‘señorita’ (had your menarche) when the flu epidemic came?” Or, 
“ were you married when such or such an event occurred?”  etc.,  
we fi nally can approximate the age of a person within four or five 
years.41
However, the Latorres also encountered re sis tance from within the Mex-
ican band, with one member confiding to Dolores her fear that enrolling in 
the Oklahoma tribe, in Dolores’s words, “ will mean that the Kickapoo from 
 here have to return to the U.S. where their ways  will be taken away from 
them as was tried before they came  here.” The tribe’s distrust of the BIA 
also figured into their reluctance to register, even when the agency acted 
through fellow Kickapoos.  After personally distributing BIA- produced ap-
plications to tribal members per the Latorres’ request, Kickapoo Pancho Mi-
nacoa privately revealed that even he was afraid of “esa gente,” or “ those 
 people.” 42 The fact was that at the end of the day the Mexican Kickapoos 
trusted no one. Mexican authorities typically got the cold shoulder, the tribe 
repeatedly refused to allow church officials on their lands, and, as already 
discussed, they burned down two schools that the Mexican Department of 
Education constructed in their village earlier in the  century.43 Thus, their 
re sis tance to  these latest overtures surprised no one, and the Latorres’ efforts 
to register the Mexican Kickapoos, though well meaning, appear to have 
yielded  little fruit.
Relations between the Oklahoma and Mexican groups, however, could 
also be quite positive. One Mexican Kickapoo, for example, extended an in-
vitation to his Oklahoma- based brother- in- law to visit Mexico. “Would be 
very happy to have you come down to Mexico in February,” he wrote, “but 
it is best if you come all the way to Muzquiz by bus as  every time we cross 
the border, the Mexican customs make us pay $15.00 to get our cars back 
into Mexico.” And in an in ter est ing aside, the Kickapoo also promised to 
send his Oklahoma relative some peyote.44 Mexican Kickapoos also re-
mained bound to their Oklahoma counterpart for more pragmatic reasons. 
The availability of welfare checks, for example, depended on at least their 
periodic presence north of the border. Writing to Kickapoo Palo Trevino, 
the Oklahoma Department of Public Welfare warned that its policy allowed 
only two successive checks to be mailed to out- of- state addresses. The 
letter continues, “This means you may receive your February and March 
checks in Mexico, but you must return to Oklahoma by April 1st, to avoid a 
change in your welfare grant.” 45 Another Kickapoo, forced onto disability 
due to an undisclosed medical condition, stood to receive aid to the dis-
abled from the state of Oklahoma for the rest of his life, but with an impor-
tant condition. “Our concern at pres ent,” a representative from the Shawnee 
Agency wrote to the Latorres, “is that [his wife]  will not realize that he 
cannot be out of the state of Oklahoma for a period of more than three 
months and still maintain residence or eligibility for financial assistance.” 
The agency requested the Latorres’ assistance in stressing to tribal mem-
bers that they must not remain in Mexico for longer than three months, 
lest the checks from Oklahoma cease.46
Despite occasional headaches, however, many Kickapoos appear to have 
valued their freedom, in de pen dence, and splendid isolation,  whether at 
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home in Nacimiento or on the mi grant trail. Tribal member Aurelio García 
explained: “The Kickapoo are dif fer ent than most American Indians. Most 
have their reservations. They stay  there. Nowhere to go.  These  people, the 
Kickapoo, are  free, like birds or what ever . . .  They feel like they can go any-
where.” 47 Another Kickapoo echoed this sentiment, telling a reporter in 
the 1980s: “I  don’t like staying in one place too long. I get bored. I had a 
steady job in Oklahoma City. But I got tired of it.” Much of the mi grant work, 
he maintained, was temporary, easy, and lucrative. For example, harvesting 
asparagus, which required them to work only a few hours in the morning 
and a few hours in the eve ning, earned them up to $800 a week. He and 
his  family typically stayed in communal housing provided,  free of charge, 
by the farmers. While in Mexico, they inhabited housing some would con-
sider substandard, but not the Kickapoos. They designed their winter homes 
to allow for quick assembly and disassembly, making their migratory life-
style all the more con ve nient to maintain. “I just want to leave it that way,” 
he concluded. “I  don’t want to change. Indians are not made to be rich . . .  
We work, pay taxes, that’s it.” 48
It should be pointed out, however, that not all Kickapoos found life on 
the mi grant trail fulfilling. As Kickapoo Margie Salazar put it in the 1990s: 
“As a child, I remember traveling with my parents on long difficult journeys. 
I worked in the fields, and we all chipped in to survive, but I knew  there 
would be a better life. I worked very hard between trips to get my educa-
tion and complete my GED. I did not want to keep working with my hands.” 
Another Kickapoo mentioned having turned to mi grant  labor only reluc-
tantly, and only when he was unable to secure a job as a roofer, his occupa-
tion of choice.49
Regardless, their wages, in addition to providing subsistence, also funded 
ceremonial observances and a host of social obligations. This was no small 
 matter, since the tribe believed that following through on their religious 
commitments protected not just the Kickapoos but the entire  human race 
from calamity. As one Kickapoo put it: “A Kickapoo does not pray for him-
self alone. He prays for all  people. And if Kickapoo are not allowed to 
practice their traditions, this  will be borne out in wars, disease, natu ral 
disasters.”50 According to one journalist, the Kickapoos believed they  were 
living in the last of four worlds. He explained: “The first three  were de-
stroyed by air, rot, and  water; this one  will be consumed by fire. But their 
faith seems to be largely  free of apocalyptic fret and doom. As long as they 
observe the tradition and conduct their lives honorably, at peace with na-
ture, they  will have an eternal reward in the western sky.” Indeed, nature 
figured prominently in their ceremonial cycle. The springtime ceremonial 
season begins  after two annual rites: the second thunderstorm of the spring 
season and the blooming of a specific species of tree. At that moment, the 
journalist added, “the tribe’s spiritual leader summons the  people, and at 
Nacimiento the holy season begins. For several weeks Nacimiento is closed 
to anyone who is not Kickapoo.” Overall, however, it was impossible to par-
tition off religion from other aspects of Kickapoo culture. One Kickapoo 
religious leader likened their culture to a  human hand in which religion rep-
resented but one fin ger. Though significant on its own, it was very much 
interrelated with and dependent on other aspects of Kickapoo culture and, 
thus, impossible to isolate in its own category.51
Also impor tant from the Mexican Kickapoos’ perspective was the fact 
that their demanding migratory/ceremonial cycle enabled them to remain 
largely aloof from outside cultural influences. “Kickapoos Almost Immune 
to Change,” claimed a 1977 headline from the Austin American- Statesman. 
“Kickapoos Are Living 400 Years in the Past,” declared another. One arti-
cle detailed a Kickapoo burial ceremony, whereby tribal members painted 
a purple streak across the face of the deceased so that his god, Pepazce, 
would recognize him.  After placing him in a shallow grave, they left the 
deceased Kickapoo with a corn cake and the following words: “Go willingly 
to Pepazce; do not molest  those of us who stay  behind.” The village then 
entered into a four- day period of mourning. The reporter marveled that, 
no, this was not Western historical fiction. “It is fact and still occurs only 
five or six hours’ driving time from Austin near the Mexican town of 
Muzquiz in Coahuila,” he wrote. He added that the tribe’s original agree-
ment with the government of Mexico, made the previous  century and men-
tioned above, included a provision that read, “It is not demanded of them 
(the Indians) to change their habits and customs.”52
But although subtle, changes  were occurring. Less than a de cade  later, a 
headline read, “Kickapoo Indians Launch Longest Journey— Move into Mod-
ern Life.” The purchase of automobiles and transistor radios became more 
common. Some Kickapoo young  women began getting permanents and 
wearing nail polish. Some Kickapoo young men began wearing their hair in 
a style reminiscent of the Beatles. Younger tribal members also began study-
ing the En glish language in increasing numbers. The tribe also began turn-
ing to modern medicine more frequently, particularly when it began to look 
like their medicine men  were failing them. Still, their suspicion of outsiders 
remained. For example, the tribe turned down an offer of $100 per man per 
day, plus expenses, to appear in a Jimmy Stewart picture being filmed near 
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Brackettville, Texas, most likely  because of a preference to steer clear of 
such publicity.53
As mentioned above, the city of Ea gle Pass, which is about ninety miles 
from Múzquiz, figured prominently in the Kickapoos’ migratory cycle. 
While living with other tribal members beneath the international bridge in 
Ea gle Pass, one Kickapoo reportedly told a journalist, “The Indian was  here 
in Ea gle Pass before it was a town.” Indeed, they had been crossing the 
border near the present- day site of the city since at least 1848, when they 
camped out in the area just prior to their move to Mexico, and used the area 
as a crossing point for the remainder of the  century. Immigration officials 
noted their appearance as early as 1862. In more recent de cades, they have 
lived in cardboard huts while  there, paid about eight dollars each month 
for  water, and often bathed in the muddy Rio Grande. As of the 1980s, the 
tribe had some forty- nine dwellings that they built themselves, along with 
three trailer homes that, all told, covered about two and a half acres. The 
huts, one anthropologist noted,  were “generally built out of a combination 
Three young Kickapoos, 1962. The caption, likely written by one of the Latorres, 
reads, “Kickapoo Youths Wearing Their Hair in Imitation of the Beattles [sic].” 
Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas Libraries, 
University of Texas at Austin.
of saplings, scrap lumber, cardboard, and sheets of black plastic, all held 
together by strips of the trimmed salvages [sic] of denim obtained from the 
local Wrangler jeans factory.” On more than one occasion, several huts 
burned  because of cigarette butts or burning matches carelessly tossed out 
of a car win dow by passersby. At one point a freak flood washed away 
most of the tribal members’ personal belongings. Local assistance in  these 
kinds of cases was usually not forthcoming. “One less Indian to worry 
about, says the government” seemed to be the consensus, according to one 
Kickapoo.54 Such attitudes  were perhaps not surprising, considering the 
fact that most Americans recognized the Kickapoos only through the popu-
lar L’il Abner comic strip, which included a Kickapoo character named 
Lonesome Polecat. His pastime was the production of a beverage called Kick-
apoo Joy Juice, an alcoholic concoction.55
Over time, however, the Kickapoos’ ties to Ea gle Pass became more 
and more substantial, and they reached a point where formalizing their 
Kickapoo  couple weaving sotol baskets in “Kickapoo Village,” which likely  
refers to their settlement near Ea gle Pass, between 1965 and 1967. The caption 
reads, “Although this is  women’s work, in this instance the Mexican husband of 
this Kickapoo  woman is giving her a hand.” Nettie Lee Benson Latin American 
Collection, University of Texas Libraries, University of Texas at Austin.
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presence in the city became yet another tribal imperative. The 1960s and 
1970s would find the increasingly Texas- based Kickapoos pursuing formal 
recognition as an American Indian tribe and petitioning for a protected 
land base in their  adopted home. In explaining their choice of Ea gle Pass 
for the site of a potential Kickapoo reservation, one Kickapoo stated, “We 
refer to Ea gle Pass  because our grandparents and our forefathers are buried 
 there. This is why we refer to that as our home ground.” “Our forefathers 
came from the United States,” another  later told a congressional commit-
tee, “and we like the United States and are proud of the fact that we 
originated from  here.”56 The tribe had evidently grown tired of the uncer-
tainties that came with camping beneath the international bridge between 
stops along the mi grant trail, and their transience was exacting an obvious 
toll. “The Kickapoo Tribe, Mexicans and North Americans at the Same 
Time,” read a 1979 Mexican headline. The article characterized the group 
as “dead and forgotten, without a  house or a home,” facing their “inevitable 
extinction, which  will prob ably occur within the next de cade, more or less.”57 
Such a lifestyle, as can be  imagined, did not help per sis tent prob lems 
within the tribe, including alcoholism and a general lack of access to ad-
equate health care. Still, they seemed to fear eviction from their Ea gle Pass 
encampment above all other concerns. As one Kickapoo revealed, “ Every 
day we go to bed with fears that tomorrow we are  going to be thrown out of 
 there.”58
In the 1960s, the city of Ea gle Pass granted the tribe a small piece of land, 
partly out of a concern for their safety and partly to keep them from being 
a nuisance. Like the Yaquis, the Kickapoos used the land to establish a variant 
stream of tribal tradition, a reconstituted tribal  whole that drew from a 
specific indigenous heritage while adapting it to their new setting. Also 
like the Yaquis, they launched a campaign for federally recognized status 
to secure the greatest pos si ble degree of sovereignty.59 In short, they had 
officially begun nation building. Also like the Yaquis, however, they faced 
a serious obstacle in that they  were claiming the right to nationhood in a 
region in which they  were relatively recent arrivals. In other words, they 
 were, in the eyes of many legislators, “Mexican” Indians seeking to become 
“American,” or, perhaps more accurately, “Texas” Indians, even though they 
had actually originated well north of the present- day U.S.- Mexico border. 
 These  were all distinctions, however, that the Indians themselves simply re-
fused to recognize. Like the Yaquis, the Kickapoos had long behaved as at 
least a nascent nation. Further, their unusual relationship with the Mexi-
can government meant that they had grown accustomed to a certain degree 
of autonomy (along with a host of associated protections) and no doubt 
wanted—or perhaps even expected— the United States to honor the pre ce-
dent set by its southern neighbor and legislate accordingly.  Doing so, how-
ever, would be tantamount to ignoring over a  century’s worth of efforts to 
invest the U.S.- Mexico border with  legal, diplomatic, and even cultural 
meaning, since a “special” relationship with the nation- states on both sides 
of the dividing line would effectively place the Kickapoos above the fray in 
their efforts to protect the border’s hard- won integrity. And again similar to 
the Yaqui case, recognition north of the border could pose potentially trou-
bling questions about national citizenship that might redirect broader con-
versations about indigenous nationalism and indigenous borders down 
troubling paths. In both regards, then, it looked like a potentially slippery 
slope. But although the Kickapoos’ push for federally recognized status in 
the 1980s would appear rather audacious, to the tribal members themselves 
it was simply the logical next step in substantiating what they innately 
viewed as a perfectly legitimate claim to nationhood.
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5 We Are Lost between Two Worlds
The Tohono O’odham Nation
In a 1990 “open letter” to Tohono O’odham living north of the U.S.- Mexico 
border,  those living south of the boundary communicated their fear that a 
rift was forming between the two halves of the tribal  whole. While the 
letter expressed gratitude for their support in the form of “money, materials, 
and encouragement,” it also described worsening conditions south of the 
boundary. “Our  human rights and aboriginal rights have slowly been 
 violated or dis appeared in Mexico,” the letter contends, “as more and more 
Mexicans have moved onto our lands. Sometimes  there  were gradual take-
overs, other times deception/fraud  were used and other times brutal and 
forceful takeovers.” An inadequate, and ever shrinking, land base had in-
creasingly forced southern O’odham to leave their communities for cities 
in Mexico such as Hermosillo and Caborca, as well as cities in the United 
States. By the end of the twentieth  century, southern O’odham controlled a 
mere 1,800 acres, not nearly enough to maintain their generations- long tra-
dition of subsistence farming. Migrating away from their communities 
was a compromise that, however necessary, “affected the continuity of the 
O’odham traditions, culture, and language.” The letter was evidently meant 
to serve as a reminder that, as the authors put it, “as O’odham we are one 
 people.”1
Southern O’odham had been hopeful for a more secure existence when, 
in 1948, the Mexican government opened the aforementioned National 
Indian Institute to assist its indigenous  people. In 1990, however, they com-
plained bitterly that the office’s efforts did not reach the O’odham  until the 
1970s. Even then, the O’odham alleged, the office was “weak” and “under-
funded,” working mostly in concert with “ranchers and dope traffickers to 
take more O’odham land.” Thus, the prob lem was not a lack of rights  under 
the Mexican government, but the enforcement of existing rights.  After futile 
protests to the Mexican government,  these O’odham now turned to their 
increasingly distant northern counterpart for assistance. In 1983, the 
O’odham nation established an office north of the boundary to investigate 
 legal issues, census reports, and correspondence between southern O’odham 
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and the Mexican government, but their efforts bore  little fruit. The prob-
lem, from the southern O’odham’s perspective, was  simple to diagnose but 
difficult to treat. “To recover or reclaim the O’odham lands,” the letter con-
tinues, “the  people who left must come back to their lands, but in order for 
the  people to stay on the land, they have to be able to eat and to find some 
way to sustain themselves.” It would take economic development and edu-
cational and health facilities, all working hand in hand, to help “draw  people 
back onto the lands.” They claimed to have had the support of Sonora’s 
Yaquis and Mayos, but needed firm support from their U.S.- based counter-
part as well. Tellingly, they went on to assure their northern relatives that 
they intended to remain in Mexico, realizing that while O’odham north of 
the border had extensive property, they “need to preserve [it] for their 
 children,  grand  children, and  great  grand  children.” “The Traditional 
O’odham Leaders of Mexico want to thank you,” the letter concludes, “and 
express that we are willing and anxious to go to your community or dis-
trict meetings and give you more information as we can not put  every  thing 
on paper now.”2
The 1990 letter was just another in a long string of efforts by southern 
O’odham aimed at reclaiming lost lands. Early the previous de cade, for ex-
ample, seventy tribal members occupied the National Indian Institute of-
fices in Caborca, Sonora. They did so to draw attention to the tribe’s lack of 
educational and health facilities and to bring the land issue to the fore. 
O’odham governor David Santiago Manuel Lara explained to a Tucson re-
porter that while his tribe had resided in Sonora for centuries, they never 
actually possessed a  legal title to their lands. “When  others bought land in 
the area,” he stated, “they received documents entitling them to it, even 
though Indians already lived  there.”3
By the end of the twentieth  century, transborder ties between O’odham 
living in Mexico and O’odham living in the United States had weakened to 
the point that the southern contingent felt neglected, even forgotten. Once 
a way of life for the tribe, transborder movement became increasingly dif-
ficult as the twentieth  century progressed, a lesson the Yaquis and Kicka-
poos had also learned the hard way. Sweeping changes along the U.S.- Mexico 
border, coupled with the dramatic development of the American Southwest’s 
economy, appeared to be the culprit. In this light, the letter reads like a 
wake-up call for northern O’odham, a reminder, again, that the concerns 
of O’odham south of the boundary should be the concerns of all O’odham. 
Instead, both groups watched ner vously as federal officials on both sides of 
the border gradually implemented rules and regulations designed to more 
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closely monitor and control O’odham transborder migratory patterns. Con-
sequently, the very practice began falling out of  favor, and tribal interests 
began to diverge.
North of the border, the O’odham had gone through their own period of 
readjustment in an effort to maintain tribal cohesion and cultural continu-
ity. One anthropologist noted in the 1970s, “While so many Papagos still 
reside in villages that appear at first glance to possess pristine aboriginal-
ity, the fact is that a  century of American owner ship of the Papaguería has 
resulted in increasing interpenetration of the American and Papago 
socio- cultural systems. The changes in Papago society have been contin-
uous, cumulative, and transformative.” 4 Religious observances that had 
long required transborder mobility became ever more difficult to maintain, 
while the O’odham’s increasingly vis i ble participation in, and increasing 
dependence on, southern Arizona’s cash economy slowly eclipsed the im-
portance of transnational economic networks. By the late twentieth  century, 
then, movement between Tohono O’odham lands in the United States and 
Mexico had nearly ground to a halt, having lost nearly all of its cultural, 
po liti cal, and economic relevance. While the Yaquis and Kickapoos faced 
increasing restrictions on their movements during this period, the O’odham’s 
migratory patterns had essentially become a  thing of the past, effectively 
isolating their southern counterpart while si mul ta neously sending north-
ern O’odham down a divergent economic, po liti cal, and even cultural path. 
In other words, forces beyond their control increasingly complicated and, 
in the end, prohibited the maintenance of the tribal  whole as the twentieth 
 century progressed, leaving the O’odham among the most divided of North 
Amer i ca’s Indian nations.
By midcentury it was becoming apparent to the O’odham that residing 
north of the boundary held notable advantages over residing south of the 
boundary. As the Indian agent at Sells put it at midcentury, it was prov-
ing difficult for O’odham south of the boundary “to remain content and 
satisfied . . .  seeing that the O’odham in Arizona are improving in health, 
they have better education, and advance in every thing having to do with 
their prosperity, while their  brothers on the other side of the border lose 
what  little they have.”5 In 1950, one anthropologist estimated that only a 
few hundred O’odham resided on the Mexican side of the border on a per-
manent basis, living primarily in rancherías, or “villages with  houses 
scattered barely within sight of each other,” while  others who had long since 
lost their lands “eke out a parasitic existence around towns of Mexicans 
who have taken their lands.” Somewhat hyperbolically, he claimed that  these 
O’odham had “given up their Indian heritage and are waiting passively to 
die.” 6 This chapter  will explore the historical roots of  these disparities, 
highlighting moments when the barrier between  these two halves of the 
tribal  whole, long signified by the U.S.- Mexico border, began to appear in-
surmountable.
Unfettered movement in the present- day U.S.- Mexico border region had 
been of paramount importance to the tribe since well before the boundary’s 
inception. As O’odham Josiah Moore recently explained, “The history of our 
 people shows that they  were migratory and that they moved seasonally on 
a north- south axis to vari ous springs, wells, streams, grazing areas and 
religious and cultural sites between what now is Arizona and Sonora.” U.S. 
officials had, from the very beginning of their relationship with the group, 
assured the tribe that their right to migrate would remain in place. Moore 
maintains that as U.S. and Mexican officials began implementing the 1848 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Major W. H. Emory, who was one of four U.S. 
commissioners placed in the field, personally assured tribal members that 
they would “be able to visit back and forth across the border and carry on 
the usual relations between villages as though the boundary  were non- 
existent.” The Americans ultimately constructed fences along the border, 
but actually placed gates at  those locations most commonly used by the tribe 
to move across their lands. The tribe also claimed to have an “informal” 
agreement with the Border Patrol that they would continue to move freely, 
but would keep officials apprised of  those movements. By the end of the 
twentieth  century, however, past assurances and informal agreements 
meant  little.7
Subsisting in a desert environment has proved perennially challenging 
for the tribe, often necessitating unfettered mobility. As one scholar ex-
plained, “The movements of entire families or kinship villages to work for 
other  people are of ancient vintage.”  After his arrival in O’odham country 
in 1692,  Father Kino noted the O’odham practice of moving “from parts so 
remote, from the north, from the west,  etc.,” to capitalize on the regional 
economy and to attach themselves to developing settlements.  Whether it 
was a mission, a mine, a  cattle ranch, a cotton field, or any one of a number 
of economic enterprises over the next three centuries, the O’odham regu-
larly reverted to a migratory lifestyle when their own farms and fields 
proved unproductive or inadequate.8 And it was a subsistence strategy that 
the tribe had practiced, in some form or other, since well before the arrival 
of Eu ro pe ans. Often referred to as the “two- village” system, it entailed a 
seasonal migratory cycle between winter villages in mountainous areas, 
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where the group had access to  water sources, and summer settlements in 
the desert below near the deltas of washes, where they waited for the late- 
summer monsoons. They also maintained encampments near sources of 
saguaro cactus, the fruit of which the O’odham used to make wine for 
ceremonial purposes.9
As of the late nineteenth and even the early twentieth  century, the two- 
village system still figured prominently in the O’odham’s subsistence strat-
egy. When the  water dried up on their Arizona reservation, usually at the 
end of the summer, O’odham families simply packed up and headed south. 
“Over the mountains where you call Mexico,” one O’odham  woman ex-
plained, “ there  were more of our  people who had  water ditches in their fields. 
We worked for them and they gave us food.” As for the trek south, O’odham 
 women placed “the  children and the bedding and a small grinding stone” 
atop  horses while they ran alongside, carry ing pots, nets, and other ne-
cessities. O’odham men, meanwhile, went “far up in the hills . . .  running 
with their bows and arrows, looking for deer, and sometimes they met us 
with loads of meat on their backs.” She also mentioned cutting wheat and 
even harvesting figs for Mexican farmers while south of the border.10 As 
A Tohono O’odham man poses in front of his off- reservation home in  
the Sonoyta Valley, Arizona. No date given. Nettie Lee Benson Latin American 
Collection, University of Texas Libraries, University of Texas at Austin.
the economy of the American Southwest began booming, however, the 
O’odham found less and less incentive to venture into Mexico. North of the 
border, they worked as railroad laborers, nurserymen, truck  drivers, cooks, 
and general construction laborers. They became increasingly skilled in the 
pro cess,  running tractors, bulldozers, and cotton- picking machines, while 
also taking responsibility for their maintenance. In fact, one Tucson official 
noted in 1957 that “ there is more of a demand for Indian  labor than  there is 
a supply,” and that area employers seemed to be “prejudiced in  favor of the 
Papagos.”11 Accompanying this surge in off- reservation employment was a 
surge in O’odham population density on the reservation as O’odham real-
ized they no longer had to travel quite so far afield for employment oppor-
tunities. In fact, reservation population figures, which had long been on the 
decline, witnessed a dramatic reversal between 1900 and 1950. Tellingly, 
however, population figures for  those O’odham living south of the bound-
ary remained stagnant, never deviating dramatically from estimates dating 
back hundreds of years.12
Sometimes their  wholesale movement into the cash economy, particu-
larly during the twentieth  century, required a period of adjustment. One 
O’odham  woman recalled the first time she witnessed a group of Apaches 
giving her husband cash, rather than food or clothing, in exchange for 
 horses. She marveled at the fact that cash allowed him to “go to Tucson and 
buy any kind of food he wanted,” a circumstance that eventually led to a 
condition unfamiliar to her. “I got fat,” she revealed, and found that she was 
unable to stoop over and put on the new shoes he bought her. On one trip 
to Tucson, he even offered to buy her a sewing machine, to which she re-
plied, “What would I do with it?” They left it in the shop win dow. She was 
also surprised when her husband took her to Tucson to work “for the white 
 people” rather than into Mexico with the other O’odham when their  water 
supply dried up. As further testament to the tribe’s preference for mobility, 
she concluded about her husband: “He was good to me; he took me every-
where. I have been lucky in my husbands; I never had to stay home.”13
Although leaving O’odham lands to participate in Arizona’s cash econ-
omy at the expense of older economic networks had become the norm at 
midcentury, it was not a new phenomenon. For example, during the 1910s, 
a shantytown occupied predominantly by O’odham sprang up on the south-
western outskirts of Tucson. Concern for the Indian squatters’ well- being 
steadily grew among locals in ensuing years, prompting the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs to construct a school for O’odham  children nearby. A subse-
quent series of real estate booms, however, threatened this arrangement, 
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as local entrepreneurs began subdividing and selling non- Indians the lands 
upon which the O’odham  were camping. Some of  these same entrepreneurs 
arranged to sell the O’odham plots of land at reduced prices, an offer many 
evidently could not refuse. Two small subdivisions resulted from  these trans-
actions, named, appropriately, Native American Addition and Papagoville. 
Some O’odham remained in  these new neighborhoods, while  others opted 
to move farther south onto public lands. Development followed them 
wherever they went, however, and by the 1920s the vast bulk of Tucson’s 
O’odham had  either purchased lots, moved in with area relatives, or left the 
city altogether. Still, by midcentury the O’odham had established a perma-
nent presence in Tucson, and,  little by  little, replaced their once temporary 
structures with sturdy adobe brick  houses.14
Aside from the lure of the burgeoning Tucson economy, other forces con-
spired to thrust the O’odham off the reservation and into the cash economy 
during the first half of the twentieth  century. While drought had long cata-
lyzed O’odham movement, the intervention of the U.S. government in the 
1930s only complicated the tribe’s latest bout with per sis tent dry weather by 
undermining one of their primary subsistence strategies. U.S. government 
officials, acting through the New Deal’s Civilian Conservation Corps, arrived 
on the O’odham reservation with a livestock reduction plan early in the de-
cade, a plan they hoped would counteract a recent surge in  cattle deaths on 
tribal lands. As one O’odham remembered, “The government tried to tell the 
Papago cattlemen that  cattle died on our ranges  because of too many mes-
quite trees and too many rodents.” They claimed that removing mesquite 
trees and eradicating rodents would encourage the growth of pasture grass 
that would, in turn, reverse a supposed trend  toward overgrazing. Then, 
without consulting the tribe, officials proceeded to implement their plan.15
If they had consulted the tribe, they would have learned that the trees 
represented a key component of the tribe’s subsistence strategy. First of 
all, in the absence of pasture grasses, O’odham  cattle ate the mesquite beans. 
It was also not unusual for the O’odham themselves to eat mesquite 
beans. Second, the tribe depended on the trees for both firewood and fenc-
ing. As one O’odham explained, “Mesquite was weaved together to build 
corral fences. We  didn’t use wire . . .  because the  cattle would get cut up 
by it.” He did concede that the reservation had witnessed environmental 
change over the course of the previous de cade or so, and that the blue 
grama, common grama, and cotton grasses that had once grown four or five 
feet high  were nowhere to be found by the 1930s. The culprit, however, was 
not the mesquite trees, but simply drought. He argued: “The Indians knew 
that it  wasn’t rodents or too many mesquite trees that caused the lack of 
grass. It was the lack of rain . . .  If it rains, good. If not, then we are hurt. If 
the  cattle are  going to die, let them die. But they  will die right  here on their 
reservation.” Although the O’odham tried to explain to government officials 
that regional droughts  were cyclical and that the O’odham  were accustomed 
to riding them out, in the end the “white man never understood.”16
Overall, New Dealers had a difficult time implementing their programs 
in such close proximity to the U.S.- Mexico border. As one historian observed, 
“In Arizona’s borderlands, the Indian New Deal included an extra layer of 
complexity.” Since the border had essentially divided indigenous  peoples 
of similar cultures, languages, and traditions, many of whom often worked 
side by side with and even intermarried with non- Indians, “decisions about 
who would or would not be eligible for reor ga ni za tion seemed arbitrary.”17 
But the era proved profoundly significant for the O’odham, since,  because 
of their po liti cal reor ga ni za tion  under the auspices of the Indian New Deal, 
the group began to imagine themselves as a distinct po liti cal unit, separate 
from even close relatives like the Akimel O’odham. Ironically enough, 
then, the U.S. government was in no small way responsible for the Tohono 
O’odham’s eventual adoption of the rhe toric of nationhood.18
At the same time, however, the early twentieth  century also witnessed a 
growing schism between “progressive” and “traditional” O’odham on the 
reservation. In 1911 a group of O’odham founded the Papago Good Govern-
ment League, which was essentially a group of “progressive” O’odham. They 
 were mostly Presbyterians, had been educated at BIA schools, considered 
the allotment of tribal lands and the adoption of a ranching economy to be 
the keys to economic growth on the reservation, and overall favored as-
similation into the American cultural and po liti cal mainstream. They also 
tended to live around Tucson and Sells, the area’s two urban centers. More 
“traditional” O’odham, meanwhile, tended to be Catholics, opposed allot-
ment,  were much more likely to uphold tribal traditions such as the annual 
pilgrimage to Magdalena, and tended to have stronger connections with 
O’odham living south of the border. They also tended to live in the much 
less population- dense northern reaches of the reservation, and  were more 
likely to take advantage of seasonal employment opportunities off the res-
ervation. As the historian Andrae Marak put it, “The Tohono O’odham  were 
thus caught between two nations, the United States and Mexico, and 
two religions, Presbyterianism and Catholicism . . .  They  were also caught 
between two worlds, the traditional and the modern.”19 But while “progres-
sive” O’odham appeared ready to embrace assimilation and, especially, 
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education north of the border, they nonetheless appeared committed to gov-
erning themselves. As one put it, “We want all of our  children educated so 
that . . .  we  will have a strong country that the Americans re spect.”20
The schism between northern and southern O’odham was even more 
acute than the one that divided progressive and traditional O’odham, how-
ever. For example, southern O’odham  were left out of debates over reor ga-
ni za tion during the Indian New Deal era, since according to the Mexican 
constitution they technically possessed no special status and, thus, no right 
to a protected land base simply by virtue of their “Indianness.” Sanction-
ing their participation with a “tribal” government was a nonstarter in a 
nation that does not, according to its constitution, recognize ethnic differ-
ence. They  were also struggling, as mentioned earlier, with land disposses-
sion. In 1920, for example, an O’odham governor based in Sonoita complained 
to officials that Mexicans had taken to planting wheat on lands the tribe 
had long regarded as their own. Shortly thereafter, Mexicans acquired 
lands on the reservoir side of the local dam and  were hoarding the  water 
for themselves. Another Mexican attempted to block O’odham access to 
one of their wells, while an American  cattle outfit began building fences on 
O’odham lands. The O’odham’s attempts to seek redress, as one historian put 
it, “generally resulted in inaction, the status quo, or their expulsion,” while 
similar attempts north of the border “resulted in the creation of a reserva-
tion and governmental efforts to retrieve their property.”21
This is not to say that all of the southern O’odham lands  were vulnerable, 
however. In 1928, Mexican president Elías Calles designated lands around 
the O’odham village Pozo Verde (amounting to roughly 7,675 acres) an ejido. 
As previously discussed, although the designation implied communal use 
of the land, it was not what  those familiar with U.S. Indian policy would 
consider a reservation. In fact, when the Mexican government granted the 
O’odham ejidos, they  were designated dotaciónes, or endowments, rather 
than restituciones. The latter designation would have represented an 
acknowl edgment by the Mexican government that the land had once be-
longed to indigenous communities, which would have invested the ejidos 
with at least a degree of sovereignty. The former designation, meanwhile, 
meant that officials would treat the Indians no differently than peasants and 
farmers in the region. Further, despite the designation, O’odham numbers 
continued to dwindle dramatically. An American traveler, for example, 
counted 900 O’odham scattered across twenty- three villages earlier in 
the  century, and by 1930 perhaps as few as 500 individuals living in Sonora 
identified themselves as O’odham. From  here, O’odham ejidos near the border 
found themselves increasingly surrounded by and steadily losing ground 
to large  cattle ranches and other economic interests. The O’odham claimed 
that outsiders  were dividing and selling off O’odham land, enclosing  those 
lands in barbed- wired fences, diverting O’odham  water sources, blocking 
the O’odham’s access to grazing lands, and even rebranding O’odham 
 cattle. Then, during the Depression- era repatriation campaign north of the 
border, Mexican officials began establishing agricultural colonies for re-
cent deportees on lands claimed by the O’odham. Although the O’odham 
complained constantly, the fact that their complaints appeared to fall on 
deaf ears led them to conclude that the Mexican government had abandoned 
them. The end result was that many Sonoran O’odham  were simply absorbed 
into nearby Mexican towns.  After surveying the Sonoran O’odham in 1957, 
one Mexican anthropologist concluded that non- Indian encroachment on 
O’odham lands had reached crisis proportions, which he considered to be a 
“grave injustice.”22 By 1930, then, it was clear that the geopo liti cal border 
meant something to  these Indians, if it had not before. And since it would 
be de cades before northern O’odham would take action on behalf of their 
relatives living south of the boundary, the line separating O’odham com-
munities from Mexican communities would only continue to blur.
Other prob lems southern O’odham encountered  were religious in nature. 
The years between 1931 and 1934  were a time of extreme anticlericalism at 
the highest levels of the Mexican government. What followed was a “defa-
naticization” campaign designed to secularize, especially, Mexico’s edu-
cational system and indigenous  peoples and communities. The campaign 
climaxed, at least in Sonora, in 1934 with the ransacking of the O’odham 
church in Magdalena, in which books, religious icons, and the San Xavier 
statue itself  were burned. The incident convinced many southern O’odham 
that their  children would be better off attending schools in Arizona, where, 
as one scholar put it, “they would be  free to worship as they saw fit, and 
where, in fact, Tohono O’odham religious beliefs and education  were closely 
intertwined.” Thus, anticlericalism served as yet another impetus to migrate 
north, at least for  those who had the means, and connections, to do so.23
It should be pointed out that O’odham south of the boundary  were not 
alone in seeming to merge with non- Indian communities. By midcentury 
a significant number of northern O’odham had permanently moved their 
residences off the reservation to compensate for general housing and em-
ployment shortages on the reservation. Although some returned periodi-
cally for social and/or religious occasions, a significant number did not. 
Many, therefore, further removed themselves from not only their southern 
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 contingent’s social, po liti cal, and economic orbit, but also that of their U.S.- 
based contingent. This increasing number of off- reservation O’odham be-
gan attracting less than flattering press during the 1940s, when several 
newspaper articles appeared asserting that tribal members  were in dire 
need of assistance. A 1947 article, for example, contended that between 400 
and 500 O’odham near and around Tucson  were practically destitute. An-
other article put that figure at 7,000, while yet another cited seventy- five 
families. While the articles did not agree on numbers, they did agree that 
the tribe was undergoing a serious economic crisis that was impacting off- 
reservation O’odham, and also shone a light on deteriorating conditions on 
the reservation. The O’odham did not entirely welcome the recent press 
coverage. “What we resent,” one O’odham responded, “is the implication that 
the Papagos as a tribe are a charity case. The morning  after the first news-
paper story appeared, our Papago  children  didn’t want to go to school. 
They  were embarrassed, as we all  were.” The tribe quickly began receiving 
calls and visits from concerned neighbors and charity organ izations, in-
cluding the Red Cross. A tribal representative denied charges of widespread 
starvation, citing the fact that the tribe possessed 6,000 head of  cattle and 
 were typically able to grow enough beans, melons, squash, and other veg-
etables to support themselves, with some left over. They also pointed out 
that they had recently donated 200 pounds of clothing to needy Navajo 
 children. “We still are an in de pen dent and proud  people,” he stated, “but . . .  
acknowledge that larger appropriations for health care, education, roads, 
and irrigation would vastly improve reservation conditions.”24
What followed was yet another temporary surge in non- Indian interest 
in the O’odham’s well- being. In 1951, Congress proposed a bill to “rehabili-
tate” the O’odham reservation. The purpose of the bill was to “establish the 
members of this tribe on an economic level comparable to that of the rural 
population of the area; to facilitate their integration into the social, eco-
nomic, and po liti cal life of the Nation; and to hasten the termination of 
Federal supervision and control special to Indians.”25 As Tribal Chairman 
Thomas Segundo put it in hearings surrounding the bill:
First, the productivity of the reservation at the pres ent time is so 
low that it cannot support the population, but the Papago  people 
found the answer when between 10 and 20 years ago this area sur- 
rounding the Papago Reservation came  under subjugation. When 
it came  under irrigation farms began to develop all around the 
Papago Reservation. It served as an outlet for the Papago  people, 
 because where they could not subsist on the reservation, they went 
off the reservation, hired out as farm laborers, and still do that. This 
year 4,500 Papagos, or over 50  percent of the population, left the 
reservation and went into the cotton fields to pick cotton from about 
September through January. Some went clear through February into 
March . . .  They had to. For many of them  there was nothing to 
subsist on on the reservation. For many of them that was the only 
income they  were getting . . .  That would have to tide them over 
 until the next cotton chopping and picking season.26
Segundo went on to remind Congress that the O’odham had been staunch 
allies of the United States for nearly a  century by this point, serving as scouts 
and guides for the U.S. military during the late nineteenth- century “upris-
ings in the Southwest” and sending young O’odham to fight— and often 
die—in both world wars. In fact, they had only recently buried an O’odham 
soldier who had died in  Korea. “We have not gotten much,  either,” he added. 
“As an ally of the United States we would have expected better treatment, 
more assistance from the Federal Government, but we did not get it.” This 
being a point in time when Congress was actively debating the withdrawal 
of federal responsibility for Indian reservations, Congress was largely un-
sympathetic. Arizona senator Ernest W. McFarland expressed a troubling, 
though increasingly pervasive, attitude regarding the Indian presence in the 
United States: “ Don’t you think that is one of the trou bles  here? We have 
been treating  these  people as foreign nations too much. We have to treat 
them more like white  people and like every body  else both in expenditures 
of money and every thing  else.”27 Despite having the support of the Depart-
ment of the Interior and vari ous Indian welfare organ izations, the rehab bill 
stalled.28
Thus, in 1952 Pima County officials attempted to fill the void left by 
federal inaction, organ izing the Association for Papago Affairs to combat 
the tribe’s economic and health prob lems. However, non- Indians under-
estimated the ability of the tribe itself to address internal economic dif-
ficulties. Rather than attempt to capitalize on Anglo sympathies, the 
O’odham, as always, simply altered their subsistence strategy. The new 
strategy involved maintaining the tribe’s land base  under the BIA’s protec-
tive auspices while also forging economic links with surrounding Anglo 
communities.29 It should be added, however, that since the 1930s the U.S. 
government had been encouraging O’odham participation in the larger 
economy through a series of programs designed to move them off the 
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reservation and into wage work; then relocation programs implemented 
during the 1950s proved equally influential in thrusting the O’odham into 
the cash economy. Thus, while the O’odham characteristically took the lead 
in forging new economic networks and identifying new subsistence strate-
gies, outside pressures often served as an additional impetus. Regardless, 
at midcentury the tribe turned to southern Arizona’s booming cotton 
industry, a development that ultimately touched off another major set of 
changes in the tribe’s migratory habits.30
Perhaps fortuitously, prob lems on the O’odham reservation corresponded 
with dramatic changes in the regional economy. In his 1950 study of the 
 Tohono O’odham’s work habits, entitled Papagos in the Cotton Fields, the 
anthropologist Henry Dobyns observed that the population of the Ameri-
can Southwest, once quite modest, had grown more than 50  percent over 
only the course of a de cade. “Now most Indians are no longer isolated,” he 
concluded. It was a development that had a decisive impact on the O’odham. 
Dobyns noted that thousands of O’odham left the reservation each year to 
work the irrigated valleys and flood plains of the Santa Cruz and Gila 
Rivers, areas, incidentally, where they had “gone to harvest for centuries,” 
but which they now no longer controlled. He also observed that very few 
O’odham actually sought employment; instead, employment most often 
found them. Farmers, foremen, and contractors had long since caught on 
to the fact that the O’odham  were particularly capable and reliable work-
ers (although Dobyns claimed that the Yaquis had the best reputation among 
Arizona’s non- Anglo  labor force), and would actually visit the tribe’s reser-
vation to recruit laborers. In an in ter est ing parallel to the Kickapoo case 
study, Dobyns noted that the O’odham typically traveled as  family units, 
with the  father,  mother,  children, and sometimes extended  family members 
all remaining together throughout the harvest season. Although they lived 
in less than ideal circumstances while on the mi grant trail, or in mostly 
substandard cabins with inadequate floor space, few win dows, and poor 
ventilation, they managed to distinguish themselves in the eyes of em-
ployers and fellow workers by making the best of a bad situation. As Dobyns 
observed, “If cleanliness is next to Godliness, the Desert People living in 
southern Arizona  labor camps are amazingly close to their  deity.”31 And 
the O’odham  were not averse to pursuing less conventional employment 
opportunities. Many appeared as extras in the 1940 Columbia  Pictures 
epic Arizona, a film that, as one scholar put it, “not only foreshadowed 
the Southwest’s rise as an iconic film location and tourist destination but 
also offered a snapshot of racial and cross- border dynamics in Arizona.” 
Some local O’odham, along with local Mexican Americans, signed up for 
six months of employment at a wage of ten dollars per day, choosing a 
job as an extra over one as a field hand, however temporarily.32
Thus, the need to migrate on a transnational scale for subsistence pur-
poses waned as the tribe learned to take advantage of its proximity to what 
was in the early to mid- twentieth  century one of the fastest- growing econo-
mies in the United States. “Papagos have been truly migratory,” one scholar 
explained in 1957, “only so long as  there has been a need for it.” “I believe,” he 
further speculated, “that we can expect further stabilization of population in 
the  future as the trend continues.” Although the Arizona reservation re-
mained an impor tant religious, po liti cal, and social center, many O’odham 
recognized benefits in living outside its bound aries and, to a greater or lesser 
degree, forfeiting their freedom of mobility. Officials had long operated  under 
the assumption that O’odham living in Tucson  were merely “temporary so-
journers,” but by midcentury they increasingly came to realize other wise. 
Non- Indians generally welcomed the O’odham into the urban fold, while the 
O’odham themselves, as the twentieth  century progressed, participated more 
visibly in southern Arizona’s po liti cal and economic spheres. But unlike the 
scenario south of the boundary, the cultural divide between the O’odham 
and their non- Indian neighbors remained fairly distinct throughout the twen-
tieth  century, much as it did in the Yaqui and Kickapoo cases. One local of-
ficial called this “cultural dualism,” meaning that the O’odham had, in a 
sense, satisfactorily resolved their Indian way of life with that of the larger 
community where they resided without feeling to need to fully assimilate.33
The anthropologist Jack Waddell echoed this sentiment, explaining that 
the O’odham, although widely distributed in space, remained steadfastly 
committed to seemingly ancient tribal and kinship responsibilities. He de-
scribed O’odham tribal and kinship ties as “sentimental domains” linked 
together over extensive spatial areas, domains that required a  great deal of 
flexibility on the part of the tribe. “A long history of geo graph i cal mobility 
within an extensive but spatially limited area,” he concluded, “has produced 
a somewhat malleable form of  family organ ization that is capable of adapt-
ing to a number of economic situations and still provides meaningful rela-
tionships with kinsmen.” Although O’odham culture remained far from 
static, it nonetheless retained a profound relevance among tribal members, 
one whose pull did not weaken even as tribal members fanned out from the 
tribe’s geographic core.34
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Unfortunately, the O’odham’s participation in the cotton industry peaked 
relatively quickly. During the second half of the twentieth  century, O’odham 
workers began losing this predictable and lucrative source of seasonal 
employment as more and more cotton growers in the area mechanized. 
Consequently, migrating for seasonal employment entered a twilight 
phase. Migrating for religious purposes, however, did not. In fact, the act 
of migrating for ceremonial observances remained widespread long 
 after economic networks had fallen by the wayside. Further,  these ceremo-
nial migratory patterns represented the last of the tribe’s transnational 
networks, or the last link between the two halves of the divided Tohono 
O’odham nation.35
Migrating on a transnational scale for religious reasons had a long his-
tory by the mid- twentieth  century. Writing in 1894, a non- Indian observer 
described one ceremony that included a ten- day period before the festivi-
ties even began during which O’odham from all over Arizona and Sonora 
made their way to Santa Rosa, Arizona, bringing produce of all kinds for a 
feast, which they followed up with a dance. Crossing the border during this 
period, of course, posed  little challenge for the tribe. Still, this same observer, 
while accompanying tribal members to an O’odham village south of the 
international boundary, wrote of a prophetic encounter with a Mexican 
customs official, one that hinted at difficulties to come. “At Sasabé,” he ex-
plained, “the [Mexican customs] collector explained that he was sorry, very 
sorry to turn us back, but—. I  there issued an ultimatum to the effect that 
we  were  going to Altar. The collector looked surprised . . .  He desired us to 
wait  until he could send a message to Nogales, but I declined to wait.” The 
expedition continued across the border despite the official’s objection, 
which, as of 1894, evidently lacked any real authority.36
Much like Kickapoo mi grant laborers, O’odham mi grant laborers in Ari-
zona refused to budge on the issue of ceremonial observances, even if they 
conflicted with their employment obligations. At the peak of the picking 
season, the O’odham would drop what ever they  were  doing for the sake of 
 these commitments. Among their most impor tant religious occasions was 
(and in many cases remains) the Fiesta of St. Francis Xavier, a tradition that 
likely began in the eigh teenth  century  under the direction of Franciscan 
missionaries. It started in early October (once the summer’s heat and rains 
had subsided) and sometimes lasted for several weeks. One anthropologist 
observed, “Many [non- Indian] farmers throw up their hands then, and gripe 
loudly about families that leave for two or three weeks or a month.”37 The 
site of the fiesta was the small Mexican town of Magdalena, which is situ-
ated about sixty miles south of the U.S.- Mexico border and just west of 
Mexico’s International Highway 15. The main attraction  there was a small 
chapel containing, as mentioned earlier, a statue of San Francisco Xavier, 
who was, as one scholar describes it, a kind of “composite saint,” or a blend-
ing of the identity and influence of several religious figures whom the tribe 
reveres and celebrates for vari ous reasons. He explains: “The story centers 
around the lives of three men, two of whom died long before Eu ro pe ans ar-
rived in this region. The first is  Father Eusebio Kino, the Jesuit missionary 
who labored in the Pimería Alta between 1683 and his death in 1711, and 
who lies buried in the Magdalena plaza. The second is Saint Francis Xavier, 
a Spanish Basque who died off the coast of China in 1552, and whose body 
lies in the former Portuguese colony of Goa, on India’s west coast. The third 
is Saint Francis of Assisi, a medieval Italian who founded the Order of Fri-
ars Minor or Franciscans. All three have touched our region in a number of 
ways; the presence of all three is still strongly felt.”38 The O’odham be-
lieved that this “composite saint” works miracles on behalf of his adherents 
and generally watches over the Sonoran Desert. “In some ways he acts more 
like a local deity than a Catholic saint,” one scholar concluded.39
The trip to Magdalena alone could take a week or more depending on 
one’s point of origin. And not only  were  these pilgrimages time- consuming, 
they  were also expensive. In fact, O’odham families would often spend all 
of the money they had earned up to that point over the course of their 
stay. According to one observer, they factored in $90 for transportation, 
food, and lodging for an average- sized  family, then would set aside an ad-
ditional amount for new boots, gifts for relatives, a donation to the saint, 
beer and mescal, and enough money to, if necessary, “get out of jail the 
next morning.” They also often returned from Magdalena with sacred ob-
jects such as religious pictures and statues. Thus, they could easily spend 
$125 in the space of a week. As for the  actual border crossing, he noted 
that while U.S. tourists had to obtain “tourist permits,” this rule proved 
more difficult to apply to migrating O’odham. Many O’odham spoke nei-
ther En glish nor Spanish, possessed no proof of citizenship, and  were of-
ten unsure on which side of the border they had been born. “The migration 
of the Desert  People,” he concluded, has “given many virtually duel [sic] 
citizenship.” 40
In 1947, a Tucson- based reporter accompanied tribal members who 
 were en route to Magdalena. “In past years,” the article claimed, “the wagon 
caravans have stretched out for 10 miles,” containing as many as 2,000 
O’odham. The journey typically took four to eight days, and covered 
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 between 140 and 200 miles, depending on the route. The O’odham did not 
mind the grueling trip, since, according to the article, “it is a holiday, a time 
for recalling when the Sonora lands belonged to their ancestors, and for tell-
ing old tales.” As for the border crossing, the article contended, “For years 
the Immigration regulations of the United States and Mexico have been 
swept aside by this annual tide of Indians.” The World War II years  were 
somewhat dif fer ent in that immigration authorities required the Indians to 
obtain a special permit from the Selective Ser vice board to temporarily cross 
into Mexico.41 That exception aside, the O’odham appear to have had an in-
formal agreement with immigration authorities that permitted their unfet-
tered transborder movement. This could be attributable, in part, to the fact 
that, again, the pilgrimage had such deep historical roots. John Russell 
Bartlett of the United States and Mexico Boundary Commission visited Mag-
dalena during the fiesta in 1851 and estimated that the population of the 
town had swelled by some 10,000 individuals. He described a lively scene, 
complete with orchestras playing polkas and waltzes, roadside booths 
selling food and liquor, and public gambling. And a more recent attendee 
contended that not much has changed since 1851.42
One anthropologist explained that the trip south of the border was “as 
impor tant to the Papagos as Christmas to Anglos.” The meetings  were a time 
for performing baptisms, praying to the saint for cures, and giving thanks 
for past good fortune, while also a prime opportunity to socialize. Another 
lure, he contended, was liquor, “the sale of which is not restricted in Mex-
ico, as in the U.S. for Indians.” In maintaining  these ceremonial obligations, 
the O’odham typically enjoyed the assistance of their employers, again 
nearly mirroring the Kickapoo experience. Although some employers scoffed 
at the O’odham’s request, most apparently sympathized with and tolerated 
their cultural convictions. Growers in the region evidently prized O’odham 
workers over Mexican and Jamaican contract  labor, German and Italian 
war prisoners (at least during war time), and inexperienced town laborers, 
and thus happily contracted them at high wages. And when their workers 
increasingly began requesting that the growers not only allow them to make 
their annual ceremonial trips, but also provide transportation, growers often 
complied. While it typically meant a significant financial loss for the grow-
ers, they realized that their crops would likely not get harvested at all with-
out the O’odham’s cooperation. Thus, growers could devote a day to 
transporting tribal members to Mexico via automobile and a day returning 
from Mexico, and thereby lose much less money than they would have had 
they allowed the tribe to go by wagon, a more traditional mode of transpor-
tation that could mean a three- or even four- week absence.43
 There have of course been efforts to supplant the annual pilgrimage. 
Some religious leaders viewed it as simply an opportunity to drink to excess 
and spend what  little money tribal members managed to earn, while taking 
them away from their responsibilities for up to a month at a time.  Father 
Tiburtius Wand, who administered to O’odham at San Xavier in the 1920s, 
attempted to offer an alternative to the Magdalena trip by installing a statue 
of Christ (the origins of which remain shrouded in mystery) in an elaborate 
case at the mission, where it remains  today. Although the statue failed to 
wean the O’odham off the expensive and time- consuming Magdalena trip, 
it nonetheless attracted a number of devotees who  today often decorate it 
with metal milagros (a type of devotional object), hospital bracelets, and 
handwritten notes.44 Additionally, it is likely no accident that of the thirty- 
six mission churches constructed by the Franciscans on the Papaguería 
between 1912 and 1976, only one was placed south of the boundary. Clearly 
the O’odham homeland was being re imagined on their behalf in light of 
new border realities.45
Although deeply rooted in O’odham tradition, the Magdalena pilgrim-
age was not without its hazards. The O’odham, much like the Yaquis and 
Kickapoos, never  really had a good relationship with their Mexican neigh-
bors. O’odham Salvador López, for example, relayed an uncomfortable ex-
perience during an early twentieth- century pilgrimage to Magdalena from 
Sells, Arizona. On his way back to Arizona, he made camp with a group of 
O’odham. Suddenly, a mounted Mexican man entered the camp in pursuit 
of two Mexican girls. The O’odham men came to the girl’s aid, and the Mex-
ican escaped on foot. López pursued him, whereupon the man shot him in 
the hip. López’s companions took him to a Chinese doctor, who treated him 
with herbs, while another group of O’odham caught up with the Mexican 
shooter. Mexican authorities ultimately fined the man 500 pesos, while the 
injury left López disabled. The brush with death discouraged López from 
returning to Magdalena. Instead, he simply visited yet another saint the 
tribe had recently acquired specifically for  those residing in Sells, a move 
that further suggests that the tribe was gradually becoming less and less 
interested in maintaining even religiously motivated transborder migratory 
patterns.46
As noted above, O’odham living in Mexico have been only peripherally 
affected by what could be considered Mexican Indian policy currents, if at 
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all. This does not mean, however, that the Mexican government neglected 
them completely throughout the twentieth  century. Beginning in 1921, for 
example, Mexico’s Education Ministry targeted the O’odham for assimila-
tion, which in the minds of officials entailed, especially, an embrace of Mex-
ican citizenship. One way to accomplish this, they reasoned, was to force 
“proper” gender roles on the O’odham, fund schools for O’odham  children, 
and encourage O’odham men to become yeoman farmers. All three goals, 
it turned out,  were unrealistic. Put simply, the O’odham had lost too much 
land to become farmers, and the fact that fewer and fewer lived on tradi-
tional O’odham lands and more and more lived in or on the outskirts of 
nearby cities and towns made any investment of the Mexican government’s 
time and resources in the O’odham’s collective  future seem unwise. In fact, 
one scholar asserted that the 1930s was the last de cade the southern O’odham 
lived in their traditional desert villages in significant numbers, and by the 
1960s they could be described as “more or less fully incorporated” into 
nearby urban areas.47
Like their northern counterpart, O’odham on the Mexican side of the 
boundary also underwent a dramatic period of change near midcentury, 
though, as mentioned above, not always for the better. Illustrative of the 
southern O’odham’s ongoing woes was a conflict over the placement of fenc-
ing near their lands. In 1937, a commission of O’odham arrived at a govern-
ment office in Hermosillo to file a complaint. They claimed to have suffered 
“abuses and attacks” that interfered with “the tranquil and peaceful pos-
session of their lands and  cattle.” Writing to the mayor of Altar, Sonora, 
Sonoran governor Ramón Yocupicio urged the mayor to “grant them the 
protection and guarantees which the law grants them, and arrange that they 
 shall no longer be molested in their peaceful occupancy of their possessions 
and other interests.” He encouraged the mayor to consider the U.S. exam-
ple in “carry[ing] out the foregoing instructions,” arguing that the reser-
vation system had helped immeasurably in the “conservation and . . .  
development of [the Indians’] way of life.” 48 The following year, a military 
official reported directly to the “Constitutional President of the Republic” 
concerning the arrival of another O’odham commission with a similar com-
plaint, namely, that “their Mexican neighbors have fenced [their lands] in 
and persecuted them so that they have been obliged to abandon the few 
lands they have.” He urged the president to, essentially, put an end to such 
injustices and give them the lands “to which they have the right.” 49
From  here, however, the situation appears to have deteriorated consid-
erably. The O’odham singled out a single perpetrator— local farmer Jesus 
María Zepeda— who they alleged had been erecting fences and trespassing 
on O’odham lands “from time immemorial.”50 Shortly thereafter, local law 
enforcement apprehended a group of O’odham whom Zepeda had accused 
of destroying a section of his fence. State officials ultimately informed the 
O’odham that Zepeda had already proved to their satisfaction his owner-
ship of 20,000 hectares near O’odham settlements and had their authoriza-
tion to erect a fence around his property. They also chided the O’odham for 
resorting to vio lence rather than “defend[ing] their rights in  legal form and 
manner.” Still, the state’s governor agreed to revisit the  matter and once and 
for all establish owner ship of the disputed lands in order to end the “con-
flict which has existed for many years.”51 President Lázaro Cárdenas, cham-
pion of the Yaqui Indians, had actually already demanded that O’odham in 
Mexico be given  free and clear title to their lands, but the order was appar-
ently not carried out. This was most likely  because of the obstructionist tac-
tics of private landowners who stood to lose lands they claimed as their 
own, but which  were known to be the “traditional” lands of the O’odham. 
In fact, during the presidency of Manuel Avila Camacho (1940–46), a group 
of Sonoran property  owners began pressing the government to relocate the 
O’odham to lands nearer the coast in an effort to get them out of the way. 
The O’odham refused to be dislodged, however, despite mounting pressure 
to move.52
As mentioned above, the Mexican government was not completely unre-
sponsive as the O’odham aired their grievances. In March 1943, for exam-
ple, officials from both sides of the border gathered in Sells in part to discuss 
per sis tent land- related difficulties, like  those with Zepeda, long experienced 
by Sonoran O’odham. Among  those in attendance  were representatives from 
Mexico’s Department of Indian Affairs, a representative from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Mexico’s chief of animal medicine from the Ministry 
of Agriculture, vari ous U.S. officials including the superintendent of the 
Sells agency, and the O’odham tribal council. Much of the meeting con-
cerned the Arizona reservation. They discussed issues related to the regional 
economy, livestock husbandry, drought/rainfall levels, and irrigation. In-
terestingly, an official from Mexico’s Department of Indian Affairs asked 
how the tribe determined eligibility for the tribal roll, a question that should 
have seemed irrelevant in a nation that does not recognize distinctions be-
tween Indians and non- Indians, at least officially. According to the meet-
ing’s minutes, “The response was that when the Roll was first made the only 
proof required was simply the fact that  people then living on the reserva-
tion and [who] had been born  there,  were considered members of the tribe 
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if they had Papago blood. In case anyone’s citizenship was questionable, 
word of reliable Papagos was required as to that person’s eligibility.” Post– 
Indian New Deal, however, tribal members relied on the criteria laid out by 
their constitution: individuals who appeared on their group’s first official 
census (January 1, 1936), their  children, and  children from off the reserva-
tion who  were of one- half or more Indian blood and whom the tribal coun-
cil agreed to adopt  were all included.53 The meeting, however, showed that 
officials on both sides of the border  were not only attempting to find solu-
tions to per sis tent prob lems within indigenous communities, but also be-
ginning to consider  these prob lems within a transnational context.
In this spirit, they also addressed the southern O’odham, ultimately pro-
ducing a resolution that they hoped would help combat deteriorating con-
ditions south of the boundary. First of all, the resolution created a commission 
composed of soil conservation experts, an irrigation technician, and a vet-
erinarian, along with representatives from Mexico’s Ministry of Agriculture, 
Department of Indian Affairs, and, interestingly, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The commission would be charged with locating “the zone in which 
the Papago Indians of Sonora should reside definitely.” Once the commis-
sion determined this site, the Department of Indian Affairs was to “deliver 
the lands in defined property to the Papagos, with all treatments necessary 
to guarantee them against any plundering,” and encourage  cattle raising 
and agriculture among tribal members.54 Officials made clear, however, that 
they had no intention of establishing a “reservation” for O’odham south of 
the border. Yet while they vowed not to segregate the Indians, they also 
vowed not to force their acculturation. Fi nally, they also made clear that 
only O’odham of Mexican nationality could reside on the Sonoran lands; 
other wise, officials feared that the presence of “North American Papagos” 
would compromise Mexico’s territorial integrity.55 This plan evidently failed 
to materialize, however, as evidenced by the southern O’odham’s repeated 
pleas for assistance from their northern counterpart. O’odham south of the 
border would continue to strug gle mightily with a largely unresponsive 
Mexican government.
It appears that O’odham in Mexico  were not alone in their feelings of 
neglect. In 1948, Dr. Hector Sánchez, then head of Mexico’s Department of 
Indian Affairs, delivered a speech in which he characterized all Mexican 
Indians as “geo graph i cally and socially disconnected,” with only “marginal 
contact with national culture.” In short, they often lived beyond the legis-
lative reach of the Mexican body politic and the cultural orbit of Mexican 
society, which complicated efforts to improve their material circumstances. 
And  little seems to have changed in many spots around Mexico, with the 
Sonoran O’odham emerging in recent de cades as a prime example. Experi-
encing disappointment when appealing to the Mexican government, then 
finding that their entreaties increasingly fell on deaf ears north of the bound-
ary, many simply resigned themselves to a life of uncertainty on the mar-
gins of two nations. O’odham Clemencia Antone perhaps best summed up 
this predicament. Although born in Mexico, she never considered herself a 
Mexican, nor did she even bother to learn the Spanish language. She had 
no personal attachments to the Mexican nation per se, only  those O’odham 
lands that happened to be situated within its borders. And yet  because of 
her place of birth, U.S. officials denied her the privilege of citizenship and 
unfettered movement north of the boundary, as well as access to the same 
forms of governmental assistance that “American” Indians, including her 
fellow O’odham,  today enjoy. Thus, she exists beyond the po liti cal and cul-
tural purview of one government, and does not fulfill the requirements to 
live  under the auspices of the other. “To me both governments see every-
thing in black and white,” she said. “ There are no gray areas and that is 
where I am, in the gray area.”56 It was a familiar predicament for each of 
the indigenous groups discussed herein, but one perhaps most acutely felt 
by the O’odham.
While the second half of the twentieth  century witnessed a gradual sta-
bilization of the O’odham population, this did not mean that they completely 
abandoned their migratory tendencies. It did mean, however, that O’odham 
movements had become far more predictable and, most significantly, over-
whelmingly confined within each half’s respective borders. In 1962, census 
takers indicated that although approximately 60  percent of the northern 
O’odham population remained mobile, their movements consisted of  little 
more than a seasonal shift between on- reservation and off- reservation 
homes, with the latter most often in Tucson. About two- thirds of the tribe 
engaged in seasonal and part- time wage work, while some of  these  people 
also maintained small herds of  cattle and subsistence agricultural plots on 
the reservation.  Others subsisted primarily on welfare payments.57 This pat-
tern appeared irreversible.  After all, the tribe had moved full force into the 
regional economy, first as agricultural laborers, and eventually as promi-
nent participants in the more general occupational structure of the Ameri-
can Southwest. Although a minuscule number of O’odham families (one 
anthropologist estimated about six or seven) still eked out a living raising 
 cattle on the reservation near Sells, the vast majority of the roughly 11,000 
O’odham had entered a new phase in their collective history. It was a phase 
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that would require what one scholar described as a “more dynamic pro cess 
of adaptation” than the tribe had mustered up to that point.58
By the end of the 1960s it was clear that Arizona’s economy was transi-
tioning from one based on farming, ranching, and mining to one based on 
high- tech and ser vice industries. Off- reservation jobs that allowed the 
O’odham to live on O’odham lands at least part- time became harder and 
harder to find, thereby forcing the O’odham to focus on creating on- 
reservation jobs and, when  these proved inadequate, seeking out perma-
nent employment elsewhere. Nearly 40  percent of the O’odham population 
would end up settling everywhere from Tucson to Chicago to Los Angeles. 
Tucson, not surprisingly, had the largest off- reservation O’odham commu-
nity anywhere. Although individual O’odham appeared to have proac-
tively assumed control of their economic destinies, the real ity was that 
they  were growing increasingly dependent on the tribal government, the 
federal government, and large corporations.59 The historians Andrae 
Marak and Laura Tuennerman summed up the predicament facing the 
O’odham, arguing that “the shift from self- sufficiency to engagement in a 
larger economy” placed the O’odham, along with other minorities, “in a 
particularly precarious position during national economic downturns.” “It 
is ironic perhaps,” they continue, “that as self- sufficiency was shed in 
 favor of inclusion into the larger society, it was the prob lems of American 
society— rather than its benefits— that the Tohono O’odham often experi-
enced.” 60
A subsequent breakthrough for northern O’odham occurred in 1970, 
when they began seeking compensation through the Indian Claims Com-
mission (ICC) for lost lands. Created by the federal government in 1946 for 
the purpose of resolving outstanding disputes involving Indian land, the ICC 
was a thinly veiled attempt to legally abrogate Indian claims once and for 
all so that the government could continue terminating Indian tribes and re-
locating Indian  peoples. Although the O’odham submitted their petition to 
the ICC in 1954, it would take more than ten years for the commission to 
hear the case, then another de cade or so to dispense the O’odham’s settle-
ment money. The ICC ultimately concluded that the tribe had at one time 
legally possessed aboriginal title to much of southern Arizona, including 
the site of the city of Tucson, and had been unjustly divested of  those lands 
by non- Indians. It agreed to award the O’odham $26 million. More impor-
tant than the monetary award, however, was the symbolic significance of 
the judgment. As the historian Eric Meeks explained, “In the  future the tribe 
would use this as state- sanctioned evidence for the expansion of its auton-
omy,” making the ICC award “yet another building block in the construc-
tion of the Tohono O’odham nation.” 61
In the late 1970s, then, the Tohono O’odham tribal council began using 
some of its expanded power to address per sis tent prob lems faced by its 
southern counterpart. According to Mexico’s National Indian Institute, by 
1979 the number of O’odham living in Sonora had dwindled to about 200. 
Such figures can admittedly be misleading, since  those O’odham who 
temporarily worked and/or lived elsewhere  were likely excluded. Nonethe-
less, at the top of their list of complaints, not surprisingly,  were non- Indian 
encroachments on their lands. Although the Mexican government, as pre-
viously mentioned, had designated lands around Pozo Verde an ejido,  those 
Indians who remained migratory, or who moved seasonally between their 
home villages and vari ous places of employment, had a difficult time pro-
tecting the territorial integrity of their ejido. While they  were on the migra-
tory trail, their lands fell  little by  little into the hands of private ranchers. 
Once made aware of this trend, the Mexican government proved surpris-
ingly responsive, ultimately setting aside another 50,000 acres of land for 
communal use by the O’odham. Northern O’odham also responded to this 
crisis, passing a series of resolutions in 1979 that collectively condemned 
the Mexican government for not  doing more to protect O’odham lands, call-
ing on a joint Mexican, U.S., and United Nations investigation of continu-
ing encroachments on O’odham lands in Sonora. They also demanded the 
guarantee of “ free access across the international Border and freedom to 
worship through ceremonials and traditional rites at all Papago sanctuar-
ies and religious sites.” By the end of the 1970s, then, Tohono O’odham on 
both sides of the U.S.- Mexico border had a clear sense of themselves as first 
and foremost tribal citizens whose own nation’s borders just happened to 
overlap  those of surrounding nation- states. That awkward orientation, how-
ever, would prove increasingly consequential as the  century progressed, 
and that sense of tribal citizenship would suffer as a result.62
Broader fears that conditions along Arizona’s southern border  were de-
teriorating began attracting widespread official attention, which ultimately 
served to blunt the O’odham nation’s renewed attempts to extend its sover-
eign reach into Mexico. In 1977, one newspaper account characterized the 
southern border of the O’odham reservation as a “ ‘no border’ border.” The 
seventy- five- mile fence separating Arizona and Sonora was so full of holes 
by this time as to render it meaningless, and the author easily located un-
locked gates across dirt roads that crossed the boundary line. The article 
continues, “And  there are no signs proclaiming: ‘Welcome to the United 
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States’ or ‘Bienvenido Mexico.’  There is nothing, in fact, to indicate that you 
are crossing from one country to another, just the barbed wire fence with 
its myriad openings.” The area had no border station and no agents check-
ing for documents or questioning anyone’s citizenship. “Officials of both 
countries,” the author adds, “pay no attention to  people moving back and 
forth—so long as they are Indians. For this is Papago country.” “It is the 
strangest section of the 1,966- mile line separating the two nations,” the ar-
ticle concludes.
Even stranger  were some of the practices the reporter uncovered. Mexi-
can O’odham seeking medical attention simply crossed into Arizona and 
 were apparently “never turned away” at the government- run hospital in 
Sells, as had long been the custom. Further, many of  these same O’odham 
regularly crossed into Arizona to collect welfare checks, which could be 
Two Tohono O’odham crossing a fallen section of border fence in southern 
Arizona. Photo graph by John Malmin. Copyright 1977, Los Angeles Times, used 
with permission.
easily acquired by simply giving officials the home address of an American 
O’odham accomplice. O’odham  children typically went north of the border 
for schooling. In a profoundly telling claim, one O’odham told the reporter, 
“You can be what you want to be when you are Papago— either a Mexican 
or an American.” Another put it a  little more mildly, stating, “We Papagos 
have dual citizenship. We are citizens of both nations  whether we live on 
the Arizona side or the Mexican side of the border. That is why we can go 
back and forth with no papers.” 63
However, dynamics along the Arizona- Sonora border  were changing rap-
idly, and the scenes this reporter witnessed would soon be a  thing of the 
past, as would the O’odham’s already tenuous claim to dual citizenship. The 
same article characterized the reservation as “a funnel through which thou-
sands of illegal aliens have entered the United States.” Drug smugglers 
 were also increasingly drawn to the isolated reservation and its often un-
guarded crossing points. U.S. officials responded to  these alarming changes 
by establishing the first all- Indian U.S. Customs force in the country, con-
sisting of fifteen men and headquartered at Sells. It was an unpre ce dented 
attempt to address an unpre ce dented prob lem in what one customs official 
characterized as a “most unusual place.” “Both sides of the international 
boundary have always been the land of the Papagos,” he explained. “Before 
Mexico. Before Amer i ca. And so it is  today.” The O’odham enthusiastically 
echoed the sentiment. “For us the border is an artificial barrier,” explained 
one O’odham, “a meaningless symbol that cuts through the heart of the 
age- old Papago nation.” 64 But by the late twentieth  century, the “mean-
ingless symbol” could no longer be ignored.
All of this is not to imply that the border did not have practical implica-
tions for the O’odham prior to the 1970s. Although the evolving regional 
economic dynamics discussed above had a lot to do with the abandonment 
of more traditional transnational migratory networks, the border itself was 
not blameless. For example, in the 1940s Sonora was riding out an epidemic 
of hoof- and- mouth disease, prompting officials on both sides of the border 
to carefully monitor, and in many cases halt altogether, transborder traffic. 
It was during this period that O’odham Henry José crossed into the United 
States to volunteer for the U.S. Army.  After he was turned down by the mil-
itary, U.S. immigration officials detained him  because of the epidemic. He 
was not allowed to return to his ranch in Mexico for several years, which 
proved disastrous. “When I got home,” he  later explained, “my  house was 
gone, my land was fenced, and my  cattle  were mixed in with someone  else’s 
herd.” He then filed a complaint with the Mexican government. However, 
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 because he lacked official documentation attesting to his owner ship of the 
land, authorities dismissed the complaint. “My  father was born on the land,” 
he said, “and I think his  father, too. And they told me I  couldn’t live  there 
and if I cut any fences or took any of my  cattle back, I’d be arrested and 
sent to jail. I lost every thing. I had to hire out as a ranch hand and I had to 
pick cotton on the other side.” 65 But whereas prob lems like José’s  were, once 
upon a time, essentially anomalous, similar violations of the rights of indi-
vidual O’odham became far more widespread in the 1970s as the O’odham 
reservation once again began attracting unwanted news coverage and the 
wrong kind of official attention.
The O’odham’s ability to come and go at  will continued to deteriorate, 
ultimately prompting the publication, in 2001, of a book entitled It Is Not 
Our Fault: The Case for Amending Pres ent Nationality Law to Make All Mem-
bers of the Tohono O’odham Nation United States Citizens, Now and Forever. 
In it, they explain: “Our Nation is divided. Our  people are no longer  free to 
live, work and travel. Our families are separated. We cannot visit the sa-
cred places where our ancestors rest . . .  Under pres ent law, some of us are 
subject to arrest, prosecution, incarceration, and deportation  because we 
do not have documents . . .  Our vehicles have been seized.” Although many 
O’odham  were born in the United States, few had documents attesting to 
that fact. “If I do not  really exist,” queried O’odham Johnson José, refer-
ring to his inability to acquire a birth certificate, “how come I am paying 
taxes?” Further, no birth certificate meant no retirement benefits, even  after 
a lifetime of hard work. Roughly 1,400 O’odham lived south of the bound-
ary as of 2001, and often expressed sheer puzzlement as to why they now 
had to obtain permission to travel across their own tribe’s lands. “We live 
in fear,” they poignantly concluded. O’odham Art Babachi went so far as to 
propose the seemingly impossible, writing, “I ask Congress to take away the 
border. Make the land to the north and the land to the south all O’odham 
land again.66
Aside from prob lems with undocumented immigrants and drug traffick-
ers, the tribe had also confronted an increasingly aggressive border patrol 
that often seemed determined to curtail tribal movements. “Recently,” one 
O’odham claimed, “incidents have been reported in which members of this 
nation  were prohibited from entering the U.S. . . .  in order to meet hospital 
appointments at the Indian Health Ser vice hospital in Sells, and their 
hospital appointment rec ords and tribal membership cards  were confis-
cated.” Tribal members with tuberculosis, diabetes, and other life- threatening 
illnesses have been denied care to which, according to O’odham law, they 
are legally entitled, and forced to return to Mexico by non- O’odham agents 
operating on O’odham land.67 “Even though I am a great- grandmother,” 
wrote Ruth Ortega, “the U.S. Border Patrol still chases me . . .  Now when 
[they] stop me, I am tired of talking to them and answering their questions 
so I only talk O’odham to them and they let me go.” Rita Bustamante, who 
census takers included on the 1937 trial roll compiled by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, also encountered constant obstacles any time she tried to cross. 
Unable to conceal her frustration, she argued, “All of  these lands are 
O’odham lands. It should not be so hard to cross.” “The boundary has hurt 
me,” explained María Jesús Romo- Robles, “ because I cannot see my  children. 
They cannot come and see me  because they cannot safely return north.” 
 Those born in Mexico and attempting to live in Arizona  were subject to 
arrest, prosecution, and deportation, an irony not lost on George Ignacio. 
“My  father told me that in 1937 the United States recognized my Nation . . .  
as a sovereign government . . .  Although my  father was Chairman of the 
Tohono O’odham Nation, in your words, he was an ‘illegal alien.’ ” “They do 
not want to recognize that we have been  here for millions of years,” he 
added, concluding, “We are a Nation. It makes me feel bad when we are 
called ‘illegal aliens.’ It is degrading.” 68 Living near the border is one  thing, 
but living on the border, the O’odham  were learning the hard way, was 
another. Their geographic orientation had virtually guaranteed the per-
petual omnipresence of non- O’odham authorities and an environment of 
heightened (and often mutual) suspicion.
Stepped-up efforts on the part of the Border Patrol made casualties of 
key O’odham traditions for more than a few tribal members. Alejandro 
Velasco explained, “The last several years I have been unable to attend the 
St. Francis ceremony in Magdalena. When I try to cross the boundary, the 
Mexican officials tell me that my Tohono O’odham membership credential 
is worthless and they turn me back.” As a consequence, the O’odham have 
instituted what one scholar referred to as a “floating” Fiesta of San Francisco, 
meaning that it is held at a dif fer ent village each year, but always north 
of the boundary. “I just do not even try to cross anymore,” Mary Anita Antone 
stated, lest she risk getting “stuck on the other side.” “We are lost between 
two worlds,” added Francisco Velasco, perfectly summarizing the tribe’s 
predicament.69 “Our  People and our Nation,” It Is Not Our Fault succinctly 
concludes, “cannot continue to suffer the consequences of a series of his-
torical oversights.”70 Thus far, however, officials north of the border have 
shown an unwillingness to act on the O’odham’s behalf, with perhaps one 
exception. In 2001 Congress was preparing to pass a bill that would have 
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granted U.S. citizenship even to  those O’odham living in Mexico, but the 
9/11 terrorist attacks meant that the bill ended up on the back burner.71
Meanwhile, despite the Mexican government’s efforts to shore up the 
southern O’odham’s land base, their dispossession continued, and perhaps 
accelerated, as the twentieth  century began winding down. One historian 
explained:
Mestizo farmers in Sonora continuously encroached on their 
settlements, leasing them or poaching them outright. In the  
mid- twentieth  century, Sonoran O’odham lived in some twenty 
settlements, but by the end of the  century they only inhabited eight. 
Moreover, only a single  family lived in each of  these localities, 
whereas between two and five families had lived in them in the 
mid- twentieth  century. The vast majority of Sonoran O’odham had 
left their rural villages to work on Arizona’s Sells Reservation, or in 
cities such Tucson, Caborca, or Hermosillo, where they sold bread 
and tortillas, worked on ranches and mines surrounding  these cities, 
or performed manual  labor. To survive, some worked for Mexican 
drug cartels, which benefitted from their  family connections on both 
sides of the border and their familiarity with the routes and terrain 
of the Arizona- Sonora border region.72
Population figures are telling. From the mid- twentieth  century to 1990, 
Arizona’s O’odham population went from about 7,200 to over 17,000, while 
Sonora witnessed a decline from 400 to less than 50 during the same 
period. And although some no doubt remained, the 1990 Mexican census did 
not count any O’odham at all.73 Perhaps more so than the Yaquis and Kick-
apoos, then, the Tohono O’odham have strug gled mightily to reconcile tribal 
bound aries with  those of the two nation- states within which historical cir-
cumstances beyond their control placed them. The twenty- first  century 
found the Tohono O’odham nation hopelessly divided. While many south-
ern O’odham weathered the long string of assaults and emerged with their 
culture and identity intact, they appear to have, as Andrae Marak and Laura 
Tuennerman put it, “a culture and identity dif fer ent from that of the 
 Tohono O’odham living north of the border.” They also strug gle with of-
ten acute poverty.  Those in the north, meanwhile, enjoyed the benefit of 
BIA- administered health, social, and educational benefits. But although a 
small number of northern O’odham landowners have prospered by leasing 
their lands to mining companies, and an even smaller number have pros-
pered as ranchers, prob lems on the reservation abound. By the second half 
of the twentieth  century, the O’odham’s average  family income was only a 
fifth that of whites, many did without electricity and  running  water in 
their homes, hundreds of O’odham  children did not attend school  because 
families relied on their  labor, 25  percent of  children born on the reserva-
tion did not survive their infancy, and more than 50  percent did not sur-
vive to the age of eigh teen. One can understand, then, the need to remain 
mobile, to migrate off- reservation on a temporary or, increasingly in re-
cent de cades, permanent basis.74 But perhaps the unforgiving desert envi-
ronment should share the blame with the seemingly arbitrary international 
boundary. As the anthropologist Ruth Underhill concluded in the 1970s, 
“The desert has scarcely changed.  Unless some modern miracle can 
make it livable, its  people must still move back and forth. Now they travel 
farther and stay longer. But they come back.”75 It was a fitting observation, 
and one that retains a par tic u lar resonance to the pres ent day.
Still, like the Yaquis and Kickapoos, the Tohono O’odham have refused 
to forfeit their hard- won transnational way of life. As discussed above, the 
annual Magdalena pilgrimage remains on the ceremonial calendar for many 
O’odham, representing what one scholar considers “the continuation of a 
pro cess of mediation between the regional and the international, a pro cess 
that has been  going on since  Father Eusebio Kino started work [ there] about 
three hundred years ago.”76 And  there is recent evidence that the sense of 
neglect felt by southern O’odham discussed at the beginning of this chap-
ter is perhaps beginning to abate. For example, in 1993 a mining com pany 
set up shop on ejido land that contained Quitovac, one of nine O’odham vil-
lages in Sonora. O’odham living near the mine gradually grew troubled by 
the mine’s presence and suspicious of its claims that its operations  were en-
vironmentally sound. Soon the O’odham began blaming the com pany’s un-
fenced cyanide leach pit for a host of disturbing environment- related 
developments, such as the poisoning of animals and the contamination 
of a nearby sacred spring. Northern O’odham soon joined their southern 
counterpart in protesting the mining enterprise. O’odham leaders from 
both sides of the border held a series of community meetings to devise a 
plan of action, and from this renewed spirit of cooperation emerged two key 
 things: a petition, which the O’odham submitted to Mexico’s agrarian at-
torney general, demanding the revocation of the mine’s permit, and the rec-
ognition, for the first time, of the authority of traditional O’odham leaders 
south of the border. In  doing the latter, O’odham north of the border made 
clear their desire to reverse the pattern of po liti cal and cultural estrangement 
from the tribal  whole that had proved so detrimental and disorienting to 
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southern O’odham. Their actions also suggested a desire to make  whole 
again what was at least a nascent O’odham nation, one that the U.S.- Mexico 
border divided before it had the opportunity to fully coalesce.77 Although 
regular transborder movement has more or less ground to a halt among the 
O’odham as a consequence of what might be called the militarization of 
the border, they have time and again proved  adept at pursuing tribal agen-
das and maintaining tribal imperatives in the face of seemingly insur-
mountable odds. The situation may appear grim in some re spects, in other 
words, but certainly not for the first time.
When the O’odham produce images of their creator, I’itoi,  whether in 
jewelry, baskets, or other works of art, he is very often situated in a kind of 
circular labyrinth or maze. In some stories, the maze represents a map  either 
to or from his cave, which, as mentioned above, is said to be beneath 
Baboquivari Mountain. In other stories, as the historian José Antonio Lu-
cero explains, it “represents the choices one encounters along the journey 
of life.” He continues, “As religious, imperial, and state practices divided 
the O’odham  people along multiple lines, they made the O’odham vulnera-
ble to threats from many sides.” Thus, the image provides “an apt meta phor 
for the twists and turns of the collective history of the Tohono O’odham 
 people and nation,” since, like I’itoi’s maze,  these divisions ultimately “cre-
ated new paths for O’odham politics.”  These paths may have been inter-
mittently bumpy, but any adversity seems only to have strengthened the 
O’odham as a collective. It is fitting, then, that the so- called man in the maze 
appears on the “unofficial” O’odham nation flag.78
6 All the Doors Are Closing and  
Now It’s Economic Survival
Federal Recognition
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
— Robert Frost, “Mending Wall”
Writing to Arizona congressman Morris K. Udall in 1964, Tucson attorney 
A. Turney Smith aired his objection to a proposal to carve out a Yaqui res-
ervation on the city’s outskirts. “ These so- called Indians are not Indians in 
the proper sense of the word,” he wrote. “They are a mixture of several 
breeds— they have no nationality—no home and are not citizens of any 
country.” Granting the Yaquis land, Smith argued, would amount to plant-
ing a “Leprosy colony” near Tucson. “When  these Yaquis get hold of liquor,” 
he claimed, “they get wild and  will do most anything even to killing.” Udall’s 
response, though diplomatic, was terse. Evidently unwilling to dignify 
Smith’s allegations with a defense, Udall simply wrote, “I  don’t quite know 
what I can do with your objections.” Another local attorney, however, wrote 
Udall with a more mea sured objection. “The defining of a Yaqui,” he argued, 
“is almost an insurmountable task. What we have done is taken in a very 
broad class of persons as eligible for [tribal] membership . . .  I do not be-
lieve  there would be any way to know definitely the names of all the indivi d-
uals we desire to benefit.”1 He had a point. Even as late as the 1960s— more 
than half a  century  after Yaquis began filtering into Arizona from Mexico— 
officials had yet to clarify their status or determine if they  were Mexican 
nationals, Mexican Americans, Mexican Indians, or American Indians.
Initially, few Yaquis living in Arizona bothered applying for U.S. citizen-
ship, primarily  because of the relatively steep twenty dollar application 
fee. With an unclear citizenship status, however, they could not formally 
own land, and thus often remained, de cades into the twentieth  century, 
 little more than squatters of uncertain nationality. Furthermore, status 
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issues increasingly impeded their transborder movement as the twenti-
eth  century progressed, complicating (if not thwarting altogether) efforts 
at maintaining open lines of communication with their southern counter-
part. In short, by the mid- twentieth  century Yaquis in Arizona  were more 
vulnerable to the whims of outsiders than  those living along Sonora’s 
Yaqui River. They enjoyed none of the  legal protections afforded “Ameri-
can” Indian groups nor the economic safety net enjoyed by American citi-
zens, and evidently never failed to recognize the precariousness of their 
situation.2
The fact was, however, that by 1964 the tribe had stabilized its presence 
in Arizona, and tribal members had  little intention of abandoning their 
 adopted homeland. Since transplanted from the Yaqui River valley in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth  century, Yaquis living in the United 
States had made remarkable strides in rebuilding Yaqui society and culture, 
or at least a “variant stream” thereof. Although some locals may have 
doubted the “legitimacy” and/or “authenticity” of the tribe’s claims to Indi-
anness,  those most intimately acquainted with them had  little reason to 
question their commitment to tribal life. The Arizona contingent of the 
Yaqui tribe had long maintained an elaborate ceremonial schedule, par-
ticularly at Easter; had remained distinct from surrounding Mexican 
communities; and had remained firmly committed to educating all tribal 
members in the Yaqui language, tribal customs, and tribal history.3 Still, in 
order to secure their presence in Arizona, tribal members needed to convince 
outsiders of not only their legitimacy and authenticity (which, if the letters to 
Udall  were representative, was a tall order), but also their commitment to 
their  adopted homeland. Ultimately, the tribe deci ded to undertake the 
federal acknowl edgment pro cess, or to seek a status as “American” Indi-
ans, even given the glaringly obvious fact that they had not originated within 
the borders of the United States. As the self- appointed arbiter of Indianness 
in an era when Indian policy currents  were again shifting, the U.S. govern-
ment would ultimately have no choice but to carefully consider a case that, 
at least on its surface, could not have seemed more open and shut (of course 
they  were not “American” Indians). In characteristically audacious fash-
ion, however, the Yaquis would force all involved to reconsider even basic 
definitions and assumptions that had long guided not just American Indian 
law and policy but also national citizenship. However preposterous a bid 
for recognition might have seemed in the eyes of many Arizonans, the 
tribe’s determination to assert its sovereignty was becoming difficult to 
ignore.
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At roughly the same time, the Kickapoo Indians hit upon the same strat-
egy. Frustrated with living beneath the international bridge when not on 
the mi grant trail and weary of being plagued by status issues while on the 
move, the tribe sought, once and for all, to negotiate a protected land base 
in its  adopted home of Ea gle Pass, Texas. Like the Yaquis, the Kickapoos ul-
timately turned to the federal acknowl edgment pro cess, thereby leaving 
them open to similar lines of criticism, namely, that they  were  either a “for-
eign” or “Mexican” tribe, that they simply did not meet the criteria of an 
“American” Indian tribe, or that they did not have substantial enough his-
torical ties to the state of Texas. But given the peculiar nature of the fed-
eral acknowl edgment pro cess, at least in the late 1960s and the 1970s, the 
evidence could, in the right hands, be made to suggest other wise. Put simply, 
the Mexican counterpart of the Kickapoo tribe, although significantly 
smaller and seemingly cut off from the primary center of Kickapoo life in 
Oklahoma, had a long- standing reputation as militantly separatist and pro-
foundly conservative, even among fellow tribal members. Over the course 
of the twentieth  century, Yaquis in Arizona gradually acquired a similar 
reputation. While it was difficult to question both groups’ “Indianness,” the 
question of their nationality, as this chapter shows, proved far stickier.
The federal acknowl edgment pro cess, then, became a sort of litmus test, 
a way to determine if their hard- won transnational patterns of life, their 
right to migrate on a transnational scale, and their right to forge, maintain, 
and even strengthen transborder tribal ties would ever acquire more for-
mal ac cep tance. It became a test of the degree to which indigenous groups 
residing in North Amer i ca  were in de pen dent, sovereign po liti cal entities, 
or  whether the policies of surrounding nation- states would forever trump 
tribal agendas and initiatives. It also became a test as to  whether the power-
ful, omnipresent nation- states that the United States and Mexico had 
become would tolerate the existence of  these anomalous indigenous nations. 
 After all, both tribes boasted a long history of evading and/or resisting state 
authority, while also steadfastly refusing to remain confined within non- 
Indian borders. Thus, far more than serving as the strategy of choice in 
legitimizing their claims to Indianness, to some sort of authenticity as 
indigenous  peoples, federal acknowl edgment, at least north of the border, 
would also legitimize their right to govern themselves wherever they chose 
to reside. It would come at a price, however, since convincing U.S. officials to 
grant them a status as “American” Indians meant distancing themselves 
from at least a portion of their transborder counter parts. In other words, 
they  were forced to downplay the extent to which they remained mobile 
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and/or maintained transborder po liti cal, economic, and social ties. Thus, 
the indigenous nations that had coalesced in the U.S.- Mexico borderlands 
would, near  century’s end, emerge diminished versions of their former 
selves. Given their tumultuous and violent histories up to this point, how-
ever, a  little stability and security likely seemed worth the trade- off.
This final push for stability and security would propel  these tribes into 
 legal and po liti cal circles for the first time, where they would demonstrate 
an impressive level of resourcefulness and po liti cal sophistication as well as 
a surprisingly all- encompassing commitment to tribal life. They found will-
ing accomplices in a host of scholars and educators, sympathetic  legal pro-
fessionals, and, perhaps most importantly, politicians. This chapter examines 
first the federal acknowl edgment pro cess itself, then  these tribes’ late 
twentieth- century experiences with the pro cess. Taken collectively, their ex-
periences reveal a refusal to compromise certain tribal imperatives along 
with a reluctant willingness to share power with surrounding po liti cal en-
tities in the interest of peaceful coexistence. While the Yaquis and Kickapoos, 
in only a few years, went a long way in clarifying their statuses with both 
the U.S. and Mexican governments, explication of the Tohono O’odham’s 
status, particularly that of its southern counterpart, remained elusive. What 
emerged as the twentieth  century closed, then, was not a story of unqualified 
triumph, but rather of difficult compromise and ongoing strug gle. Still, the 
late twentieth  century marks a watershed moment, when  these transborder 
indigenous  peoples fi nally forced officials on both sides of the border to 
confront, sometimes in concert, a host of troubling issues posed by indig-
enous claims to nationhood that directly challenged their own, claims that 
clearly  were not  going away.
 “Recognition” and Its Evolution
The federal acknowl edgment pro cess has a long history. Problematic to the 
core, it essentially represents an attempt to place  legal par ameters on the con-
cept of “culture.” While the concept of culture is shaky enough on its own, 
when it has been introduced into  legal idiom, the results have typically been 
baffling, leaving lawmakers, as well as  those placed in the unenviable posi-
tion of interpreting their laws, with more questions than answers. Yet, as the 
historian Richard White wrote, “Cultural conventions do not have to be true 
to be effective any more than  legal pre ce dents do. They only have to be ac-
cepted.” 4 Thus, the two are not all that dif fer ent.  After all, both are essen-
tially po liti cal constructs, both develop and evolve in response to external 
stimuli, neither can exist in a vacuum, and, perhaps most significantly, 
only through popu lar ac cep tance can  either acquire any mea sure of legiti-
macy and relevance.
U.S. Indian law has never been known for consistency. According to 
the  legal scholar Sidney Harring, “U.S. Indian law lacks historical vision 
 because it is so policy oriented and so full of contradictory objectives.”5 
Major pre ce dents have often arisen out of singular, isolated events, while 
 legal policy currents have not exactly been immune to the influence of 
popu lar po liti cal movements. And its traditional status as “judge- made law” 
has frequently subjected it to all manner of prejudices, po liti cal agendas, 
and questionable ideological commitments.6 Yet the foundation of Indian 
law has remained unchanged since the Supreme Court handed down three 
landmark decisions, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), Worcester v. Georgia 
(1832), and Crow Dog (1883).  These decisions, respectively, established the 
idea of Indian reservations as “domestic dependent nations,” introduced the 
concept of tribal sovereignty, and ultimately gave birth to a “pluralist”  legal 
tradition in the United States, meaning one set of laws for Indians and one 
set of laws for every one  else.7
We should not attach too much significance to the role of case law in de-
fining the character of U.S. Indian law, however. As Harring astutely ob-
serves, “The rec ord of Indian  peoples’ attempts to protect their sovereignty 
defines the  legal concept of sovereignty more accurately than does a long 
line of ambiguous federal cases, and the history of this strug gle is a vital 
part of the U.S.  legal tradition.” 8 Although all three tribes  under consid-
eration  here fought vigorously to protect their tribal sovereignty, they 
ultimately realized that  there  were limits to what they could achieve with-
out forfeiting at least some of that sovereignty through compromise with 
the dominant po liti cal entity or, in the case of  these transborder tribes, 
entities.
Although tribal sovereignty remains the linchpin of Indian law, in prac-
tice, at least north of the border, the concept falls apart without federal 
acknowl edgment of an Indian group’s right to “tribal” status. The empha-
sis placed on tribalism in Indian law, however, became increasingly prob-
lematic throughout the early twentieth  century as more and more Indian 
groups living within U.S. borders began demanding federal acknowl-
edgment of their sovereign rights as a “tribe,” and the federal government 
found itself unprepared to respond to the question of what exactly consti-
tuted a tribe in the first place. The Yaqui and Kickapoo cases introduced 
additional variables in that  these groups only relatively recently (in the 
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Yaquis case), or only occasionally (in the Mexican Kickapoo case), called 
the United States home. Attorney William Quinn Jr. has proposed perhaps 
the most helpful framework in examining the development of the federal 
acknowl edgment pro cess in an effort to address  these complicated questions 
in a systematic way. He describes the evolution of the federal acknowl-
edgment concept as a shift from “cognitive” recognition, meaning that fed-
eral officials simply “knew” a tribe existed, to “jurisdictional” recognition, 
whereby federal officials legally acknowledged a tribe’s status as a “domestic 
dependent nation” to be dealt with on a government- to- government basis.9
Formal recognition most often took place when the federal government 
began granting reservations during the nineteenth  century. Although the 
concept of recognition had not been formally articulated, officials nonethe-
less “cognitively” acknowledged the legitimacy of tribal organ izations 
based on their history of relations with the federal government as well as 
their physical location on a federally sanctioned reservation. Treaties ex-
isted as another ave nue to acknowl edgment, but the federal government dis-
continued the practice of treaty making in 1871, leaving unrecognized tribes 
seeking to change their status with  little recourse. Other less common 
methods of acquiring federal acknowl edgment included executive  orders, 
unilateral statutes, and approval of a request for recognition by the secretary 
of the interior.10 Thus, since the U.S. government handled the acknowl-
edgment pro cess largely on a case- by- case basis and through a confusing 
array of methods, unrecognized groups that sought to obtain the benefits 
of federally acknowledged status, such as government- financed health, edu-
cation, and other developmental programs, as well as recognition of their 
sovereign rights as a po liti cal entity, had no clear idea where to begin. More-
over, the development and evolution of federal acknowl edgment from 
 abstract notion to articulated  legal concept was a painfully slow pro cess, 
plagued by linguistic and conceptual ambiguities,  legal setbacks, and often 
alarming policy shifts.
Still, for tribes seeking to re create a relatively autonomous tribal exis-
tence in the United States in the twentieth  century, acquiring federally rec-
ognized status represented a quantum leap in the right direction. The Yaquis 
and Kickapoos both found themselves embroiled in the strug gle to change 
their status with the U.S. government in the second half of the twentieth 
 century, as did many other tribes. What makes  these tribes’ experiences 
unique, however, is the fact that they had to overcome the additional bur-
den of often being labeled “Mexican,” as opposed to “American,” Indians. 
Not being “native” to the immediate areas within which they resided,  these 
tribes had difficulty convincing local and federal officials that they  were en-
titled to lands and federal benefits typically reserved for  those groups who 
had established a relatively stable presence within the current bound aries 
of the United States centuries earlier. From  these tribes’ perspectives, how-
ever, the fact that circumstances beyond their control  either encouraged or 
forced them to assume a transnational orientation was of  little import and 
should not be held against them.
Perhaps they  were not “native” to the regions they currently inhabited, 
but they could still accurately claim to be “tribal”  peoples. Or could they? 
The question of what constitutes a tribe, at least north of the border, has 
been endlessly debated. For example, during the 1898 case Dobbs v. U.S., 
the Court of Claims tried to define the term “tribe,” and concluded that “a 
nation, tribe, or band  will be regarded as an Indian entity where the rela-
tions of the Indian[s] in their or ga nized or tribal capacity has [sic] been fixed 
and recognized by treaty . . .  [and where  there is no treaty] the court  will 
recognize a subdivision of tribes or bands which has been recognized by 
 those officers of the Government whose duty it was to deal with and report 
the condition of the Indians . . .  [and] where  there has been no such recog-
nition by the Government, the court  will accept the subdivision into tribes 
or bands made by the Indians themselves.”11
The “tribe” designation acquired increasing complexity as it relates to 
the acknowl edgment pro cess in the 1901 Montoya v. U.S. case, which estab-
lished a distinction between being “recognized” by the federal government 
and being “in amity” with the federal government. In this case, the Supreme 
Court found that while the federal government had, in fact, recognized the 
Chiricahua Apaches as a band, their status differed from that of other tribes 
owing to the fact that they  were not “in amity” with the United States at 
the time. While the implications that this case had for authorities’ concep-
tion of the term “tribe”  were significant,  legal scholars still discuss the case 
for dif fer ent reasons altogether. The case marks the first articulation, how-
ever vague, of not only what constituted a tribe, but also how a group might 
go about changing its status with the federal government to “recognized.”
In fact, the  legal scholar William Quinn refers to the Montoya decision 
as the “Montoya test,” meaning that it had become the new standard in de-
fining “tribe.”12  Here the Supreme Court concluded, “By a ‘tribe’ we under-
stand a body of Indians of the same or similar race, united in a community 
 under one leadership or government, inhabiting a par tic u lar though some-
times ill- defined territory.”13 The decision would have far- reaching impli-
cations for the acknowl edgment pro cess, essentially plotting the  future 
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trajectory of its development. Its emphasis on a stationary, distinct tribal 
community and a functioning tribal government, in other words, repre-
sented a big step forward as the pro cess began taking shape. For the time 
being, however, debate continued. In his 1892 annual report  under the sub-
heading What Is an Indian?, Commissioner of Indian Affairs T. J. Morgan 
admitted, “One would have supposed that this question would have been 
considered a hundred years ago and been adjudicated long before this. Sin-
gularly enough, however, it has remained in abeyance, and the Government 
has gone on legislating and administering law without carefully discrimi-
nating as to  those over whom it has a right to exercise such control.”14
Perhaps the first case in which federal courts directly addressed the is-
sue of federal acknowl edgment came in United States v. Sandoval (1913), 
which represented an attempt by the Supreme Court to limit the “plenary 
power,” or essentially absolute power, of Congress over Indians. The Court 
argued against the perceived congressional right to extend its authority over 
a group or community by “arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe.” Rather, 
the Court insisted that only  after a group was formally identified as a “dis-
tinctly Indian community” could Congress determine “ whether, to what 
extent, and for what time they  shall be recognized and dealt with as depen-
dent tribes requiring the guardianship and protection of the United States.”15 
However, the par ameters of “Indianness” that officials became more and 
more conscious of establishing through this long succession of related court 
cases became less distinct as the concept of “culture” came to the fore during 
the John Collier era of Indian affairs (1933–45). The so- called Indian New 
Deal, with the Indian Reor ga ni za tion Act as its centerpiece, attached a 
 great deal of importance to federal acknowl edgment by establishing that 
only “recognized” tribes would receive BIA- related benefits. It contained 
the clearest statement yet: “The term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act  shall in-
clude all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized tribe 
now  under Federal jurisdiction, and . . .  all other persons of one- half or 
more Indian blood.”16 Collier then listed all formally acknowledged tribes, 
some 258 Indian groups, including the Tohono O’odham but not the Kicka-
poos or Yaquis, in order to determine voting eligibility in approving or re-
jecting the IRA. The issue then became, “How, then, can an unrecognized 
Indian group establish recognition?”17
Between the enactment of the IRA and the mid-1970s, this question would 
occupy government officials and scholars alike. In his seminal Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law, published in 1942, the  legal scholar Felix Cohen stated, 
“The question of what constitutes tribes or bands has been extensively con-
sidered in recent years by the administrative authorities of the Federal 
Government in connection with tribal organ ization effected pursuant to sec-
tion 16 of the Act of June 18, 1934.”18 Cohen then attempted to outline five 
criteria that the Interior Department generally considered when making 
such a determination:
(1) That the group has had treaty relations with the United States.
(2) That the group has been denominated a tribe by act of Congress or 
Executive order.
(3) That the group has been treated as having collective rights in tribal 
lands or funds, even though not expressly designated a tribe.
(4) That the group has been treated as a tribe or band by other Indian 
tribes.
(5) That the group has exercised po liti cal authority over its members, 
through a tribal council or other governmental form.19
Following a period of substantial pro gress in the development and artic-
ulation of the federal acknowl edgment pro cess, the U.S. Congress fell 
 silent on the issue in the postwar years, and remained so  until the 1970s. 
Instead, Congress began the 1950s with the termination policies, which, as 
discussed earlier, essentially relegated governmental responsibilities for In-
dians in the areas of social welfare, education, law enforcement, and eco-
nomic assistance to the individual states, thereby effectively severing tribal 
ties with the federal government and abolishing some reservations.20 The 
new legislative trend made federal acknowl edgment seem like a moot point.
It was not  until the Johnson and Nixon administrations that the issue of 
federal recognition came to the fore once again.  These administrations over-
saw the production of perhaps the most exhaustive survey of the history of 
federal Indian policy ever written. The congressional commission in charge 
of the study, known as the American Indian Policy Review Commission, is-
sued a two- part overview in 1977 that contained separate recommenda-
tions from eleven task forces. The volume produced by Task Force #10 
examined “Terminated and Non- federally Recognized Indians,” and con-
tained a long list of unacknowledged tribes. The task force concluded by 
suggesting the establishment of federal acknowl edgment criteria and pro-
cedures in an attempt to address the needs of  these unrecognized tribes. It 
was not long before the BIA began receiving petitions from groups inter-
ested in obtaining federally recognized status. In fact, by the mid-1970s the 
Interior Department had over forty on file. The Interior Department imme-
diately issued a temporary set of guidelines  until an official system could 
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be developed, and within ten months, on September 5, 1978, the department 
finalized and implemented the revised procedures.21
The seven criteria established by 25 CFR 83, the “Procedures for Estab-
lishing That an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe,” state that 
an Indian group’s petition must
a) establish that they have been identified from historical times to  
the pres ent on a substantially continuous basis as an American or 
aboriginal;
b) establish that a substantial portion of the group inhabits a specific 
area or lives in a community viewed as American Indian, distinct 
from other populations in the area;
c) furnish a statement of facts which establishes that the group has 
maintained tribal po liti cal influence or other authority over its 
members as an autonomous entity throughout history  until the 
pres ent;
d) furnish a copy of the group’s pres ent governing document . . .  
describing in full the membership criteria and the procedures 
through which the group currently governs its affairs and members;
e) furnish a list of all current members . . .  based on the group’s own 
defined criteria. The membership must consist of individuals who 
have established, using evidence acceptable to the Secretary of the 
Interior, descendancy from a tribe which existed historically or  
from historical tribes which combined and functioned as a single 
autonomous entity;
f) establish that the membership of the group is composed principally 
of persons who are not members of any other North American 
Indian tribe;
g) [demonstrate] that the group or its members are not the subject  
of congressional legislation which has expressly terminated or 
forbidden the Federal Relationship.22
Fulfillment of  these provisions in petition form is only one aspect of the 
acknowl edgment pro cess.  Because the entire pro cess comprises several 
stages, it is often quite lengthy. At least more recently, from the time that 
the BIA receives the petition, three months typically elapse before it 
reaches the BIA’s Branch of Federal Acknowl edgment (BFA, later renamed 
the Office of Federal Acknowledgment). The BFA then notifies the petitioner 
of any readily apparent deficiencies and extends the petitioner the opportu-
nity to revise and resubmit the petition if the prob lems can be easily reme-
died. The petition then languishes for approximately one year  until it is 
given “active consideration” status. Often referred to as the “waiting pe-
riod,” the one- year span is the result of a tremendous backlog of petitions 
awaiting review. During the active consideration period, BFA staff carefully 
examine the petition section by section, often  taking up to eigh teen months 
to do so, as this stage requires site visits, a verification of genealogical claims 
and documentary evidence, and a search for any additional evidence. The 
BFA then produces a written decision concerning  whether to tentatively ap-
prove or reject the petition, which is then published in the Federal Register. 
 After the decision’s publication, the BFA requires another 120 days to elapse 
to allow for any rebuttals or other objections from government officials. In 
the event that the BIA has no further objections, it publishes the finalized 
decision and extends federally recognized status.23 Recent estimates put the 
number of unrecognized Indian enclaves in the United States at well over 
200, while the BIA currently recognizes approximately 332 Indian tribes, 
bands, or other entities (a number that does not include Alaskan natives). 
Within less than a de cade  after implementing the procedures, the BIA had 
already received 91 petitions, and by 2004 had received more than 250.24 
Anthropologists believe that a pattern of geographic distribution among 
 these unrecognized tribes exists, namely, that they have largely been found 
on  either the Eastern Seaboard or the western coast, or in the Deep South.25
A broad and fairly common complaint among tribes that have undertaken 
the acknowl edgment pro cess is that the procedures do not allow for the 
pressures of acculturation, which are easy to succumb to without previous 
government protection.26 As the historian Alexandra Harmon has observed, 
“ People who profess to be Indians have had to defend their claims with a 
frequency and rigor seldom demanded of  people in other ethnic or racial 
classes.”27 Herein lies an inherent flaw in the recognition pro cess.  Legal 
pre ce dent has gradually established the notion that Indian rights are not 
racial, but po liti cal. In other words, the tribe is viewed as a po liti cal unit rather 
than as a collection of individuals from a common ancestry.28 However, the 
U.S. government still has not developed a satisfactory definition of “tribe.” 
Does the designation require documented lineage from a historic tribe, a 
history of community- based po liti cal organ ization, or the recognition of a 
tribe’s claim to “Indianness” by the surrounding community, or is it simply 
a question of cultural retention in the face of pressures to assimilate? In 
practice, the procedures require all of  these  things and more. Furthermore, 
scholars generally agree that Indians have, since long before contact with 
whites, viewed themselves as nations, or at least some form thereof,  until 
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having the label “tribe” foisted on them by non- Indians. The phenomenon 
of the “tribe,” then, is  little more than the product of colonialism. Still, the 
U.S. government insists, up to the pres ent day, that petitioning Indians exhibit 
at least some of the characteristics of nations, such as consistent territorial 
claims, some degree of po liti cal organ ization, and at least an informal 
 legal code, without allowing for the fact that policies emanating from im-
perial powers and,  later, nation- states have, for the most part, had as their 
primary objective the elimination of all of  these  things.29
Nevertheless, the BIA, shortly  after implementing the procedures, esti-
mated that approximately 30  percent of petitioning groups would ultimately 
be granted federally acknowledged status. And as the anthropologist Su-
san Greenbaum asserted in 1985, “The BIA’s interpretations [of the petitions] 
thus far have exhibited considerable flexibility with re spect to limitations 
and adaptations imposed on the unrecognized tribes by virtue of their sta-
tus.” She adds that recent decisions have placed  little emphasis on cultural 
retention but have instead looked for proof that the group has “retained 
sufficient internal organ ization and stability of membership to be able to 
reasonably enter into a government- to- government relationship.” In this re-
gard, Greenbaum concludes, the BIA has been more than fair.30 Furthermore, 
the BIA revised its regulations in 1994 to lessen the burden on petitioning 
groups. Among the more notable changes  were ones concerning the 
hopelessly vague provision requiring Indians to prove that non- Indians had 
identified them as Indians “from historical times to the pres ent.”  After 
1994, petitioning groups only had to go back to 1900. The BIA also qualified 
the provision calling for evidence of self- government. Instead, petitioning 
groups had only to prove that a distinct community existed at key moments 
in the group’s history.31 But criticisms of the pro cess still abound. Some con-
tend that the BIA’s Office of Federal Acknowledgment (OFA) has not been 
consistent in the application of the criteria, to the benefit of some petition-
ers and the detriment of  others.  Others have characterized some OFA staff 
as incompetent and/or unqualified, too secretive about their methods and 
findings, and too bound to rigid and even outmoded notions of “authentic-
ity.” Still  others argue that the office has been too generous, and has thus 
recognized too many tribes in too hasty a fashion. The fundamental prob-
lem with the pro cess, however, seems to be that federal bureaucrats have 
become, in one historian’s words, “colonially empowered voices in Indian 
identity debates,” while the acknowl edgment pro cess itself has become just 
another form of “white paternalism” and another means of “exerting colo-
nial power.” It is no won der, then, that for petitioners the pro cess has tended 
and still tends to stoke “anxiety, shame, anger, grief, and feelings of inad-
equacy over cultural loss.”32
Regardless, as the Yaqui and Kickapoo cases demonstrate, the acknowl-
edgment pro cess could exhibit a  great deal of flexibility, particularly since 
 these groups undertook the pro cess while it was still in its formative years. 
In retrospect, and in light of the number of tribes who have failed in their 
efforts to achieve recognition,  these groups’ bids for a status change seem 
improbable and their success almost like a strange oversight.33  After all, a 
quick glance at the acknowl edgment criteria is enough to lead one to con-
clude that  these tribes  were not eligible by a long shot. Yet a look at their 
experiences reveals a dizzying array of  factors working to their advantage. 
Simply put, the right  people came together at the right time and place. The 
tenacity on the part of the tribes and the sympathy and even indignation 
on the part of influential neighbors, coupled with the peculiar cultural and 
po liti cal dynamics within the U.S.- Mexico borderlands region during the 
mid- to late twentieth  century, combined to make their recognition a real-
ity. Put another way,  these groups had located within the U.S.- Mexico border-
lands what one historian called “clandestine social spaces,” spaces beyond 
the purview of officials within which their cultures could flourish and their 
collective identity could remain intact. Another historian referred to  these 
spaces as “forbidden landscapes,” or regions that are often “at the crossroads 
of empires, nations, markets, and cultures,” where corporations, states, and 
regional entrepreneurs have often tried, and have often failed, to assert con-
trol. When the time came to convince both locals and local officials north of 
the border of their “Indianness,” then, they  were ready.34
The Yaquis and Federal Acknowl edgment
For the Yaquis, that opportunity came in the 1960s. Since migrating, the 
tribe had long relied on non- Indians for assistance as it sought to stabilize 
its presence in Arizona, but it was during the 1960s that tribal members 
found their most power ful advocates. Writing to Arizona congressman Mor-
ris Udall in 1962, Robert Roessel, then director of Tempe’s Indian Educa-
tion Center, discussed in ter est ing parallels to the Yaqui situation elsewhere 
in North Amer i ca. He wrote, “It is very in ter est ing to compare the pres ent 
situation of the Yaqui to that of the Rocky Boy Cree and Chippewa, and 
Indians of Montana during the 1900s.”  These Indians  were at one time res-
idents of present- day Canada, and gradually migrated into the present- day 
United States, where they remained. “ After being a po liti cal football,” Roessel 
All the Doors Are Closing 175
176 Chapter Six
continued, “fi nally justification prevailed and  these Indians  were assigned 
a reservation and placed  under the Bureau of Indian Affairs.” A local attor-
ney, in a letter to Udall, added two more names to the list: the Metlakatla 
Indians of Canada, now residing in Alaska, and the Cocopa Indians of Mex-
ico, now residing in Arizona. The Yaquis faced a similar predicament, and 
Roessel could not help expressing his desire for a similar outcome. He con-
cluded, “Each of us, I am sure, can think of dozens of rational reasons why 
the Yaqui are not entitled to the ser vice of the Bureau. At this point I am 
more interested in the humaneness of the situation and trying to find what 
can be done to help this destitute and forgotten group.” Another attorney 
put it more succinctly: “Recognition is and prob ably  will continue to be a 
determination of the merits of each case. In my opinion, the case of the 
Yaquis is indeed meritorious.” Another local, cutting through the legalese, 
argued, “With all of the acres of sunshine available in Southern Arizona, 
 there must be a place for them on federal land.”35  Those familiar with the 
Kickapoos expressed similar sympathies. “I’m not only willing, but I’m very 
 eager to help you secure justice,” vowed one official to a contingent of Kicka-
poos assembled at a congressional hearing, adding, “History tells us, certainly, 
that more than enough terrible injustices have been heaped upon the Ameri-
can Indians and I think whenever we have a remedy before us to undo some 
of that injustice and secure justice for you, we should use that remedy.”36 
Since  these kinds of attitudes pervade the history of Indian- white relations 
in the United States only once in a while, the spirit of the times, so to speak, 
seemed to be on the Indians’ side.
Sudden local interest in the Yaquis likely stemmed from unwanted press 
coverage. On February 2, 1970, an article appeared in the New York Post en-
titled “The Plight of the Yaquis, Our Invisible Indians.” “Fearful of deporta-
tion,” the article begins, “one of the strangest groups of expatriates in history 
has been ‘hiding’ in the U.S. since the late 1800s. They live in some of the 
worst slums in Amer i ca and have never sought citizenship.” It quotes twenty- 
seven- year- old  Virginia Balthazar, allegedly “one of few Yaquis to gradu ate 
from high school,” as stating, “My  people have always been afraid that if 
they speak up and ask for help they  will be deposited on the other side of 
the border.” The article describes Pascua as “a collection of tin, scrap wood 
and cardboard shacks” with “no indoor toilets,  running  water, electricity, 
sidewalks or paved streets.” Its inhabitants, it continues,  were habitually 
unemployed, unskilled, and illiterate. But  things  were changing, the article 
goes on to explain, since Morris Udall had sponsored a bill, still moving 
through Congress, to grant “ those ‘foreign’ Indians” 200 acres of federal 
land near San Xavier Mission. Further, the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO) and other relief organ izations  were taking notice of the Yaquis, pro-
viding assistance with housing and education. “Fear of recognition is start-
ing to dis appear,” Balthazar told the article’s author, concluding, “Not all 
Yaquis are accepting the old ways— the belief that it is better if nobody knew 
they existed.”37
Though well meaning, the article understandably upset the Yaquis. Three 
weeks  later, they mailed a letter to Udall requesting his assistance in pres-
suring the paper to issue a retraction, and enclosed a petition, containing 
fifty Yaqui signatures, in support of the action. “We  don’t know where this 
so- called journalist got his information,” the letter reads, “but it is clear that 
he turned this half- hearted attempt to get a story into an oversimplification, 
and if that  weren’t enough, at least half of what he said was just plain bunk.” 
The tribe evidently feared becoming a ste reo type, and wanted the world 
to know that they, in fact, paid gas and light bills and  were more than just 
unskilled, illiterate squatters, and that the deportation fears the author de-
scribed  were “ancient history.” “We wrote to you,” the letter concludes, 
“ because of your prominence and interest, hoping that you  will act on our 
behalf.”38 While the tribe apparently never received the retraction it re-
quested, it did receive an encouraging response from Udall. In it, Udall calls 
the article “grossly inaccurate.” He adds, “The suggestion that the Yaquis 
are fearful of deportation is ridicu lous, since most Yaquis  today are Ameri-
can citizens.” Udall then promised to send along a copy of his and the 
Yaquis’ letters to the author to make their objections known.
The article might have applied to an earlier generation of Yaquis, but by 
the second half of the twentieth  century,  those Yaquis north of the U.S.- 
Mexico border had come far in solidifying their presence in their  adopted 
home and  were poised to take the next step in fully realizing Yaqui nation-
hood in the United States. In this effort, Udall and his po liti cal associates 
proved invaluable assets. The tribe’s push for federally recognized status be-
gan in earnest in the early 1960s, with a proposal to resettle the Yaquis at a 
new village site. By the mid-1950s, the city of Tucson had grown to the point 
that it very nearly surrounded the Yaquis’ neighborhood. As the city began 
demanding property taxes from the group, Yaqui families began losing their 
lands to foreclosure. They found temporary assistance through the Marshall 
Foundation, a charitable trust that assisted the tribe in meeting their new 
tax burden while also helping tribe members acquire additional plots.39 At 
the same time, however, the Yaqui community was itself expanding, and 
its pres ent village site, due to space constraints, did not permit further 
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growth. “At pres ent,” one newspaper reported in 1963, “some 600 Yaquis 
are crowded on a tract of land located west of Oracle Road and just south 
of Grant Road. Suffering from extreme overcrowding and substandard hous-
ing conditions, the area is corroded with poverty and many families live in 
dwellings so poor they are not adequately protected from the winter cold.” 
According to the tribe, three and even four Yaqui families at a time often 
shared a single  house due to overcrowding. It was around this time that 
Yaqui Anselmo Valencia, who would spearhead their push for recognition, 
visited Black Mountain in the Sonoran Desert and had a prophetic vision. 
He saw the tribe living peacefully on a plot of land far from Tucson’s bustle, 
or far from the ware houses, nightclubs, and brothels that abutted their 
pres ent village site. Shortly thereafter, Valencia began exploring his options 
and, most importantly, developing a relocation plan. With the assistance of 
the anthropologists Edward Spicer and Muriel Painter, Valencia ultimately 
selected a 202- acre plot of federal land one mile south of Valencia Road and 
roughly ten miles southwest of downtown Tucson. The plot, all involved 
agreed, held a  great deal of promise.40
The plan may not have gotten off the ground without the help of Morris 
Udall. Udall, a former student of Edward Spicer’s, vowed to assist the tribe 
if elected to the congressional seat just vacated by his  brother Stewart, who 
had recently begun his tenure as secretary of the interior. To Udall, the under-
taking was a good idea not only from a humanitarian standpoint, but also 
from a po liti cal one. As expected, the largely Demo cratic district elected 
Udall, and Udall, staying true to his campaign promise, went to work on 
the Yaquis’ behalf. In May 1963, he introduced a bill that would allow the 
transfer of federal land to the tribe  free of charge. It also called for the cre-
ation of the Pascua Yaqui Association, a nonprofit corporation headed by 
tribal members and charged with administering to the tribe.41
Earlier that year Udall had told a group of Pascua Yaquis that he expected 
the land conveyance to occur within six months. “It  will be your land,” he 
reassured them; “you can do what you want with it.” One article reported 
that “good natured laughter” erupted when Anselmo Valencia added, “And 
it  won’t be on a reservation.” The differences between the  legal status of 
the Yaquis’ land grant proposal and that of reservations  were myriad. First 
of all, the nonprofit, Indian- run corporation, not the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs, handled the allotment of individual plots to individual families. In 
fact, the BIA would not be involved at all since the Yaquis, as of yet, did not 
have a  legal status as American Indians. Second, the lands, once allotted, 
 were subject to taxation and state and county jurisdiction in  legal  matters. 
Fi nally, officials imposed an impor tant ground rule, one typically reserved 
for recognized tribes. In order to occupy the new village site, Yaquis had to 
be at least one- quarter Yaqui, married to a Yaqui, or affiliated with the Ya-
qui religious order. They also had to have resided in the old village for at 
least a year.  These provisions, one can assume,  were designed to prevent a 
sudden influx of Yaquis, or even persons claiming to be Yaquis, from Mex-
ico.42 The Yaquis themselves, meanwhile, bristled at the provision. “Any 
Yaqui knows who is a Yaqui,” one tribal member contended. Still,  these 
provisions remain largely intact  today.43
The Yaquis also launched a public relations campaign of sorts, enlisting 
Muriel Painter to help the tribe prove their “Indianness” to members of Con-
gress. With the use of Paint er’s 1962 brochure, Faith, Flowers, and Fiestas, with 
its portrayal of Yaqui ceremonial observances, the tribe hoped to remove 
all doubt as to their authenticity by appealing to popu lar conceptions of 
Indianness. They also tried to fashion an image of themselves as  humble, 
grateful refugees, committed to a colorful culture that was undeniably 
worth preserving, and pointing out that a small piece of federal land was 
the surest route to achieve  those ends. Interestingly, Anselmo Valencia also 
 adopted the practice of referring to himself as “chief,” even though the title 
had  little meaning to the Yaquis themselves.44
Resettlement of the Yaquis to a new village site was not without contro-
versy. One local educator called it “a violation of  every princi ple upon 
which this nation was founded” and “discrimination of the worst kind” in 
a country where  every effort was being made to end segregation. Another 
local educator put it more bluntly, stating that the Yaquis “need new homes 
and would love to have better housing— but not at the expense of being 
buried alive way out in the country. You cannot motivate  people to move 
forward when the only image they have is of the past.” Some Yaquis, too, 
 were uncertain about the benefits of the move, and felt that other Yaquis 
and local officials  were placing undue pressure on them to relocate. Even-
tually, then, a small group of tribal members began adding their voices to 
the chorus of detractors, claiming that transportation prob lems would hin-
der Yaqui employment and that the schools nearest the new village site 
 were already too crowded.45
Still, Udall proceeded to steer the relocation bill through the House Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs in 1964, and ultimately met with 
 little opposition. President Johnson subsequently signed the legislation in 
October of that year. The Pascua Yaquis’ initial elation at this surprising 
turn of events proved short- lived, however, when the tribe learned that 
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realizing Valencia’s dream of a Yaqui settlement on Tucson’s arid outskirts 
would require a  great deal of funding, which the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
was in no way obligated to provide. Again with the assistance of Edward 
Spicer, the tribe began seeking out alternative sources, and ultimately suc-
ceeded with President Johnson’s newly founded OEO (which was designed 
to help wage his War on Poverty), to the tune of $433,000 over four years. 
The Pascua Yaqui Association, with Valencia now serving as its executive 
director, managed the federal funds, pouring them into ser vices such as 
adult education classes, vocational training, welfare assistance, and summer 
youth programs, while also funding a number of new construction proj ects, 
including a Yaqui church. Meanwhile, the bulk of the region’s Yaquis still 
resided at Old Pascua, as the original site came to be known, and remained 
suspicious of Valencia and the new community, resentful of its economic 
pro gress, and unsure of the wisdom of relocating to the still relatively iso-
lated locale. In fact, tensions festered to the point that the two communi-
ties temporarily severed ties.46
Although New Pascua initially prospered, its success depended on OEO 
funding. Richard Nixon’s 1972 presidential victory, however, spelled disas-
ter for the fledgling program. Nixon almost immediately dismantled the 
OEO, and along with it the Pascua Yaquis’ primary source of funding. The 
tribe, now facing a serious financial crunch, temporarily considered pur-
suing state recognition as an American Indian tribe, but backed down in 
the face of overwhelming opposition from Arizona’s other Indian tribes. As 
one Arizona Indian explained, “We  don’t want them to dip into funds which 
are already inadequate,” adding, “The Yaquis are from Mexico, outcasts 
from Mexico.” 47
In the mid-1970s, then, the Pascua Yaquis deci ded to push for federally 
recognized status. One newspaper editorial admitted that the request was 
problematic. “The Yaqui is considered to be a Mexican tribe,” the article 
states, “but so, at one time, was the Papago Indian tribe.” While most con-
sidered southern Arizona largely O’odham territory, the article contended, 
anthropological evidence suggests that the Yaquis’ territory once extended 
well north across the U.S.- Mexico border. Still, the article raised concerns 
about  whether the group possessed the requisite degree of internal organ-
ization to pass as a “tribe.” “Indeed,” the article continues, “the Yaqui  people 
in Arizona have never had what could be called a tribal structure in the tra-
ditional sense. Their history in this country has been primarily as wards—
of the state, of religious groups, of private organ izations and foundations 
and well- intentioned philanthropists who helped, fought over and with the 
Yaqui  people.” By the mid-1970s, their unclear status had left the Yaquis in 
a difficult position. Their village needed a new sewer system, yet the fact 
that the land was  under federal trust meant that the county could not build 
one. Officials denied the tribe access to federal Indian programs  because 
they had not been formally declared American Indians. The tribe’s village 
had  little, if any, police protection, and financing for additional housing 
was becoming increasingly hard to come by. The editorial, in the end, rec-
ommended federal recognition, but opined that any legislation should in-
clude a stipulation forbidding further migration from Mexico. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, it also reported strong opposition from other Arizona tribes, 
tribes that felt that “the federal pie for Indians” was “already cut too thin.” 
Indeed, the eight Arizona Affiliated Tribes ultimately expressed opposi-
tion, as did the Colorado River tribes and the White Mountain and San 
Carlos Apaches, while the Hopi reportedly lent “informal” support. As for 
the O’odham, they  were, according to one Yaqui, “pretty quiet and still 
thinking about it.” 48
Meanwhile, the proposal sent at least one contingent of Yaquis, in the 
words of one reporter, “on the warpath.”  These Yaquis, most of whom lived 
at Old Pascua, feared the loss of “their rights as individuals and their free-
dom of choice” if they submitted to a status as “wards of the federal govern-
ment.” Some had an “intense aversion” to the prospect of being referred to 
as “American Indians” rather than “Yaquis.” “ There is a strong feeling,” 
one Yaqui claimed, “that we are ‘Yaquis’ first and ‘Indians’ second.” Further, 
they feared that a status as “reservation Indians,” with all the term con-
noted, would demean the tribe,  whether or not they chose to live on the 
reservation. Fi nally, they feared that reservation status for New Pascua 
would all but cut off aid to nonreservation Yaquis, or  those living primarily 
in Old Pascua, South Tucson, Marana, which is just northwest of Tucson, 
and Guadalupe, a town fifteen miles south of Phoenix. “ After they get all 
the money for their reservation,” one Yaqui speculated, “maybe we  won’t 
get any, and  every bit of money coming in we might be fighting them for.” 
Still other Yaquis, however, feared the complete dissolution of Arizona’s 
Yaqui community should the federal government not come to their aid. In 
Valencia’s words, “Without their help, New Pascua would become a dete-
riorated community with no administrative function for  running our own 
village.” Another popu lar sentiment among tribal members was that the 
new status was the last hope for ensuring the preservation of any vestige of 
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Yaqui culture and traditions in Arizona. “We’ve been in de pen dent of the 
government all  these years,” one Yaqui concluded, “but all the doors are 
closing and now it’s economic survival.” 49
The momentum the proposal initially garnered proved short- lived. “ After 
being held in a House subcommittee on Indian affairs,” editorialized one 
local paper in 1976, “a bill giving the Yaqui Indians tribal status  hasn’t moved 
an inch. But meanwhile, the prob lems of the Southwest Indians continue to 
grow, and  will keep increasing  until the bill is rescued from Congress’ leg-
islative jungle.” Local officials and tribal members alike feared the bill was 
 dying from “inaction,” a fate that would threaten “the hope and livelihood 
of the Indian group with  little chance of preserving their history for the 
 future.”50 Their fears proved well founded. In 1977 that inaction forced tribal 
members to place their drive for federal recognition “on the back burner,” 
in the words of one local reporter.51 Another blow came  later that year, when 
Ramon Ybarra, then director of the Pascua Yaqui Association, died of an 
“undetermined illness.” Ybarra, who, interestingly, participated in the 1961 
Bay of Pigs invasion during the Kennedy administration, worked tirelessly 
on behalf of the tribe to promote its cause, and his death hurt morale and 
left a leadership void.52
May of the following year witnessed a renewed and more aggressive 
move on behalf of the Yaquis to gain federally recognized status. With the 
aid of the Native American Rights Fund, the tribe sent a spokesperson di-
rectly to Washington to discuss the proposal face to face with the House 
Subcommittee on Indians Affairs. The committee ultimately agreed to at 
least consider legislative federal recognition.53 Congressional hearings re-
garding the Yaqui request for federal acknowl edgment commenced during 
September 1977. Arizona senator Dennis DeConcini was the first to testify 
on the Yaquis’ behalf, stating, “ There is no doubt in my mind that this rec-
ognition is both earned and needed. The assistance that could be extended 
through existing federal programs, ser vices, and facilities, although a mi-
nuscule portion of the resources of this  great country, would be a tremen-
dous boost to  these Native Americans who have strug gled alone for so 
long.”54 In response to questions regarding their claim to “Indianness,” 
Edward Spicer lent his considerable expertise in the form of a letter to the 
committee. He wrote: “The native Indian language continues to be spoken 
by the Yaquis in Arizona. The distinct Yaqui customs which have been 
uniquely their own since before the time of Eu ro pean discovery continue 
to shape and influence their way of life. This central core of Yaqui culture 
is highly prized by the Yaquis and has been maintained through the  whole 
course of their unique and difficult historical experience.”55
By March of that year the tribe could say with some confidence that fed-
erally recognized status would be forthcoming. “We are somewhat assured 
it  will pass,” stated Valencia, further noting that the tribe had, thus far, en-
countered  little or no or ga nized re sis tance, having easily garnered the sup-
port of other Yaquis, anthropologists, community leaders, and national 
Indian groups. The bill included an impor tant stipulation, however, namely, 
that federal benefits would apply only to members of the Pascua Yaqui As-
sociation, which numbered roughly 2,500,  those who could prove at least 
one- quarter Yaqui blood, and, perhaps most significantly,  those who had 
proof of U.S. citizenship. Residence at New Pascua was not a prerequisite; 
the bill also included Yaquis living in South Tucson, Old Pascua, Marana, 
Guadalupe, and even Los Angeles.56
Valencia clearly recognized, however, that their efforts to push the bill 
through Congress would likely fail without addressing the fact that a large 
number of Yaquis still lived along the Yaqui River in Mexico and regularly 
migrated into the United States. More specifically, Valencia felt it impor tant 
to establish the fact that recognition would protect the  future of only 
American- born Yaquis, stating, “Out of approximately 2,500 members of the 
Pascua Yaqui Association, about 20  were born in Mexico. They are  people 
from 60 to 98 years old; unfortunately, they  will not be with us for too many 
more years.”57 The Yaquis also carefully noted that they would not be “cam-
paigning” for additional Yaquis to add to the tribal rolls, even though about 
6,000 Yaquis called Arizona home.58 A Yaqui nation that truly transcended 
the U.S.- Mexico border, Valencia seemed to realize, simply could not survive 
the recognition pro cess. His appeal convinced Congress, and in 1978 it ap-
proved Public Law 95-375, which provided federally recognized status to 
the Pascua Yaquis and made them eligible “for all Federal ser vices and ben-
efits provided to Indians  because of their status as Indians.”59 Interestingly, 
the Yaquis claim the distinction of being the last tribe to obtain federally 
recognized status prior to the promulgation of the formal Federal Acknowl-
edgement Pro cess. Had they pursued recognition through the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs rather than through the legislative pro cess, their bid very likely 
would have failed. The latter route was simply too rigorous and, one could 
argue, inflexible, at least when addressing an anomaly like the Yaquis.60
It is impor tant to note, however, that the bill passed in a compromised 
form. Rather than grant the tribe unconditional federally recognized status, 
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a modified version of the bill gave the state continued civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over the tribe’s village site. Still, it retained the most impor-
tant features of the original proposal, including the recognition of the Yaqui 
tribal government, reservation status for the New Pascua site, and unfettered 
access to federal Indian programs. The final bill, however, contained no 
provisions limiting membership or establishing any requirements for  future 
membership. This task ultimately fell to the Pascua Yaquis themselves, and 
in ensuing years Yaquis living throughout Arizona would gradually  settle 
in New Pascua, swelling the ranks of Arizona Yaquis to about 15,000 by the 
end of the 1990s.61 Though the Car ter administration initially objected to 
the tribe’s recognition, it ultimately relented, since, according to a House 
staff member, Udall was  handling Car ter’s civil ser vice reform bill, and the 
administration wanted to avoid “get[ting] Mr. Udall mad.” 62
The  battle over the tribe’s status, however, was not over, and difficulties 
and resentments would fester in ensuing years. The 1978 recognition bill 
officially classified the tribe as an “adult Indian community,” and not a “his-
toric tribe.” The differences between the two are far from negligible. A 
historic tribe enjoys the full range of powers granted to federally recognized 
Indian  peoples, including the right to enroll new members, control inheri-
tance laws, create and enforce a civil and criminal justice system, and de-
termine population size, without BIA oversight, when applying for federal 
benefits. A nonhistoric tribe, or adult Indian community, does not have un-
conditional control of its tribal rolls (although the Yaquis  were an excep-
tion), and policy changes within the tribal government require the approval 
of the BIA. Further,  these tribes cannot levy taxes, condemn property, or 
maintain law and order on their reservation. Fi nally,  these groups carry the 
unfortunate label of “created tribe” in the eyes of the federal government. 
Thus, in 1993, the Yaquis, this time with the assistance of Ed Pastor, Udall’s 
congressional successor, pushed for a final clarification of their status, a 
status that would entitle the tribe to full sovereignty. Not surprisingly, the 
BIA objected on the basis that the tribe did not originate in the United States. 
“I  don’t think  we’re saying that the Pascua Yaquis are not a tribe,” stated a 
BIA representative, “but it’s not just ‘a tribe is a tribe is a tribe.’  There are 
historical differences. It may seem like hairsplitting to Congress, but we 
have a procedure . . .  and  there are many groups that  don’t qualify  under 
the law. It’s very dangerous to set a pre ce dent that says all Indian groups 
are the same.” Interestingly, it had taken the BIA all  these years to call the 
tribe’s pedigree into question. A historic tribe, the spokesperson continued, 
“has existed since time immemorial and its powers are derived from its in-
extinguishable and inherent sovereignty.” The BIA looked for direct ances-
tral links between Arizona Yaquis and the  mother tribe, but claimed,  after 
having researched the  matter, only to have uncovered a “series of unrelated 
lineages.” The Yaquis understandably felt that the BIA was misrepresent-
ing their history, and answered with an assertion that the tribe has “roamed 
since pre- Columbia days across Arizona and the rest of the Southwest.” One 
Yaqui elaborated, “Yaqui clans and customs would not have survived if only 
individual Yaquis had crossed the border, but did survive  because the tribe 
came across as villages, clans and as a tribal group.” While the state recog-
nized a government- to- government relationship with the tribe, the federal 
government held out, and has yet to revisit the issue.63
The Kickapoo Bid
As was the case with the Yaquis, the Kickapoos’ prob lems, many of which 
stemmed directly from their unclear  legal status within the United States, 
worsened as the twentieth  century progressed. “The Kickapoo Tribe, Mex-
icans and North Americans at the Same Time,” read one Mexican headline. 
The 1979 article went on to characterize the group as “dead and forgotten, 
without a  house or a home,” and simply waiting for their “inevitable ex-
tinction, which  will prob ably occur within the next de cade, more or less.” 64 
An earlier article, again of Mexican origin, placed the Kickapoos on a short 
list of Mexico- based tribes heading for extinction (incidentally, the list also 
contained the Yaquis). It counted only one hundred Indians residing in 
Nacimiento, and claimed that their economic circumstances  were increas-
ingly forcing tribal members into the United States on a more permanent 
basis. It concluded that the few remaining Indians stubbornly refused to 
abandon their land solely  because their  children  were born  there.65
Numbering between 600 and 700  people, the Mexican Kickapoos  were, 
in fact, increasingly calling Ea gle Pass, Texas, home, despite the fact that 
conditions  there  were less than ideal, to put it mildly. The tribe’s living con-
ditions did not go unnoticed by their non- Indian neighbors. As previously 
noted, the city of Ea gle Pass granted the tribe a small piece of land on an 
informal basis during the 1960s. The small plot, however, proved woefully 
inadequate for ceremonial observances, and some Kickapoos evidently con-
tinued to live beneath the international bridge. Thus, the tribe  adopted the 
habit of migrating north of the border to work, then south of the border to 
meet their ceremonial obligations, while making their home in between. 
Over time, the group’s ties to Ea gle Pass grew stronger and stronger. In 
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explaining their attachment, one Kickapoo stated, “We refer to Ea gle Pass 
 because our grandparents and our forefathers are buried  there. This is why 
we refer to that as our home ground.” “Our forefathers came from the United 
States,” another Kickapoo  later told a congressional committee, “and we like 
the United States and are proud of the fact that we originated from  here.” 
Yet the specter of forced removal still loomed. As another Kickapoo revealed 
to the committee, “ Every day we go to bed with fears that tomorrow we are 
 going to be thrown out of  there.” 66
The first action on the tribe’s behalf came in April 1977, when the Texas 
Senate unanimously voted to legally recognize the Kickapoo Indians living 
 under the international bridge in Ea gle Pass. Senate Bill 168 acknowledged 
the “traditional Kickapoos” as a Texas Indian tribe, adding to a roster that 
included El Paso’s Tiguas and East Texas’s Alabama-Coushattas, while also 
authorizing the Texas Indian Commission to provide economic assistance 
to the beleaguered group. While tribal members retained dual citizenship, 
they  were now eligible for state aid for Indians. “Texas is always known as 
a big state,” the Kickapoos’ chief told the state senate’s  Human Resources 
Committee, “always  doing  things big. Let this be one of the big  things you 
do for a group that is wandering around looking for a place to live.” 67 The 
tribe applied for and received a $1.5 million Community Development Block 
Grant from the Small Cities Program, which operated  under the auspices 
of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Texas 
Indian Commission, in the wake of recognizing the Kickapoos as Texas Tra-
ditional Tribe, sponsored the grant proposal, then watched in frustration 
while the Texas attorney general almost immediately revoked the grant, 
claiming that the federal government had not authorized the Texas govern-
ment to interact with the tribe. The move generated a  great deal of media 
attention, which the Kickapoo handled with aplomb.68
As mentioned, the state of Texas had two Indian reservations as of this 
point in time: El Paso’s Tigua and East Texas’s Alabama- Coushatta. Texas 
had no state- level equivalent of the BIA and only a small “relocational” of-
fice in Dallas, which officials had designated to assist Indians from other 
states who had come to Texas seeking job opportunities. The Alabama- 
Coushattas, though federally recognized in 1927, lost that status in 1954 
during the termination era, while the Tiguas had entered into a trust rela-
tionship with the state for the first time in the 1960s. Shortly thereafter, 
however, the Texas attorney general announced his opinion that the state 
simply could not  favor any race over another when appropriating funding. 
Therefore, he concluded that the activities of the Texas Indian Commission 
had to be reconsidered. The implications of the attorney general’s opinion 
made the state’s indigenous  peoples understandably ner vous. A represen-
tative from the Texas Indian Commission pointed out that following this line 
of reasoning would leave one with the impression that only the federal gov-
ernment “has authority to discriminate between races.” While he agreed 
that Indians should be entitled to the same level of assistance as any other 
Texans, he also insisted that their needs  were quite dif fer ent, particularly 
since they  were so “unassuming.” “They  won’t put themselves forward,” he 
argued. “In turn, they  don’t receive the assistance without somebody . . .  
taking them before the authorities and saying, look, we need help. They 
 won’t ask for it.” It was a concern that the attorney general had evidently 
failed to consider.69
In the 1980s, then, the tribe, with the assistance of sympathetic officials, 
took its case to the federal government. It was an effort to both gain feder-
ally acknowledged status and protect itself from the  legal and bureaucratic 
morass it had been wading through while functioning  under the auspices 
of the Texas Indian Commission. Understandably, the bid was problematic 
from the beginning. One official from the Texas Indian Commission admit-
ted that the stigma of being a “Mexican tribe” still followed the Kickapoos 
around at both the federal and state level and could potentially derail their 
efforts. It was an assumption that had led to constant red tape as the tribe 
sought security and stability. “I  don’t think  there is any question,” he as-
serted in a display of support, “that they are U.S. citizens.”70 Such attitudes 
regularly put the Kickapoos on the defensive, necessitating constant remind-
ers that, in the words of one Kickapoo, “we are not Mexican  people. We are 
Kickapoo Indians.” During congressional hearings concerning the tribe’s 
fate, one congressman queried, “So far as the bureaucracy is concerned, 
your members in this  century are only of the Kickapoo Nation. You are not 
clearly U.S. citizens nor are you considered to be Mexican citizens. This is 
an impediment for you to get the kind of assistance that you desire and need; 
is that correct?” Their reply, not surprisingly, was a resounding yes.71
Another sticking point in deliberations over the tribe’s request for feder-
ally recognized status was the fact that they controlled a large tract of land 
in Mexico. “I understand the Government of Mexico,” one congressman 
noted, “in gratitude for ser vice that the Kickapoo provided to that Nation, 
has given you land in Mexico. If that is accurate, how was the land held? 
Who owns it  really at this point, and what is the magnitude of that holding? 
I understand that it is many thousands of acres. Is it clearly owned by the 
Kickapoo, and, if so, how do you own it?” The Kickapoo delegates anticipated 
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this line of inquiry. They explained that the Mexican government, out of 
sympathy for the tribe, granted them 23,000 hectares upon their arrival in 
Mexico with the understanding that it would be held jointly and that it 
would not be sold. “So  we’re  there temporarily,” one Kickapoo explained. 
“ Really our home is on the border  because that is where we took up perma-
nent residence.” He added that the Mexican land was very poor and lacked 
an adequate  water supply. Further, the use of the Mexican land as a ceremo-
nial site by Oklahoma Kickapoos seems to have bothered the Ea gle Pass 
contingent, which only strengthened their resolve to obtain a place where 
they could “worship in privacy and conduct our ceremonies and rites” sepa-
rate from their Oklahoma counterpart. As in the Yaqui case, the Kickapoos 
appeared cognizant of the fact that claims to nationhood that completely 
ignored the real ity of the U.S.- Mexico border would not survive the recogni-
tion pro cess. But unlike the Yaquis, the Kickapoos managed to maintain the 
all- important transnational lifeline linking Nacimiento and Ea gle Pass. Of-
ficials  were receptive when the tribe requested the  legal protection of their 
right to hold land in Mexico, and deci ded to include the Mexican govern-
ment in their deliberations over Kickapoo recognition.72 It was a revolution-
ary step for the U.S. Congress, one that fi nally acknowledged the fact that 
transnational tribes should be treated as such.
In 1982, then, the Inter- American Indian Institute, on behalf of the Mex-
ican government, submitted a Declaration of Princi ples to the congressio-
nal committee overseeing Kickapoo recognition. The institute expressed its 
opinion that the tribe should be granted U.S. citizenship, largely  because it 
would ease their passage to and from Mexico. It also felt it only fair that 
the Mexican Kickapoos enjoy the same rights enjoyed by tribes living 
along the U.S.- Canada border, rights that stemmed from the aforemen-
tioned Jay Treaty. The Declaration of Princi ples also recommended that 
the tribe receive an adequate, nontaxable land base that was “subject to 
federal restraints against alienation.” The last “princi ple” was perhaps the 
most significant. The institute opined that any legislation should not only 
“explic itly recognize the tri- cultural status of the Kickapoo,” but should 
also “direct all appropriate federal officials, when providing education and 
other special ser vices to the Kickapoo, to consult and cooperate with the 
appropriate Mexican Government officials in regard to the delivery of such 
ser vices, in order to meet the special tri- cultural circumstances of the 
Kickapoos.”73
The Oklahoma Kickapoos, meanwhile, seem to have recognized the de-
sire of the Texas band to remain separate from the larger tribal entity. They 
did not object to severing at least some aspects of their relationship with 
their Texas- and Mexico- based counterpart. One committee member re-
minded the Oklahoma Kickapoo representative that the legislation  under 
consideration contained a provision granting the Texas band complete au-
tonomy, which meant that it would be recognized as a separate po liti cal entity 
from the Oklahoma tribe. Further, the provision required that the Okla-
homa Kickapoos amend their tribal constitution, giving  those Kickapoos 
included in the current bill a separate status within the tribe, though they 
would remain on tribal rolls in Oklahoma. In other words, their southern 
counterpart wanted to remain united  under the “umbrella of the tribe of 
Oklahoma,” or wanted to maintain some mea sure of po liti cal influence 
while guarding their access to sources of state and federal forms of assis-
tance. But they also wanted a  legal separation between the two groups, a 
separation that the Mexican Kickapoos viewed as symbolic more than any-
thing. “You  people in Oklahoma, the tribal leaders,” another committee 
member asked, “are willing to amend your constitution to accommodate 
them?” The representative’s response was a  simple “yes sir.” The Oklahoma 
contingent also agreed to allow the Texas band to participate in tribal elec-
tions and even, if elected, serve on the tribal council. They seemed to rec-
ognize the fact, painfully clear to the Texas band, that in addition to the 
 family and cultural ties that kept the two groups united, the Texas band had 
traditionally relied on the Oklahoma tribe’s “expertise” in dealing with the 
U.S. government. They relied on their relatives’ education, ability to speak 
En glish, and knowledge of the financial aspects of maintaining a tribal land 
base.74 While they wanted to remain distinct from their Oklahoma coun-
terpart, in other words, they  were not yet prepared to sever their relation-
ship. It was an unusual arrangement for an unusual tribe.
The other key issue in deliberations surrounding the tribe’s request for 
federal recognition concerned their right to cross the border. “The act must 
do nothing,” one committee member demanded, “to jeopardize their right to 
pass across the border in both directions that they presently enjoy.” Attor-
neys working on behalf of the Kickapoos went to  great lengths to ensure 
that the pending legislation did not curtail this right. They worked closely 
with the Mexican State Department and other Mexican officials, and even 
retained an attorney in Mexico in order to be “absolutely certain” that their 
right to migrate would not be curtailed by the pending legislation. One 
member of the Kickapoos’  legal team went so far as to attend the fortieth 
anniversary meeting of the Inter- American Indian Institute in Mexico City, 
during which officials from both the United States and Mexico agreed to 
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cooperate on the issue of border passage of indigenous  peoples. Mexico, in 
turn, sent its own delegate to the Kickapoo hearings in Washington to tes-
tify that the two nations had reached a preliminary agreement. He assured 
committee members that since the Kickapoos’ lands in Mexico enjoyed 
ejido rather than reservation status, a land grant in Texas would not affect 
their status in Coahuila. “Something that would be impor tant  here,” he 
continued, stressing the significance of Mexico’s Declaration of Princi ples, 
“ will be to recognize in the bill the fact that the Kickapoos have a tricul-
tural ele ment and this should be . . .  [taken] into consideration.” He fur-
ther highlighted a fact that may have eluded the committee, stating, “The 
existence of Indian groups, along border areas, is not unique to the United 
States and Mexico.  There are more than 70 ethnic groups in the Amer i cas 
that face similar prob lems, in some cases, more severe prob lems than the 
ones that concern us  today.” He pointed out that following in de pen dence, 
the developing nations in Latin Amer i ca drew their borders with  little 
regard for indigenous and ethnic groups that called  these regions home. 
Fi nally, he expressed the hope that the legislation  under consideration 
would help open doors for other Indian groups occupying other border re-
gions by encouraging the committee to think more broadly, or to develop a 
hemispheric consciousness when it came to indigenous  peoples.75
Aside from the transnational implications of Kickapoo recognition, all 
involved in the federal acknowl edgment effort recognized that the Kicka-
poos sorely needed a protected homeland, and the practical reasons  were 
myriad. “Many of our  people suffer from illnesses,” one Kickapoo explained. 
“ There is much T.B., asthma, headaches, pink eye, measles, and whooping 
cough.” The tribe had no out houses and no stoves, and instead of investing 
in such fundamentals of daily existence had to spend their meager earn-
ings on food. Put simply, life had become a strug gle for the tribe. They lived 
on what was essentially borrowed land in Ea gle Pass, afraid of improving 
it  because it could be taken away at any moment. Their  children did not 
take well to education  because of their inability to speak En glish and the 
fact that, as Kickapoos, they  were conspicuously dif fer ent from the other 
 children of Ea gle Pass.76 They battled, on a daily basis, ste reo types of 
Kickapoos as, in the words of one scholar, “a  people who are relentlessly 
stubborn, excessively aggressive, overly suspicious, and collectively ignorant.” 
 These ste reo types had evidently even penetrated academia. One scholar, 
testifying before the congressional committee, claimed that a colleague 
 cautioned him about testifying on the tribe’s behalf, contending that the 
Kickapoos  were “mean as hell” and “just no damn good.”77
In 1981, Congress passed H.R. 4496, a bill granting federally recognized 
status to the Kickapoo “Band.” It included provisions that placed lands in 
Maverick County, Texas, in federal trust and made the tribe eligible for fed-
eral ser vices available to other federally recognized tribes. Then, in the 
mid-1980s, the tribe pushed for an additional clarification of their status. 
“Holdout Kickapoo Indians Relent, Become U.S. Citizens,” read one head-
line. Describing the Mexican Kickapoos as a “renegade band,” the article 
explained that immigration officials granted 143 Kickapoos certificates that 
bestowed upon them “permanent alien status.” Interestingly, the recognition 
bill gave the tribe the option of acquiring  either U.S. or Mexican citizen-
ship, yet another unique twist in the Kickapoos’ recognition saga. While 
U.S. officials expressed pride that “so many of them have chosen to become 
U.S. citizens,” federal recognition actually was not dependent on which 
country they chose for citizenship status. It did, however, affect their eligi-
bility for state and federal welfare programs that fell outside of BIA aus-
pices, which for many made U.S. citizenship a no- brainer.78
Woman hanging laundry in the Kickapoos’ makeshift village near Ea gle  
Pass, Texas. Photo graph by John P. Filo. © 1980 The Associated Press.
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Federal recognition, from the tribe’s perspective, was just one more con-
firmation of its right to nationhood. In legitimizing this right to  others, the 
Kickapoos have long cited the 1832 document discussed earlier, which the 
tribe used to cross the U.S.- Mexico border and which the tribe character-
izes as a government- to- government treaty. But the tribe also possesses what 
it feels is an even more power ful confirmation of their sovereignty: a coin- 
like medallion, dated 1789, that bears the profile of George Washington on 
one side and a pair of clasped hands and crossed pipes on the other side, 
along with the inscriptions “Friendship” and “The Pipe of Peace.” It was a 
gift, according to the tribe, from President Andrew Jackson. One Kickapoo 
explained its significance this way: “It is, in essence, the cornerstone of the 
tribe’s relationship with the Americans . . .  It’s a commitment, government 
to government.”79  Couple this conviction with the outcome of their recog-
nition bid, then, and it is no won der that one writer who interviewed Kick-
apoo tribal members in the 1990s observed, “[They] do not perceive the 
border to be nearly the impediment that other borderlands tribes do.” 80 
 After all, it had failed to contain their claims to sovereignty. Yet embracing 
recognition entailed compromise. Although the Kickapoos now had a pro-
tected homeland in their  adopted city of Ea gle Pass, reservation status has 
not always delivered on the promise of that sovereignty. The historian Jef-
frey Shepherd argues that while reservations are often viewed as safe ha-
vens in which indigenous groups can assert their autonomy and practice 
their cultures, they have historically been “targets of colonialism and racial 
transformation.” Venturing outside of reservation borders, meanwhile, has 
historically meant inhabiting “a liminal space where they  were racialized 
 others at the bottom of the sociocultural hierarchy of Amer i ca.” 81 Yet retain-
ing the right to migrate in a transnational fashion meant retaining a safe 
haven of a dif fer ent sort, one well beyond the reach of agents of the U.S. 
government.
The Tohono O’odham’s Status Woes
While the Yaquis and Kickapoos had more or less stabilized their commu-
nities on both sides of the border by the end of the twentieth  century, emerg-
ing from centuries of tumult with a secure land base and at least some 
degree of sovereignty, status woes still plagued the Tohono O’odham. Con-
sidering the degree of interaction between the Tohono O’odham tribe and 
the U.S. government over the course of the twentieth  century, the tribe re-
ceived federally recognized status surprisingly late in the game (though 
much earlier than the Yaquis and Kickapoos). As previously discussed, the 
United States had given reservation status to O’odham lands in southern 
Arizona early in the  century, and since then had charged an Indian agent 
in the area with hearing their grievances and implementing reservation- 
based economic, health, and educational programs. Still, the tribe had  little 
in the way of internal po liti cal organ ization, making the government- to- 
government relationship, which distinguished recognized from nonrecog-
nized tribes, essentially impossible. In the 1930s, then, the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, acting  under the auspices of John Collier’s Indian Reor ga ni za tion 
Act, encouraged the tribe to formulate and implement a tribal constitution 
and replace their council of elders with a majority elected tribal council.82 
The tribe cooperated. Forty- eight  percent of  those O’odham living on the res-
ervation voted on the  matter, with 88  percent voting in  favor. They submitted 
a tribal constitution to Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes in May 1936, and 
the department took only a few months to approve it. In 1937 the tribal council 
began to meet, though it would take some time for it to gain anything ap-
proaching reservation- wide ac cep tance as a central authority. Regardless, 
once the tribe was unified  under a single, federally sanctioned government, its 
sovereign status was effectively guaranteed. It was a significant development 
since, again, the Tohono O’odham had never  really had a central govern-
ment. As in the Yaqui case, authority tended to flow from the village level 
up. Individual villages tended to be po liti cally autonomous, with decisions 
related to agriculture, ceremonial obligations, and hunts made during nightly 
meetings. Po liti cal alliances across villages, meanwhile, tended to be tempo-
rary and typically  were formed only in the event of war.  Under the new ar-
rangement, vari ous district governments gradually emerged to provide 
repre sen ta tion for village- level governments, thereby mimicking the older, 
more familiar arrangement, while a tribal chairperson and legislative council 
assumed governing power over the reservation as a  whole.83
The absence of a formal governing structure prior to the New Deal is per-
haps understandable. The reservation, the anthropologist Ruth Underhill 
explained, “was on the very land where the Papagos had always lived and 
 there  were no treaties or payments connected with it. It was simply marked 
off so that Papago could continue to have their own country, without fear 
that White ranchers would fill it up.” Thus,  there was simply no need for any 
kind of central authority. The Spanish had earlier attempted to or ga nize the 
tribe into a coherent po liti cal  whole, with  little success. In fact, tribal 
members  were unable to even pronounce the word gobernador, since their 
own alphabet lacked an “r.” Instead, when necessary, they employed the 
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word gobenal, a practice that actually persisted well into the twentieth 
 century.84 Then, when the BIA conducted a census of the O’odham popula-
tion during the New Deal, it included tribal members on both sides of the 
U.S.- Mexico border, even though the reservation technically ended at the 
international boundary.  These individuals  were all included in the 1937 
“base roll,” which, as mentioned earlier, is submitted along with the consti-
tution as a condition for formal recognition. At least at some point, then, the 
U.S. government appeared poised to accept the real ity of the tribe’s trans-
national orientation. Other wise, why include “Mexican” O’odham in the 
base roll? Further, in the years following their recognition, the BIA contin-
ued to treat all O’odham the same, regardless of where they  were born or 
where they currently resided. The tribe explained, “Federal buses picked 
up our  children living south of the boundary and transported us to schools 
in the north. Some of us born south of the boundary served in the military. 
Some of us went to war. Still, we  were not guaranteed United States citizen-
ship.”  Those born north of the boundary, meanwhile,  were. The base roll 
then, would cause considerable confusion  later when  those members resid-
ing south of the border increasingly found their tribal and citizenship sta-
tus called into question.85
 Whether or not southern O’odham have any kind of  legal status north of 
the border remains unclear up to the pres ent day, and related challenges 
still abound. Even though BIA officials might have led them to believe other-
wise in an earlier era, the BIA had made clear by the end of the  century 
that the O’odham’s status as a federally recognized tribe stopped at the bor-
der. “Tohono O’odham Seek Sovereignty” read a 1989 newspaper headline, 
illustrating the fact that federal recognition in the United States had 
not solved the po liti cal, economic, and, perhaps most importantly,  legal 
issues still confronting the tribe. It was yet another case of federally recog-
nized status failing to deliver on the promise of sovereignty. That same year 
the tribe made the audacious move of taking its grievances to the World 
Court, claiming that it was on the verge of extinction due to repeated  human 
rights violations at the hands of both the U.S. and Mexican governments as 
well as the steady erosion of tribal autonomy. In their request for uncondi-
tional sovereignty, including total exclusion from the laws of both na-
tions, the tribe first challenged the legitimacy of the Gadsden Purchase, 
which initially divided the tribe in 1853. The O’odham went on to argue 
that “illegal” immigration restrictions curtailed a slew of basic rights and 
freedoms covered by the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, the 1948 
document that created the World Court, including, especially, Article 15, 
which maintains that all  human beings are entitled to an inalienable na-
tionality. Further, U.S. and Mexican laws, they claimed,  were hastening 
the loss of O’odham lands on both sides of the border.  These lands  were 
often being taken “fraudulently and violently,” according to the tribe, by 
developers and ranchers. The losses amounted to roughly 93  percent of the 
60,000 square miles occupied by the tribe at the time of the Gadsden Pur-
chase, leaving them with 4,450 square miles in the United States and a 
mere 12 in Mexico.86
They had a point. Though, as detailed earlier, O’odham land losses in 
Mexico accelerated around midcentury, they actually began early in the 
twentieth  century, when the Mexican government began encouraging the 
settlement of “vacant” lands in northern Sonora. Suddenly, significant num-
bers of newly landless O’odham  were  either relocating to Mexican cities or 
being conscripted into the Mexican military. In fact, evidently at least some 
enlisted in campaigns against the Yaquis. The tribe’s attorney explained: 
“They would wait for the O’odham, traditionally nomadic in their ways, to 
head north to Arizona for religious ceremonies or for the yucca harvest. 
Then the ranchers would bring government inspectors out to the lands and 
say, ‘See, this land is abandoned.’ Then they would file a land claim, tear 
down the O’odham  houses, incorporate the O’odham  cattle into their own 
herds and put up fences.” 87
Involved in the 1989 claim to sovereignty was the noted Indian activist 
and scholar Vine Deloria Jr., who began characterizing it as “the prime test 
case” and argued that its outcome would have enormous implications for 
all tribes whose communities overlap North American borders. Further, 
the strategy of using the World Court, if successful, would place tribes making 
similar claims on equal footing with large nation- states such as the United 
States and Mexico. Southern Arizona, then, was starting to look like a po-
tential “proving ground” in a new direction in Indian policy, one that might 
ultimately be hemispheric in scope. Lest the World Court seem an unlikely 
ave nue for the pursuit of an Indian policy goal, the Tucson Citizen main-
tained, “it would not be unheard of for the World Court to establish a sepa-
rate nation for a group of  people. The court has broken off several parts of 
South Africa to establish new in de pen dent nations.” One Tucson attorney, 
however, was pessimistic. When the Nicaraguan government appealed to 
the World Court  after the United States began mining its harbor, the court 
ruled in the small nation’s  favor. The United States, however, refused to rec-
ognize the validity of the ruling or the jurisdiction of the court, claiming 
that the World Court cannot rule on cases involving sovereignty or national 
All the Doors Are Closing 195
196 Chapter Six
security. Thus, even if the O’odham  were successful, Mexico and the United 
States would likely contest the decision or simply refuse to recognize it.88 
Ultimately, all such speculation proved irrelevant. World Court officials in 
the end refused to hear the case.
This was not the first time a North American group had appealed to the 
international community when grievances went unaddressed at home. In 
the 1920s, the Mohawk Indians  were battling the Canadian Department of 
Indian Affairs over fishing and hunting rights.  After reaching an impasse, 
Mohawk chief Deskaheh left his home in Akwesasne, Mohawk Territory, 
to pres ent the  matter to the League of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. Simi-
lar to the O’odham’s attempt to appeal to the World Court, however, Des-
kaheh’s efforts did not get far. Although he managed to enlist the support 
of King George V of  Great Britain as well as the government of the Nether-
lands, in the end the league refused to hear Deskaheh out. Instead, the league 
insisted that any issues between the Mohawks and the Canadian government 
 were strictly domestic, not international, concerns. Although unsuccessful, 
Deskaheh’s strategy to enlist the international community in a dispute be-
tween a Native nation and a nation- state was a completely new one as of the 
1920s.89
The next ave nue the O’odham pursued was the United Nations Commis-
sion on the Rights of Indigenous  People. In 1989, with the assistance of Uni-
versity of Arizona law professor Robert A. Williams, the tribe submitted a 
list of alleged  human rights violations.  These violations, they maintained 
to the Geneva- based organ ization, arose directly out of their strug gles over 
land. This latest effort, again, evidently failed to significantly advance their 
cause.90 However, perhaps sensing the pressure being placed on them by 
ever more resourceful indigenous groups such as the O’odham, the Mexican 
government did respond. Late in 1989, government officials announced a 
proposal for a constitutional amendment that would act as a sort of Indian 
Bill of Rights. “If passed,” explained the head of the National Indian Institute, 
“the result would be that the indigenous communities in Mexico  will receive 
better attention to their demands and better protection of their land and 
rights.” The proposed amendment, however, did not address the most press-
ing concern of all, namely, the tribe’s right to cross the border without the 
interference of immigration authorities. And the biggest prob lem of all was 
that the bill as a  whole was subsequently left to languish.91
In It Is Not Our Fault, the 2001 publication discussed earlier, the O’odham 
urged Congress to amend the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act to in-
clude a subsection that granted U.S. citizenship to any enrolled tribal mem-
ber, regardless of  whether they resided north or south of the U.S.- Mexico 
border. The hope was that their tribal membership credentials could serve 
as “the  legal equivalent of the federally- issued Certificate of Citizenship 
and/or the state- issued birth certificate for all intents and purposes.” 92 The 
tribe distributed the publication to  every senator and representative in 
Washington, but to no avail.93 Again, it appeared that reforms in  either the 
United States or Mexico would inevitably stop at the border. While the Kick-
apoo case marked a rare moment when the United States and Mexico 
collaborated in securing rights for a transnational indigenous group, the 
O’odham’s difficulties remain unaddressed.
Still, the three groups discussed herein all exhibited a remarkable level 
of resourcefulness and tenacity as the po liti cal, economic,  legal, and cul-
tural implications of the U.S.- Mexico border became all the more apparent 
over the course of the twentieth  century. As the United States and Mexico 
became ever more rigorous in protecting their borders, so too did  these in-
digenous nations. And while the historians Andre Marak and Gary Van 
Valen argued in 2015 that the North American West “remained a place of 
shifting bound aries and allegiances” only up  until the early twentieth 
 century,  these case studies suggest that at least in the U.S.- Mexico border 
region this pro cess is actually ongoing.94 Violent clashes in the interest of 
protecting the integrity of borders may be a  thing of the past, but by the 
end of the twentieth  century the determination to protect tribal sovereignty 
that had so often strained Indian- white relations proved stronger than ever. 
The fact that the Indians’ definition of tribal sovereignty included the 
right to systematically sidestep or completely ignore immigration rules 
and regulations in not one but two power ful nation- states was bound to 
raise eyebrows. In the end, however, policy climates on both sides of the 
border at the time of their final push for status clarification often worked 
in their  favor, as did the sympathies of well- connected individuals and 
organ izations, at least as far as the Yaqui and Kickapoo cases are concerned. 
Thus, officials on both sides of the border ultimately had  little choice but to 
grudgingly accept the real ity of  these transborder indigenous nations, and, 
again at least in the Yaqui and Kickapoo cases, award them the requisite 
rights. That the Tohono O’odham still strug gle with their transnational ori-
entation attests to the fact that officials on both sides of the border still have 
a way to go in addressing the legacy of a formal boundary created without 
regard for  those they  were walling in or walling out.
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It is not impor tant that Eu ro pean languages and western civilization  
limit the natu ral expression of the Indian within us and have caused the 
disappearance of the Indian race in some countries; in the land itself, in the 
same physical environment, as in our history, art, and tradition, the voice of 
Native Amer i ca  will always speak.
— Inaugural issue of Boletín Indigenista, 1941
Kate nacion itom nokriamachi.
( There is no nation can defeat us)
— Yaqui rallying cry following their defeat  under Cajeme, 1879
In 2007, a journalist from the High Country News visited the lands of the 
Tohono O’odham to investigate reports of worsening conditions along the 
U.S.- Mexico border. He was evidently surprised by what he found, observ-
ing: “On a warm Sunday after noon in early January, no one from U.S. law 
enforcement is checking documents as  people move back and forth at a 
crossing— really, just a steel  cattle guard in a gap in the fence— known as 
the San Miguel Gate.  There are no signs of Mexican border officials keep-
ing tabs on the gate. Tohono O’odham tribal police are nowhere to be 
seen . . .  Officially, only members of the Tohono O’odham Nation are al-
lowed to pass through the San Miguel Gate. But no signs warn non- members 
against crossing. The biggest obstacles to traversing the border at the San 
Miguel Gate, it seems, are the six- inch gaps between the steel rails of the 
 cattle guard  there.”1
Although the San Miguel Gate appeared rather laxly guarded, which 
seemingly contradicts reports of O’odham oppression at the hands of im-
migration authorities, appearances rarely tell the  whole story. More recent 
trends along the border have impacted the Tohono O’odham in a variety of 
ways that are not always obvious. In 1996, for example, the U.S. govern-
ment undertook Operation Gatekeeper and passed the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act to more effectively regulate trans-
border traffic. However, both did  little more than foster anti- immigrant 
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attitudes while ultimately failing to curb illegal immigration. If anything, 
border crossing became far more dangerous as a consequence of  these 
efforts. Designed primarily to address the influx of immigrants across Cal-
ifornia’s borders, Operation Gatekeeper sent a flood of  human traffic into 
southern Arizona more generally and the isolated, sparsely populated 
O’odham reservation more specifically, thereby aggravating an already for-
midable prob lem facing the O’odham. The Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act not only increased the risk involved in cross-
ing; it also increased the economic cost of immigrating, both of which upped 
the odds of mi grants not surviving the journey and/or being eco nom ically 
exploited by  human smugglers. It also led to a decline in the standard of 
living among undocumented mi grants. And as the anthropologist Laura 
Velasco Ortiz observed, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, coupled with Mexico’s re-
fusal to support the U.S.- led war in Iraq, “chilled the incipient negotiations 
on a new migration treaty” between the two nations. Since then, any nego-
tiations over immigration reform have steadily degenerated into  little more 
than innocuous discussions of how best to deport illegal mi grants. As a con-
sequence, she continues, “border controls  under the new U.S. security and 
anti- terror policies forced many Mexican commuters who lacked  legal doc-
uments or whose families had mixed documentation to move to U.S. soil 
permanently,” and even  legal commuters found crossing points more con-
gested  because of increasingly thorough inspections of mi grants.2
The seventy- five- mile stretch of the O’odham reservation that abuts the 
U.S.- Mexico border has indeed become a hotbed of illicit activities in recent 
de cades, drug trafficking being the most serious. Even some tribal members 
have been unable to pass up to the opportunity to profit from the enterprise. 
 After all, the majority of tribal members remain impoverished, with a full 
40  percent living below the poverty line. In fact, the O’odham are poor even 
compared to other Indian tribes. Per capita income for the year 2000 stood 
at $8,000, far below the $13,000 average for American Indians. The res-
ervation’s biggest employers are the string of casinos that, between the 
three, employ about 1,400 workers, only half of whom are O’odham. Ca-
sino revenue, however, has been stretched thin in the tribe’s efforts to 
administer to the vast, isolated reservation. Complicating their financial 
situation is the fact that a sizable portion of the O’odham’s annual bud get 
goes  toward cleaning up the estimated six tons of trash left  behind by 
mi grants, which is just one of many border- related expenses. Still, the ca-
sino revenue has enabled the tribe to build a new hospital, a nursing home, 
a community college, a slew of recreation centers, and, fi nally, a museum 
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and cultural center. Recent beneficiaries of casino revenue include college- 
aged O’odham, whose education is incentivized by the tribe to help address 
the high dropout rate at the high school level, which currently stands at 
48  percent. Given  these challenges, then, it is hardly surprising that a mi-
nority has engaged in illegal activity. In 2003 and 2004, for example, law 
enforcement arrested more than one hundred O’odham, and even some 
tribal leaders have relatives in prison for drug- related convictions. The temp-
tation can be hard to resist. Smuggling drugs (or illegal mi grants for that 
 matter) just once can earn an O’odham a quick $3,000 to $5,000. The only 
way to counteract this disturbing trend, according to some tribal members, 
is to shore up the reservation economy by offering easier access to education 
and more employment opportunities. “If  these  things are not done,” one 
tribal member warned, “we  will be lost as a  people.”3
Although the O’odham government has been proactive in addressing 
prob lems posed by the influx of illegal mi grants and drug traffickers into 
tribal territory, results have been limited, and assistance from outside the na-
tion has not always been forthcoming. As tribal chairperson Vivian Juan 
Saunders recently asserted, “Anywhere  else this would be considered a crisis, 
but  there is a double standard  because we are Indians.” 4 Thus, O’odham often 
get caught up in broader efforts to police the U.S.- Mexico border. The result 
has been what another O’odham described as a “climate of oppression” on 
O’odham lands, one in which immigration officials force O’odham to carry 
documents and subject them to frequent stops, searches, and even threats of 
deportation, a scenario that does not seem likely to change in the near  future.5
As for the Yaquis, even at midcentury it was apparent that the border had 
come to represent not only a physical barrier but also a psychological one. 
While living among Sonoran Yaquis in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Ed-
ward Spicer observed that a good number of Yaquis along the river valley 
had at vari ous times lived in and moved between Yaqui settlements in Ari-
zona, with some even expressing, as mentioned earlier, “homesickness” for 
Tucson and Phoenix. However, they now found themselves cut off from their 
Arizona communities by an increasingly formidable boundary. Linkages be-
tween the two halves of the Yaqui  whole  were even then in the pro cess of 
devolving into  little more than the regular exchange of letters, while physical 
movement became, at most, “sporadic.” Spicer noted a surprising trend, 
though, namely that “a new kind of contact has developed as more pros-
perous Yaquis from the United States have come as tourists to attend and 
observe the impor tant ceremonies in Potam and the other villages.” 6 As of 
the mid- twentieth  century, Sonoran Yaquis seemed preoccupied primarily 
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with economic development, their villages having gradually emerged as, 
in one scholar’s words, “burgeoning outposts of commercial agriculture” 
boasting a “semiautonomous government” within the state. As they grew 
more confident eco nom ically and po liti cally, they also became more aggres-
sive in maintaining their cultural distinctiveness from the Mexican main-
stream. In other words, although they had become an integral part of the 
regional and even national economy, they had also effectively maintained, 
as always, a physical and emotional distance from greater Mexico.7
More recently, the 32,000 Yaquis living within the Yaqui Zona have con-
tended with NAFTA and the “opening” of the Mexican economy. Generally 
speaking, they have become more and more indebted and, as one scholar 
put it, “dependent on Mexican banks and beholden to the dictates of the 
market” as large corporate and privately owned farms have proliferated. Un-
employment and underemployment have become the norm, while travelers 
through the region often cannot help but note, as one put it, the “crum-
bling walls of wattle- and- daub  houses, their tarpaper roofs held down with 
rocks and  bottle and soil, the dirt roads that wind away from the main 
thoroughfare, the conglomeration of cramped, dusty stores, rusted bicycles, 
and limping cars.” 8
Arizona’s Yaquis, meanwhile, have had other concerns. They worked dil-
igently in the years following recognition to draft a tribal constitution and 
formalize a tribal roll. As the group stabilized following seemingly constant 
leadership changes, Yaquis at New Pascua began attracting other Arizona 
Yaquis, so that by 1980 more than 4,000 tribal members participated in 
federally funded health, education, and social programs. The Yaquis too 
turned to gambling, opening the Casino of the Sun in the early 1990s. Casino 
revenue has allowed the tribe to administer to an ever- growing population 
that, by the end of that de cade, hovered around 15,000. Fi nally, in 2001 the 
tribe honored the contributions of Anselmo Valencia, who some had likened 
to Moses, by attaching his name to a multimillion- dollar performing arts 
center.9 As for transborder movement among the Yaquis, one scholar ob-
served, “The right of Mexican Yaqui to cross the U.S.- Mexico border still 
depends on individual INS officials at the regional and border gate level, and, 
unfortunately, the mood that they are in on any par tic u lar day.” But then 
again, the Yaquis’ ability to cross the border even for ceremonial purposes 
has long depended on “ whether the individual INS officer, or the supervi-
sor on duty, was familiar with the Yaqui ceremonial occasion.” In other 
words,  whether or not a Yaqui  will be granted transborder passage was, 
and remains, a bit of a crapshoot.10
202 Epilogue
In short, both the Yaquis and the Tohono O’odham face con temporary 
challenges that are rooted in both broader Arizona politics and, especially, 
national debates about immigration and the border.  These debates began 
assuming a harsher tone in the 1970s; then, in the 1990s, as the historian 
Geraldo Cadava put it, the state began “peddl[ing] laws that sought to limit 
access by undocumented immigrants to government benefits, forbid citizens 
from offering them assistance, and make En glish the official language.” 
Anti- immigrant “vigilante” groups became more vocal, vis i ble, and influ-
ential. Then along came Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070, which Cadava calls “the 
pinnacle of state- sponsored discrimination” and which was nicknamed the 
“show me your papers” law. Among other  things, it empowered law enforce-
ment to make arrests, without a warrant, in cases where suspected “illegal 
aliens” could not verify their immigration or citizenship status. Not all 
Arizonans  were on board with the new trend. One law enforcement official 
referred to the law as “stupid,” “racist,” and “an embarrassment.” Mexican 
officials, meanwhile, characterized it as a “violation of civil rights” and a 
“kind of apartheid.” From the perspective of many, the intent of the law 
was to legalize racial profiling. And in the end, while the Supreme Court 
struck down most of the law, it upheld the provision empowering law en-
forcement to demand papers from  those they suspect might be in the coun-
try illegally.11
While the O’odham’s woes continue to mount and the Yaqui presence in 
both Sonora and Arizona continues to stabilize, much has changed in re-
cent de cades among the Kickapoos. Although Ea gle Pass is now the center 
of Kickapoo tribal life, Nacimiento remains a seasonal hub, as well as their 
primary ceremonial center, to this day. Perhaps the most notable recent 
development was their controversial decision to engage in casino gambling. 
In fact, as the Dallas Morning News reported in 2002, “A once destitute, 
850- member tribe that two de cades ago lived  under a bridge and shared 
 water from a single spigot are forging ahead with a $47 million expansion 
of their 5- year- old Lucky Ea gle Casino.” The development plan included two 
 hotels, an eighteen- hole golf course right alongside the Rio Grande, and new 
roads, so that  future visitors would not have to endure the “bone- rattling 
three- mile drive over a rut- filled road off the main highway.” “It  will be an 
oasis in the desert,” claimed tribal representative Isidro Garza.12
All did not go as planned, however. In 2006, federal prosecutors approved 
a plea bargain with Kickapoo casino man ag ers following charges of corrup-
tion and tax evasion. For years, allegations of mismanagement of casino 
funds had swirled around the 125- acre reservation. The tumult appears to 
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have begun in 2002, when Kickapoo Melina Anico began a letter- writing 
campaign to tribal leaders demanding an explanation as to why, given the 
availability of millions of dollars of casino revenue, elders residing in 
Nacimiento lacked even blankets and indoor plumbing. In October of that 
year, an overwhelming majority voted for a dramatic change in tribal lead-
ership, ousting several members of the tribal council. Federal indictments 
soon followed, and seven former tribal leaders stood accused of stealing 
more than $900,000 in casino revenue. The tribe also soon realized it was 
$20 million in debt  because of fraud and mismanagement. The new casino 
fi nally opened in 2004, accompanied by a massive surge in profits. The tribe 
is now using  these profits to shore up other on- reservation economic endeav-
ors, including their pecan orchards, to lessen their dependence on the ca-
sino. Still, their economic situation remains precarious. When asked what 
would become of the tribe if the casino  were to close, one Kickapoo re-
sponded that many would “prob ably have to go back to mi grant work to 
survive.”13
The Kickapoos have also more recently strug gled with substance abuse. 
They can appear, according to the journalist Jan Reid, “incapable of mod-
erate social drinking.” While alcohol consumption is forbidden on both 
 Kickapoo reserves, alcohol- related prob lems still abound. However, the in-
toxicant that tribal elders find especially worrisome is commercially available 
spray paint. Reid wrote in the 1990s, “About 450  people are enrolled as  legal 
members of the Texas Kickapoo tribe. At least eighty, most of them adults, 
are addicted to paint fumes.” Tribal member Joe Hernandez strug gled 
with spray paint addiction between the ages of twelve and thirteen, and 
described his hallucinations as being similar to “the flickering, jerky effect 
of dancers  under a strobe light.” When high, he could feel his blood pulsing 
through his veins and his heart nearly beating out of his chest. “You  don’t 
want to do nothing  else,” he said, continuing, “I  wouldn’t eat, and I kept 
getting caught by my parents. Even now when I smell paint, I still want to 
do it.” One especially lurid story involving paint sniffing concerned a twenty- 
six- year- old Kickapoo  woman who, in 1992, passed out on railroad tracks, 
only to be cut in half when a train came roaring through Ea gle Pass.14
As  these cases all demonstrate, then, the pro cess of reconciling formal 
borders with a transnational orientation can be complicated, painful, and, 
above all, interminable. Reservation status has not always translated into 
tribal stability, federal recognition has not always delivered on the promise 
of tribal sovereignty, and the U.S.- Mexico border looms larger than ever in 
the collective imaginations of  theses indigenous nations. In recent de-
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cades, indigenous  peoples and pro- Indian politicians and intellectuals all 
over the globe have begun questioning the legitimacy of borders that  were 
drawn without considering preexisting ethnic and spatial structures. The 
historians Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel argue that the inspira-
tion for  these attitudes can be found along the U.S.- Canada border, where 
via the aforementioned Jay Treaty both governments have long recognized 
the right of indigenous groups to cross the boundary without state interfer-
ence. They point to Latin Amer i ca as a region where we are likely to see 
mounting challenges to the legitimacy of existing borders, as well as Africa, 
a place with famously permeable state borders where one can most clearly 
see the survival of “ancient networks of regional trade.”  Whether  these net-
works have been maintained  because of sheer practicality or as a form of 
protest against “a predatory postcolonial state,” they  will no doubt continue 
to problematize  those borders that locals view as having been arbitrarily 
imposed on the landscape.15
Transnational indigenous groups have also begun grabbing headlines 
with increasing frequency of late, stirring up international controversies 
that have in some cases escalated to near- crisis proportions. For example, 
in 2009 Indian Country  Today reported on the Kumeyaay Indians, many of 
whom had for de cades moved on a regular basis between twelve reserva-
tions in southern California and four communities in northern Mexico. Like 
the O’odham, the Kumeyaays found themselves divided by the border drawn 
in the wake of the U.S.- Mexican War, and by the 1960s security along that 
boundary had become tighter than ever. Suddenly Kumeyaays wishing to 
enter the United States found that right more frequently denied. Keeping 
transborder channels open, then, has become, in the words of Viejas Band 
of Kumeyaay chairman Bobby L. Barrett, “a constant strug gle.” It has also 
become common for the Indians, according to Ron Christman, a Kumeyaay 
from the Santa Ysabel Reservation in San Diego County, to “sing Indian 
songs right  there on the border” as a form of protest. The U.S. government 
responded to this crisis in the late 1990s by issuing what  were called “ laser 
visas” to the southern Kumeyaays, which the Indian Country  Today article 
describes as a “multi- use travel credential.” The article goes on to explain, 
“While the document  doesn’t give them dual citizenship or recognize them 
as part of a sovereign nation, it gets them across the border.” Getting au-
thorization for the visas, however, was not a  simple affair. Northern Kumey-
aays had to travel to Mexico, conduct a census, and help acquire passports 
for  those tribal members who resided south of the boundary (documents 
that the  laser visas require) before the U.S. government would agree to is-
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sue the roughly 1,900 visas requested by the tribe.16 U.S. officials  were also 
actively working with the Seneca Nation of New York and Southern Ontario, 
the Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, the Pascua Yaquis of Arizona, and twenty- five 
other Indian groups to develop and distribute border- crossing identification 
cards. One source estimated that North Amer i ca’s international borders af-
fect about forty tribes, so the pro cess of addressing their needs  will likely 
require time, effort, and increasingly precious financial resources. But for 
the Seneca Nation, this move on the part of the U.S. government meant not 
only that the tribe’s right to pass and repass the border would no longer be 
hindered; it also amounted to a long- overdue recognition of their sover-
eignty.17
Scholars are also increasingly realizing that formal borders have the 
tendency to encourage the formation of entirely new identities and organ-
izations. One scholar, for example, characterized the Yaquis’ transnational 
orientation as “a fundamental aspect of their identity.”18 Another agreed, 
observing that “narratives of movement” have helped define them in a 
 con temporary sense, shaping “who they are  today and how they envision 
their connection to [the Yaqui homeland].”19 More recently, increasing glo-
balization has been blamed for encouraging the creation of subnational 
identities that have even further undermined the nation- state. It has en-
ergized and emboldened  those groups with long- standing claims to some 
form of autonomy, ultimately leading to the emergence of wholly new groups 
that are intent on capitalizing on the existence of formal borders. Their 
presence has been as predictable as it has been consequential. They have 
tended to, in a very real way, “unmake”  these formal borders by exposing the 
limits of state power in border regions, revealing again and again, in the 
historian Rachel St. John’s words, “the divide between the states’ aspirations 
and their  actual power.” But questions remain. Have  these  subnational 
identities actually succeeded in weakening the states? Or have they done 
the opposite and heightened the repressive capabilities of the states? Fo-
cusing on dynamics in far northern Mexico, the anthropologist Carmen 
Martínez Novo argues that although national governments have not entirely 
succeeded in controlling the “production of identities” along their borders, 
they have “retained the ability to shape subjects to adapt to novel global 
situations.” Thus, in the face of competing identities and claims to na-
tionalism, larger, more power ful, and more omnipresent nation- states have 
very often put into place the means of keeping  these in check,  whether it be 
through surveillance, stepped-up policing, stricter immigration policies, 
the erection of physical barriers, or even vio lence. They have not, however, 
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managed to reconcile  these efforts with the fact that borders have histori-
cally been sites where, again in St. John’s words, “categories blurred and 
power was compromised,” which is a real ity of border life that is not likely 
to change.20
Yet the case studies examined herein suggest that if borderlanders have 
been forced to “adapt to novel global situations,” so too have the United 
States and Mexico. In the face of competing claims to nationhood from in-
digenous sectors, claims that clearly  were not  going away, both nation- states 
hammered out compromises that would acknowledge  these claims while 
also blunting their  legal, po liti cal, and cultural force. In the end, each of 
 these abutting and even overlapping variables within the broader U.S.- 
Mexico border region realized that stubborn recalcitrance would get one 
only so far, and that in an increasingly interconnected world one must share 
power in order to maintain power. In other words, the United States and 
Mexico came to realize, however belatedly, what indigenous  peoples had 
long known: that re sis tance to transnationalism is futile.  After all, the in-
digenous  peoples in this story literally could not take a step without “ going 
transnational” in some form or fashion. As the historians Andrae Marak and 
Gary Van Valen argue, the very fact that indigenous  peoples gradually 
forged nations within nations “automatically makes their lived experience 
transnational.” Simply leaving their reserves to work, hunt or gather, attend 
religious ceremonies, or attend school, for example, meant crossing into a 
dif fer ent category of nationhood. Leaving their reserves meant being 
subjected to dif fer ent laws and assuming a dif fer ent (or at least dual) citi-
zenship status. It meant immersing oneself in a potentially disorienting 
environment where conceptions of national belonging and symbols of na-
tional culture  were rooted in a set of historical experiences that often felt 
unfamiliar at best and oppositional at worst. And since  these reserves  were 
owned and controlled by the nation- state, one could “go transnational” 
without so much as leaving the reserve.21
As for the characterization of transnational players as “subnational,” as 
has been shown, North Amer i ca’s indigenous  peoples have long employed 
the rhe toric of nationhood even without official Mexican or U.S. government 
sanction, and have often bristled at being reduced to a subset of some larger 
national identity that is not their own. The assertion of  these groups’ nation-
hood, however, obviously stems from some deeper impulse, one that tran-
scends this relatively narrow construct. The fact that nations encompass a 
number of dif fer ent communities does not automatically unite  those com-
munities as a “ people,” at least not in a permanent sense. At the end of the 
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day, inherent sovereignty, at least among the groups discussed herein, 
has tended to be an outgrowth of a shared language and ceremonial cycle, 
a shared connection with a specific territory ( whether  adopted or “tra-
ditional”), and a common sacred history. And one could argue that it was 
this all- consuming and almost innate sense of peoplehood that gave rise to 
modern nationalism, indigenous or other wise.22 As O’odham Joe Velasco 
put it, “Down to my roots, down to my boots, I am Tohono O’odham.” Some 
identities, it turns out, are nonnegotiable.23
However, while it is comforting to know that some  things never change, 
it is also nice to see how dramatically  things can change. A 2005 Arizona 
Republic article, for example, reported on a “lost” band of Kickapoo Indians 
living in, of all places, southern Arizona. The article stated: “ Until recently, 
the group had almost no contact with its parent tribe in Oklahoma, and its 
presence has gone largely unnoticed by other tribal leaders in Arizona. But 
last year, with help from the Oklahoma tribe, the Arizona group purchased 
a building in Douglas, just north of the border, to serve as a tribal field of-
fice. The tribe plans to seek trust status for the building, a pro cess that can 
take several years. If successful, the tribal land holding would make the 
Kickapoos . . .  eligible to participate in state gambling compacts.” The ar-
ticle concludes with a passing mention of a “splinter group” that “settled in 
lands in Texas and Mexico,” and claims that at least a portion of  those 
Kickapoos seeking some kind of “status” in Arizona “live in a tiny Mexican 
village called Tamichopa.”24 As formidable as the border has become, such 
transnational networks are not yet a  thing of the past, suggesting that not 
only do other hidden histories likely await discovery, but that other indig-
enous nations likely await their due recognition.
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